主题：【整理原创】朝鲜战争中的细菌战（三） -- 思炎

FIRST MAW'S OPERATIONS

Marine Night Fighter Squadron 513

Next day then, May 26, Colonel Wendt held a conference with the Commanding Officer of Squadron 513 and, I believe, the K8 Air Base Commander and the Commanding Officer of the Third Bomb Wing, and

discussed the various details.

The personnel of the Fifth Air Force were already

cognizant of the plan, having been directly informed

by Fifth, Air Force Headquarters.

Since the plan constituted for Squadron 513 merely

a change of target and additional responsibility to

maintain their own schedule of contamination of their area, there were no real problems to be solved.

During the first week of June, Squadron 513 started operations on the concentrated contamination belt,using cholera bombs. (The plan given to General Jerom indicated that at a later, unspecified date-depending on the results obtained, or lack of results-yellow fever and then typhus in that order would probably he tried out in the contamination belt.)

Squadron 513 operated in this manner throughout

June and during the first week in July that I was with the Wing, without any incidents of an unusual nature. An average of five aircraft a night normally covered the main supply routes along the western coast of Korea up to the Chong Chon River but with emphasis on the area from Phy6ngyang southward. They diverted as necessary to Sinanju or Kunuri and the area between in order to maintain the ten-day bacteriological replenishment cycle.

We estimated that if each airplane carried two bac-

teriological bombs, two good nights were ample to

cover both Sinanju and Kunuri and a third night would cover the area around and between these cities.

About the middle of June, as best I remember, the Squadron received a modification to the plan

from the U.S. Fifth Air Force via the Third Bomb Wing. This new directive included an area of about ten miles surrounding the two principal cities in the Squadron's schedule, with particular emphasis on towns or hamlets on the lines of supply and any by-pass roads.

Marine Aircraft Group 12

Colonel Wendt later held a conference at K6

(Pyongtaek) at which were present the Commanding

Officer, Colonel Gaylor, the Executive Officer and the Operations Officer of Marine Aircraft Group 12.

Colonel Wendt informed them that they were to make

preparations to take part in the bacteriological operations and to work out security problems which would become serious if they got into daylight operations and had to bomb up at their own base K6. They were to inform the squadron commanders concerned but only the absolute barest number of a additional personnel, and were to have a list of a limited number of hand-picked pilots ready to be used on short notice. Colonel Wendt informed them that an Air Force team would soon be provided to assist with logistic problems, this team actually arriving the last week in June.

Before my capture on July 8, both the ADs (Skyraid-

ers) and the F4Us (Corsairs) of Marine Aircraft

Group 12 had participated in very small numbers, once or twice, in daylight bacteriological operations as a part of regular scheduled, normal day missions, bombing up at K8 (Kunsan), rendezvousing with the rest of the formation on the way to the target.

These missions were directed at small towns in Western Korea along the main road leading south from Kunuri and were a part of the normal interdiction program.

Marine Aircraft Group 33

Colonel Wendt passed the plan for the Wing's participation in bacteriological operations to Colonel Condon, Commanding Officer of Marine Aircraft Group 33, on approximately May 27-28.

Since the Panthers (F9Fs) at the Group's base at

Pohang would only be used as 1ast resort aircraft, it was left to Colonel Condon's discretion as to just what personnel he would pass the information on to but it was to be an absolute minimum.

During the time I was with the Wing, none of these

aircraft had been scheduled for bacteriological mis-

sions, though the photographic reconnaissance planes

of the Group's VMJ-1 Squadron continued their mis-

sions from that base.

SCHEDULING AND SECURITY

Security was by far the most pressing problem affecting the First Marine Aircraft Wing, since the operational phase of bacteriological warfare, as well as other types of combat operations, is controlled by the Fifth Air Force.

Absolutely nothing could appear in writing on the

subject. The word "bacteria" was not to be mentioned in any circumstances in Korea, except initially to identify "superpropaganda" or "suprop."

