主题：关于毛的一本新书：《毛真的是恶魔吗？》 -- 细脖大头鬼

3. Chiang Let the Reds Go (II)

To deny Mao’s contribution in the Long March, JC offers another theory to explain why Chiang let the Red Army go: he did it to get his son back from Russia. JC’s evidence only shows that Chiang wanted his son back, but does not show he let the Reds go. On the contrary, she shows that for his same beloved son, Chiang was not even willing to release two unknown spies.

According to JC, for Chiang Kai-shek’s decision of “letting the Reds go, . . . there was another, more secret and totally private reason. Chiang’s son Ching-kuo had been a hostage in Russia” (p. 138). “Chiang had devised a carefully crafted swap: the survival of the CCP for Ching-Kuo. It was not an offer that could be spelt out. He executed his plan in subtle ways” (p. 140).

It was so subtle that no record was left for JC to prove that Chiang did it, or even intended to do so. The only evidence is that Chiang worried about his son and asked Moscow to let him back. No swap was mentioned anywhere, not even in Chiang’s diary. But there was another swap which was spelt out. According to JC, Chiang’s “sister-in-law, Mme Sun Yat-sen (nee Soong Ching-ling), who was another Soviet agent”, “speaking for Moscow”, spelt out a proposal of “swapping Ching-kuo for two top Russian agents who had recently been arrested in Shanghai. Chiang turned the swap down” (pp. 139-140).

Since Chiang was unwilling to let two Russian agents go in exchange for his son’s release, it is unlikely that he let the Red Army of tens of thousands armed men escape. If he did, one would wonder what kind of agents could be so important. Actually, the “two top Russian agents” are the Chinese couple Niu Lan and his wife. JC does not even tell their names, though a dozen other Russian agents are named in her book. Why? Maybe JC has some “more secret and totally private reason”.

* During her interview with Duowei, Jung Chang said: Chiang Kai-shek “wanted to trade the Reds’ survival for his son’s return. How did we get the references? There are many, many references. The first comes from the Russian Archive, how Chiang Kai-shek negotiated with the Russians. There are also many records in Chiang Kai-shek’s diary. Chiang Ching-kuo had an own account of the event, it contains such information as well. Moreover, as how Chiang Kai-shek let the Red Army go, there are many historical materials regarding the Long March, the telegraphs between the Kuomintang armies. We have given detailed explanations for all of them in the book.”

Of course I have read all of these detailed explanations. Precisely because of this, I wrote: “JC’s evidence only shows that Chiang wanted his son back, but does not show he let the Reds go”. JC just repeats what she wrote in the book, but still fails to show any evidence of how Chiang let the Reds go. Why didn’t she simply quote one sentence from her “many, many references”, which indicates that Chiang let or wanted to let the Reds go? Isn’t this an easier answer than to list many, many circumstantial references?

4. The Fake Battle at the Luding Bridge

JC’s claim of the nonexistence of the battle at the Luding Bridge has been widely publicized in the west as a fatal blow to the Red Army legend. In the official account, the CCP and Red Army were close to destruction near the Dadu River. If they had failed to secure the Luding Bridge, they would have been eliminated. The Luding Bridge battle is famous for its historic significance, not the scale.

Instead of disproving existing accounts, JC makes her claim mainly based on her interview with a 93-year-old woman. But, even according to that account, the Red Army did fire heavy weapons at the Bridge. JC does not explain why. Given the Reds’ limited ammunitions, it was unlikely they would have wasted them with no enemy in sight.

According to JC, the battle at the Luding Bridge “is complete invention. There was no battle at the Dadu Bridge”. “There were no Nationalist troops at the bridge when the Reds arrived” (p. 159). A 93-year-old woman lived there at the time. “She remembered the Communists firing as ‘only Yin a shell, and Yang a shot’ --- a Chinese expression for sporadic. She did not remember her side of the river being fired on at all” (p. 159).

JC does not clarify whether her definition of “Nationalist troops” includes the troops of Sichuan warlords which did not belong to the Nationalist regular army. Her source of reference suggests it does not. If so, her proof is flawed, because according to the official story, it was exactly the warlord’s army which defended the bridge.

On the other hand, JC acknowledges that the Red Army “shelled and fired across the river at Luding on the opposite side” (p.159), and “there was a fire in the town itself, caused, most likely, by Red Army shelling” (p. 160). The Red Army could not have used their gunfire as fireworks because their ammunition was very scarce. Just a month later, without any serious battle, it had “lost all its heavy weapons, leaving it only with rifles, with an average of five bullets each” (p.163). Its heavy weapons would have been used only if absolutely necessary. JC does not explain why the Reds shelled at all.

The shelling was unlikely due to a reconnaissance failure either. As “the bridge was not reduced to bare chains” (p. 160), sending a man over could have been done in a few minutes, probably more quickly than setting up the firing position. If it were a reconnaissance failure, the invention of the battle must have been used to cover it up. In that case, Mao, as one of the top commanders, was the cheated, not the cheater.

The only possible explanation left for the shelling is that it was to fake a battle for propaganda purposes, as seemingly suggested by JC. In this case, the Reds did not need to fire at all, unless they had a video camera then. Moreover, they would not have undertaken extra efforts which make it more likely that the sham would be exposed. But they held “a celebration immediately afterwards”, presenting each of 22 fake heroes with “a Lenin suit, a fountain pen, a bowl and a pair of chopsticks” (p. 160). Then the myth could have been exposed easily by any of these specifically identified fake heroes.

Furthermore, JC does not explain why the Nationalists did not expose this lie for 70 years. Their propagandists, not knowing Chiang’s plan to set the Reds free, should have no reason to keep the sham as an “unknown story”.

