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China Deserves Donald Trump

Thomas L. Friedman

托马斯·L·弗里德曼著名预言作品有《The World Is Flat : A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century》《世界是（习近）平的》，出版时是2005年。

下面是原文+翻译，时间有限基本用机器翻译的，见谅。

A U.S. businessman friend of mine who works in China remarked to me recently that Donald Trump is not the American president America deserves, but he sure is the American president China deserves.

我的在中国经商一个朋友最近对我说，唐纳德特朗普不是美国该着的美国总统，但他肯定是中国该着的美国总统。

Trump’s instinct that America needs to rebalance its trade relationship with Beijing — before China gets too big to compromise — is correct. And it took a human wrecking ball like Trump to get China’s attention. But now that we have it, both countries need to recognize just how pivotal this moment is.

wrecking ball (悬挂于吊车供拆除建筑物用的)破碎球，落锤

特朗普的直觉是正确的--美国需要在中国变得太大而无法妥协之前重新平衡与北京的贸易。 特朗普这样一颗人型落锤引起了中国的注意。 但现在我们拥有它，两国都需要认识到这一时刻的重要性。

The original U.S.-China opening back in the 1970s defined our restored trade ties, which were limited. When we let China join the World Trade Organization in 2001, it propelled China into a trading powerhouse under rules that still gave China lots of concessions as a developing economy.

20世纪70年代最初的美中关系开放定义了我们恢复的贸易关系，这种联系是有限的。 当我们让中国在2001年加入世界贸易组织时，它推动中国成为一个贸易强国，其规则仍然给予中国作为发展中经济体的许多让步。

This new negotiation will define how the U.S. and China relate as economic peers, competing for the same 21st-century industries, at a time when our markets are totally intertwined. So this is no ordinary trade dispute. This is the big one.

在我们的市场完全交织在一起的时候，这次新的谈判将确定美国和中国如何作为经济同行关系，争夺同样的21世纪产业。 所以这不是普通的贸易争端。 这是一个很大的问题。

For it to end well, Trump will have to stop with his juvenile taunting of China on Twitter (and talking about how trade wars are “easy” to win) and quietly forge the best rebalancing deal we can get — we probably can’t fix everything at once — and move on, without stumbling unthinkingly into a forever tariff war.

为了结束这一切，特朗普将不得不停止在Twitter上对中国的少年嘲讽（以及谈论贸易战如何“轻松”获胜）并悄悄地打造我们可以获得的最佳再平衡协议 - 我们可能无法修复 一切都在同一时间 - 继续前进，不会毫不犹豫地陷入永久的关税战争。

And China’s president, Xi Jinping, will have to recognize that China can no longer enjoy the trading privileges it has had over the last 40 years, so he’d be wise to curb his nationalistic “no-one-tells-China-what-to-do” bluster and look for the best win-win deal he can get. Because Beijing can’t afford America and others shifting their manufacturing to “ABC,” Anywhere-But-China, supply chains.

而中国国家主席习近平将不得不承认，中国再也不能享有过去40年来的贸易特权，所以他应该明智地遏制他的民族主义“没有人告诉中国 - 什么 - 待做“咆哮，寻找他能得到的最好的双赢协议。 因为北京无力承担美国和其他国家将制造业转移到“ABC”，“除了中国任何地方都行”的供应链。

Here is how we got here: Since the 1970s, the U.S.-China trade relationship has been pretty constant: We bought China’s toys, T-shirts, tennis shoes, machine tools and solar panels, and it bought our soybeans, beef and Boeings.

以下是我们如何到达这里：自20世纪70年代以来，美中贸易关系一直不变：我们购买了中国的玩具，T恤，网球鞋，机床和太阳能电池板，并购买了我们的大豆，牛肉和波音。

And when the trade balance got too out of whack — because China grew not only by hard work, by building smart infrastructure and by educating its people, but also by forcing technology transfers from U.S. companies, subsidizing its own companies, maintaining high tariffs, ignoring W.T.O. rulings and stealing intellectual property — Beijing placated us by buying more Boeings, beef and soybeans.

当贸易平衡失衡 - 因为中国不仅通过努力工作，建立智能基础设施和教育人民，而且通过强制美国公司的技术转让，补贴自己的公司，维持高关税，忽视世贸组织裁决和窃取知识产权 - 北京通过购买更多的波音，牛肉和大豆来安抚我们。

China kept insisting it was still “a poor developing country” that needed extra protection long after it had become the world’s largest manufacturer by far. Nevertheless, the relationship worked for enough U.S. companies enough of the time that the world’s biggest incumbent superpower, America, accommodated and effectively facilitated the rise of the world’s next largest superpower, China. And together they made globalization more pervasive and the world more prosperous.

