主题：【原创】 许世友在1979 -- 南云北望

The rst focused on a traditional PLA maxim that any correct military decision and strategy must draw on a good grasp of the situation in all its aspects. The 1979 war showed that the PLA paid scant attention to the combat doctrine and tactics of the PAVN before the war. As a result,

the Chinese military underestimated the ghting ability of its opponents. Possible from fear of giving too much credit to the Vietnamese military, the PLA literature concludes that the enemy’s regular forces lacked persistency in offence and defence and had few co-ordinated operations,

but did concede that the Vietnamese guerrilla-type tactics, sappers and 87. Luo Yuansheng, Wang Shangrong, p. 382. 870 The China Quarterly militias were surprisingly successful in keeping the Chinese forces off balance as they were anxiously seeking decisive battles with the main forces of the PAVN in a lighting war.88 A US ofcer once summarized the American experience in the Vietnam War, noting that it was impossible “to penetrate, ank, or envelop” the Vietnamese fortied positions “without taking extremely heavy casualties.”89 The PLA’s tactics of pushing its infantrymen into close massed combat with their opponents and its acceptance of high human losses may help explain why the Chinese made these assertions about the Vietnamese army’s incom-petence at defending its positions.90 Unexpected difculties in the operation led the Chinese to draw a second lesson from the conict involving intelligence and planning.

Long-standing lack of information about a traditional ally presented a

major challenge to Chinese war planning and operations. The PLA’s

assessment of the geography and terrain of northern Vietnam often relied

on outdated maps and geographic information, while its reconnaissance

capability was limited in the battleeld.91 One major failure of the

Chinese military was failing to consider the huge quantity of the militia

forces in its calculation of Vietnamese military strength. The PLA

experience showed that the Vietnamese militia put up more relentless

resistance and made more surprise raids on the invading forces than the

PAVN regulars. The PLA planners initially thought they had assembled

an overwhelming force of 8 1 against the Vietnamese forces. There were

40,000 to 50,000 militias in the Cao Bang area alone, which signicantly

altered the force ratio to 2 1. During the campaign, the PLA never

appeared able to maintain the force superiority to deliver a knock-out

strike. The operation also demonstrates how difcult it is to carry out

military operations in a foreign country if the local populace is mobilized

to resist.92

The conict with Vietnam enabled the PLA to draw a third lesson

about its warghting capabilities. It was the rst time that the PLA

leadership conducted combined arms operations with tanks and artillery

in support of infantry attacks, while assembling a air and naval forces to

provide cover. Backwardness in doctrine and tactics prevented the Chi-

nese forces from carrying out a real co-ordinated operation. While

Beijing’s political constraints and outdated military thinking proscribed

the commitment of air forces to support operations, ground forces also

demonstrated poor performance between infantry, tank and artillery units

to carry out full combined arms tactics. A clear example was that the

88. Zhou Deli, Personal Recollections, pp. 287–290.

89. Michael Lee Lanning and Dan Cragg, Inside the VC and the NVA: The Real Story

of North Vietnam’s Armed Forces (New York: Ivy Books, 1992), p. 208.

90. Western analysts generally believe that these units of the PAVN, lled up with

veterans of the long war in the south, proved to be battlewise and highly skilled in guerrilla-war

tactics. Recent Vietnamese sources indicate that they were recruits, and only joined the army

in June 1978. See n. 71. 91. The maps the PLA used were 1 100,000 scale, printed in 1965 based on the 1938 French edition, giving little detailed information. As a result, PLA forces often got lost during their march in North Vietnamese hill country.

92. Zhou Deli, Personal Recollections, pp. 294–95.

China’s 1979 War with Vietnam infantry had never trained with adequate knowledge of how to manoeuvre with tank units. Infantry soldiers, who fastened themselves to the top of tanks with ropes to prevent themselves from falling off on the march, were stuck when red upon by the enemy. On the other hand, tank units, which often operated without infantry support and direct communication between the two parties, suffered many unexpected damages and losses.93

The 1979 war experience taught the PLA valuable lessons in combined

arms skills.

The fourth lesson was the issue of command and control that derived

largely from the PLA’s traditions and culture. Personal relationships

between commanding ofcers and troops, which had been cultivated in

the past, still mattered to the PLA. As interpersonal relationships were

more important than institutional ones, it is not surprising that the leaders

of the Guangzhou Military Region later acknowledged that they felt

uncomfortable commanding the troops transferred from the Wuhan and

Chengdu Military Regions during the campaign.94 These leaders also

received many complaints from rank-and-lers about Xu’s leadership

style because he had not previously commanded them. The PLA’s

problems of command were compounded by lack of combat-experienced

ofcers. Despite sending higher-ranking ofcers, who were war veterans,

to lower-level troop units to help with command, PLA operations re-

mained frustrated by the inability of lower-ranking ofcers to make

independent judgements and co-ordinate operations at critical moments.

Nevertheless, the 1979 war with Vietnam baptized a young generation of

army cadres on the battleeld, and today many of them are serving in

high PLA positions.95

The PLA lacked enough of a modern logistic supply system and

structure to support a fast-moving, distant, offensive action. The oper-

ational statistics suggest that the average daily consumption of ammu-

nition and fuel was 700 tons in each category.96 Logistic operations were

a major area for the PLA to draw lessons. Without adequate storage and

transportation facilities, both the Guangzhou and Kunming Military

Regions had to put together a supply system, which never functioned

smoothly and efciently. Considerable quantities of supplies were lost

due either to poor management or to Vietnamese sabotage. As their forces

advanced deeper into Vietnamese territory, logistic ofcers also found it

hard to keep the communication lines open without diverting a large

number of forces to protect them. The PLA concluded that it is essential

to create a transportation command to deal with the problems its troops