Finally, who could benefit from this lie? According to JC, as Mao had just led the Red Army through a disastrous “2,000-kilometre detour” (p. 162), “a deep resentment grew towards Mao. . . . Everyone was furious with Mao” (p. 155). If Mao could have let the Red Army cross the Dadu River without firing a bullet, his image as a military genius and his popularity would have shot up the most. A fabricated battle could only have reduced his reputation, not enhanced it. Whoever made up the battle story was more likely Mao’s enemy, not his friends or himself.

* In her interview with Duowei, she answered my question this way: “Many of his arguments are because he did not read our references, even not our texts”. She said that her main evidence is not from the 93 years-old lady, “the main references are written documents, one of them shows that the 22 Red Army soldiers crossed the bridge first, these 22 men did not suffer any injury, and held a ceremony after crossing. Each of them got a bowl and a pair of chopsticks, and a pen. . . . He did not read our references, not even the text, but made comments, I do not know why. We also conducted a lot of research on which Kuomintang army defended the bridge, and explain in details in the book. We find that this army was moved away from here before the Red Army arrived. There was a telegraph from that time. Our references contain the origin of the telegraph. He does not mention this at all, it is not reasonable. Answering such questions would waste too much time”.

Sorry, it is exactly having read her text and reference sources, I could possibly write: “JC does not clarify whether her definition of ‘Nationalist troops’ includes the troops of Sichuan warlords which did not belong to the Nationalist regular army. Her source of reference suggests it does not. If so, her proof is flawed, because according to the official story, it was exactly the warlord’s army which defended the bridge”. From JC’s reply, we still cannot see “whether her definition of “Nationalist troops” includes the troops of Sichuan warlords”. Apparently, she does not want to waste her time to read a few words of my question, just “give easy answers”. But she said not only she had read my review, but also “read carefully”. “I do not know why”.

JC emphasizes that her major evidence that no battle existed is no death. I indeed did “not mention this at all”, because it is simply not an evidence. Even if “these 22 men did not suffer any injury”, we can only doubt the intensity of the battle, but cannot rule out the possibility of its occurrence. The warlord army which defended the bridge was called “double gunners”, one rifle and one opium gun, lack of basic training and experience. The mere fact of no Red Army death cannot prove that the battle “is complete invention”.

5. Mao Carried through the Long March

JC’s other sensational allegation is that Mao was carried by a litter throughout the Long March. But none of her references suggests that Mao was carried regularly. The closest “evidence” is a statement by Mao himself which was published in one of the most authoritative and tightly controlled Chinese official presses.

According to JC, from the start of the Long March, Mao, Lo Fu and Wang Jia-xiang formed a trio. “The trio traveled together, usually reclining on litters. . . For much of the Long March, including the most grueling part of the trek, most of them were carried.” (p. 144)

Very oddly, for such a sensational accusation, JC does not provide any reference to support this particular sentence. Several questions arise. The first question is whether the trio of Mao had the power to obtain such a privilege. “Lo Fu, the only member of the trio who was in the Secretariat” (p. 145), said “I felt I was put in a position completely without power” (p. 144). It was even worse for Mao, who “was isolated and miserable” (p. 132). Before the Long March he was worried that he might be abandoned, and went everywhere he thought the Red Army might go, hoping to be picked up mercifully as he stood on the side of the road (p. 128). With such a position, Mao’s litter was less likely for his comfort, but due to the fact that “days before the planned departure, his temperature shot up to 41°C and he grew delirious with malaria” (p. 132).

Another question is Mao’s desire to be carried. As the trio of Mao was plotting a coup in the Red Army (pp. 144–6), they should have been keen to boost their popularity. “Aversion to privilege was particularly strong in the army because many had originally been attracted to join by the lure of equality, which was the Party’s main appeal” (p. 77). It is unlikely that the trio of Mao could grab the leadership while lying in litters. Why didn’t the opponents complain about this? This would be possible only if they were also carried. But then it would be unthinkable that the Red Army could stick together and endure the hardship, e.g. in the swampland as JC describes (pp. 167 - 169).

JC’s other evidence is the existence of a “charge --- Mao and the other leaders had ‘sat in sedan chairs’ all through the March” (p. 165). The only quoted part of this charge is ‘sat in sedan chairs’, without a subject. This reference comes from Mao’s arch rival Chang Kuo-tao, writing long after he defected from the Red Army to the Nationalists. Chang and Mao met in late June 1935 and departed in early August (p. 166). As indicated on the map of the book, they shared a common path only from Fubian to Maoergai, a minor fraction of the March. Chang’s charge of Mao sitting “‘in sedan chairs’ all through the March”, even if true, had to come from others’ testimony. Whose testimony? Neither Chang Kuo-tao nor JC gives any clue.

The closest “evidence” of Mao being carried regularly is: “Mao himself told his staff decades later: ‘On the March, I was lying in a litter. So what did I do? I read. I read a lot.’” (p. 144). Mao’s words do not necessarily imply he was carried regularly. Let’s see how reasonable JC’s interpretation is. Mao’s words appear in his personal secretary Ye Zilong’s memoirs, published by The Press of the Central Archive (2000). It is one of the most authoritative and tightly controlled government presses. JC accuses the Chinese government of covering Mao’s secrets. But a crucial part of her story comes from an official press. Even if Mao’s loyalist Ye betrayed him, and the government was ahead of JC in denouncing Mao, it is hard to believe that such an accusation, according to JC’s interpretation, generates no awareness in China and remains an “unknown story”.