Apart from the routine replenishment operations of

Squadron 513, which required no scheduling, bacteriological missions were scheduled by separate, top-secret, mission orders (or "FRAG" orders). These stated only to include "superpropaganda" or "suprop"

on mission number so-and-so of the routine secret

"FRAG" order for the day's operations. -Mission

reports went back the same way by separate, top-

secret dispatch, stating the number of "suprop" bombs dropped on a specifically numbered mission.

Other than this, Squadron 513 reported their bac-

teriological missions by adding "via Kunuri" or "via

Sinanju" to their normal mission reports.

Every means was taken to deceive the enemy and to deny knowledge of these operations to friendly personnel, the latter being most important since 300 to 400 men of the Wing are rotated back to the United States each month.

Orders were issued that bacteriological bombs were

only to be dropped in conjunction with ordinary bombs or napalm, to give the attack the appearance of a normal attack against enemy supply lines. For added security over enemy territory, a napalm bomb was to remain on the aircraft until after the release of the bacteriological bombs so that if the aircraft crashed it would almost certainly burn and destroy the evidence.

All officers were prohibited from discussing the subject except officially and behind closed doors. Every briefing was to emphasize that this was not only a military secret, but a matter of national policy.

I personally have never heard the subject mentioned

or even referred to outside of the office, and I ate all of my meals in the Commanding General's small private mess, where many classified matters were discussed.

In the Wing, our consensus of opinion was that

results of these bacteriological operations could not be accurately assessed. Routine methods of assessment are by (presumably) spies, by questioning prisoners of war, by watching the nightly truck count very carefully to observe deviations from the normal, and by observing public announcements of Korean and Chinese authorities upon which very heavy dependence was placed, since it was felt that no large epidemic could occur without news leaking out to the outside world and that these authorities would, therefore, announce it themselves.

Information from the above sources is correlated at the Commander-in-Chief, Far East level in Tokyo, but the over-all assessment of results is not passed down to the Wing level, hence the Wing was not completely aware of the results.

When I took over from Colonel Binney I asked him

for results or reactions up to date and he specifically said: "Not worth a damn."

No one that I know of has indicated that the results

are anywhere near commensurate with the effort, danger and dishonesty involved, although the Korean and Chinese authorities have made quite a public report of early bacteriological bomb efforts. The sum total of results known to me are that they are disappointing and no good.

I do not say the following in defence of anyone,

myself included, I merely report as an absolutely direct observation that every officer when first informed that the United States is using bacteriological warfare in Korea is both shocked and ashamed.

I believe, without exception, we come to Korea as

officers loyal to our people and government and believing what we have always been told about bacteriological warfare that it is being developed only for use in retaliation in a third world war.

For these officers to come to Korea and find that

their own government has so completely deceived them

by still proclaiming to the world that it is not using bacteriological warfare, makes them question mentally all the other things that the government proclaims about warfare in general and in Korea specifically.

None of us believes that bacteriological warfare has

any place in war since of all the weapons devised bacteriological bombs alone have as their primary objective casualties among masses of civilians-and that is utterly wrong in anybody's conscience. The spreading of disease is unpredictable and there may be no limits to a fully developed epidemic.

Additionally, there is the awfully sneaky, unfair sort of feeling of dealing with a weapon used surreptitiously against an unarmed and

unwarned people.

I remember specifically asking Colonel Wendt what

were Colonel Gaylor's reactions when he was first informed and he reported to me that Colonel Gaylor was both horrified and stupefied. Everyone felt like that when they first heard of it, and their reactions are what might well be expected from a fair-minded, self-respecting nation of people.

Tactically, this type of weapon is totally unwarranted-it is not even a Marine Corps weapon-morally it is damnation itself; administratively and logistically as planned for use, it is hopeless; and from the point of view of self-respect and loyalty, it is shameful.

F. H. Schwable, 04429

Colonel, U.S.M.C.

6 December, 1952

• 【整理原创】朝鲜战争中的细菌战（三）