中国一直坚称，在成为世界上最大的制造商之后，它仍然是一个“贫穷的发展中国家”，需要额外的保护。 尽管如此，这种关系对足够多的美国公司起到了作用，足以让世界上最大的现有超级大国美国适应并有效促进世界第二大超级大国中国的崛起。 它们共同使全球化更加普遍，世界更加繁荣。

And then some changes too big to ignore set in. First, China under Xi announced a “Made in China 2025” modernization plan, promising subsidies to make China’s private and state-owned companies the world leaders in supercomputing, A.I., new materials, 3-D printing, facial-recognition software, robotics, electric cars, autonomous vehicles, 5G wireless and advanced microchips.

然后，一些变化太大，不容忽视。首先，习近平宣布“中国制造2025”现代化计划，承诺补贴，使中国的私营和国有企业成为超级计算，人工智能，新材料领域的全球领导者，3 -D打印，面部识别软件，机器人，电动汽车，自动驾驶汽车，5G无线和先进的微芯片。

This was a natural move for a China aiming to leap out of the middle-income ranks and to reduce its dependency on the West for high-tech. But all these new industries compete directly with America’s best companies.

对于中国来说，这是一个自然的举动，旨在从中等收入阶层中脱颖而出，减少对西方高科技的依赖。 但所有这些新兴产业都与美国最好的公司直接竞争。

As a result, all China’s subsidies, protectionism, cheating on trade rules, forced technology transfers and stealing of intellectual property since the 1970s became a much greater threat. If the U.S. and Europe allowed China to continue operating by the same formula that it had used to grow from poverty to compete for all the industries of the future, we’d be crazy. Trump is right about that.

因此，自20世纪70年代以来，所有中国的补贴，保护主义，欺骗贸易规则，强制技术转让和窃取知识产权都成为一个更大的威胁。 如果美国和欧洲允许中国继续按照它过去从贫困中成长的方式继续经营以争夺未来的所有产业，我们就会疯狂。 特朗普对此是正确的。

Where he is wrong is that trade is not like war. Unlike war, it can be a win-win proposition. Alibaba, UnionPay, Baidu and Tencent and Google, Amazon, Facebook and Visa can all win at the same time — and they have been. I’m not sure Trump understands that.

他错的地方是贸易不像战争。 与战争不同，它可以是一个双赢的主张。 阿里巴巴，银联，百度和腾讯以及谷歌，亚马逊，Facebook和维萨都可以同时获胜 - 而且他们一直都是。 我不确定特朗普是否理解这一点。

But I’m not sure Xi does, either. We have to let China win fair and square where its companies are better, but it has to be ready to lose fair and square, too. Who can say how much more prosperous Google and Amazon would be today if they had been able to operate as freely in China as Alibaba and Tencent can operate in America?

但我也不确定习近平会这么做。 我们必须让中国在公司更好的地方赢得公平竞争，但它必须准备好公平和失误。 如果能够在中国自由运营，阿里巴巴和腾讯可以在美国运营，谁能说今天谷歌和亚马逊将会更加繁荣？

And how much money did China save — to subsidize its own companies — when its military stole the plans for Lockheed Martin’s F-35 stealth fighter and then made its own carbon copy, avoiding all the R & D costs?

中国军方偷走了洛克希德·马丁公司的F-35隐形战斗机的计划，然后制作了自己的抄本，避免了所有的研发成本---从中中国节省了多少钱用于补贴自己的公司？

I repeat: Trade can be win-win, but the winning shares can be distorted when one side is working hard and cheating at the same time. We could look the other way when trade was just about toys and solar panels, but when it’s about F-35s and 5G telecommunications, that’s not smart.

我再说一遍：交易可以是双赢的，但是当一方努力工作并同时作弊时，获胜的股票可能会被扭曲。 当贸易只是关于玩具和太阳能电池板时，我们可以看到另一种方式，但当它涉及F-35和5G电信时，那并不聪明。

But that’s not all that is new and problematic. We now live in the age of “dual use.” In a dual-use world, “everything that makes us powerful and prosperous also makes us vulnerable,” noted John Arquilla, one of the top strategists at the Naval Postgraduate School.

但这并非全新且有问题。 我们现在生活在“双重用途”的时代。在一个双重用途的世界中，“使我们强大和繁荣的一切也使我们变得脆弱，”海军研究生院的顶级战略家之一约翰·阿奎拉指出。

In particular, 5G equipment like that made by China’s Huawei, which can transfer data and voices at hyperspeed, can also serve as an espionage platform, if China’s intelligence services exercise their right under Chinese law to demand access.

特别是中国华为制造的5G设备，如果中国的情报部门根据中国法律行使其权利要求接入，也可以作为间谍平台。

Indeed, the controversy around Huawei shines a spotlight on this whole new moment: Huawei increasingly dominates the global market for 5G infrastructure, which used to be controlled by Ericsson and Nokia. America’s Qualcomm is both a supplier of chips and software to Huawei and a global competitor.

事实上，围绕华为的争议在这个全新的时刻引起了人们的关注：华为越来越多地主导全球5G基础设施市场，而这个基础设施曾经由爱立信和诺基亚控制。 美国高通公司既是华为的芯片和软件供应商，也是全球竞争对手。

But the Chinese government has curbed competition against Huawei in China — by both foreign and Chinese companies — to enable Huawei to grow bigger, more quickly and cheaply. Huawei then uses that clout and pricing power to undercut Western telecoms and then uses its rising global market dominance to set the next generation of global 5G telecom standards around its own technologies, not those of Qualcomm or Sweden’s Ericsson.

但中国政府已经遏制华为在中国的竞争 - 包括外国和中国公司 - 以使华为能够更大，更快，更便宜地发展。 然后，华为利用这种影响力和定价能力来削弱西方电信，然后利用其不断增长的全球市场主导地位，围绕自己的技术制定下一代全球5G电信标准，而不是高通或瑞典的爱立信。

Moreover, in a dual-use world, you have to worry that if you have a Huawei chatbot in your home, an equivalent of Amazon’s Echo, you could also be talking to Chinese military intelligence.

此外，在dual-use（军地两用）的世界中，您必须担心，如果家里有跟亚马逊的Echo一模一样的华为聊天机器人，相当于与中国军情人员交谈。

In the old days, when we were just buying China’s tennis shoes and solar panels and it our soybeans and Boeings, who cared if the Chinese were Communists, Maoists, socialists — or cheats? But when Huawei is competing on the next generation of 5G telecom with Qualcomm, AT&T and Verizon — and 5G will become the new backbone of digital commerce, communication, health care, transportation and education — values matter, differences in values matters, a modicum of trust matters and the rule of law matters. This is especially true when 5G technologies and standards, once embedded in a country, become very hard to displace.

在过去，当我们刚刚购买中国的网球鞋和太阳能电池板以及我们的大豆和波音时，他们是否关心中国人是共产党员，毛派，社会主义者还是欺骗者？ 但是，当华为与高通竞争下一代5G电信时，AT＆T和Verizon - 以及5G将成为数字商务，通信，医疗保健，交通和教育的新骨干 - 价值观重要，价值观上的差异至关重要， 信任事项和法治事务。 当一个嵌入一个国家的5G技术和标准变得非常难以取代时，尤其如此。

And then add one more thing: The gap in values and trust between us and China is widening, not narrowing. For decades, America and Europe tolerated a certain amount of cheating from China on trade, because they assumed that as China became more prosperous — thanks to trade and capitalist reforms — it would also become more open politically. That was happening until about a decade ago.

又及：我们与中国之间的价值观和信任差距在扩大，而不是缩小。 几十年来，美国和欧洲在贸易上容忍了一定程度的中国作弊行为，因为他们认为随着中国变得更加繁荣 - 由于贸易和资本主义改革 - 它在政治上也会变得更加开放。 这种情况直到大约十年前才发生。

For the last decade, though, said James McGregor, one of the most knowledgeable U.S. business consultants in China and a longtime resident there, it’s been clear that Beijing, instead of “reforming and opening, has been reforming and closing.”

其中最懂中国的商业顾问詹姆斯·麦格雷戈说，在过去的十年里，很明显北京不是“改革与开放，而是改革与封闭”。

Instead of China getting richer and becoming more of a responsible stakeholder in globalization, it was getting richer and militarizing islands in the South China Sea to push the U.S. out. And it was using high-tech tools, like facial recognition, to become more efficient at authoritarian control, not less.

中国越来越富裕，而且越来越成为全球化的负责任的利益相关者，而南海的岛屿变得更加富裕和军事化，把美国赶出去。 使用面部识别等高科技工具，在专制控制方面变得更有效率，而不是更少。

All of this is now coming to a head in these trade talks. Either the U.S. and China find a way to build greater trust — so globalization can continue apace and we can grow together in this new era — or they won’t. In which case, globalization will start to fracture, and we’ll both be poorer for it.

所有这些现在都在这些贸易谈判中处于领先地位。 无论是美国还是中国都找到了建立更大信任的方法 - 全球化可以继续快速发展，我们可以在这个新时代共同成长 - 或者他们不会。 在这种情况下，全球化将开始破裂，我们两个都会变得更穷。