主题：【翻译】对朝鲜战争步兵战斗与武器使用的评注（1950冬—1951年)II -- 徐荣

十一月会战

从步兵那里了解到的真相

获得可靠情报除了能对制定建设性的公共政策产生积极影响以外，还能增强战斗行动中的效率。

步兵，在正常情况下作为战争中的主力，要与敌军的战斗部队做最持久的接触，可以把他比作获取战斗情报的机器的天线。

他最接近敌军，擅长收集各种敌情，并且准备好了应用这项资源使全军尽可能地获益。以上这些步兵的天职应该是不言自明的，完全系统化的，而且应通过在训练中投入更多注意力得到增强。

以下是第27步兵团G连对它在1950年11月清川江以西战斗所作叙述的摘录：

THE NOVEMBER BATTLE

FACTS FROM THE INFANTRY

Quite apart from the effect of sound information procurement upon the forming of constructive public policy is its influence toward increased efficiency in combat operations.

Infantry, being the body which under the normal situation in war maintains the most persistent contact with the fighting parts of the enemy, is the antenna of the mechanism of combat intelligence.

Being closest to the enemy, its receptiveness to all phenomena pertaining to the enemy, and its readiness to use this resource toward the fullest possible benefit to the total force, should be almost axiomatic, thoroughly systematized, and made acute through increased attention to the problem during training.

The following is an extract taken from the narrative of George Company, 27th Infantry Regiment, concerning its operation west of the Chongchon River in November 1950:

马文 P. 马丁上士——1排面对的山坡几乎完全被森林所覆盖，但在我们所在散兵坑的正前方高地有一段距离是无遮蔽的。

SFC MARVIN P. MARTIN - Facing 1st platoon, the slope was almost a forest, but directly in front of our pits, the rise was bare for a short distance.

约翰 F. 兰德中尉——我们都进入工事隐蔽。那里原来有些旧散兵坑，它们太小，美国兵很难钻进去。所以我们拓宽、加深了这些散兵坑。周围的泥土很新鲜。散兵坑的尺寸以及泥土的新鲜程度是告诉我们“敌人就在附近”的第一个警告。

LT JOHN F. LAND- We were well dug in. There were old holes up there. They were too small for a GI to fit in. So we widened and deepened them. The earth around was fairly fresh. The size of the holes and the freshness of the earth was the first tip-off that the enemy must be somewhere close around.

杰克 麦凯利上尉——我开始到处察看。随后，我就发现了树林中驮畜留下的粪便。我曾估计这些散兵坑是五天之前挖的，但这些粪便很新鲜；在当时滴水成冰的天气里，这些粪便还没有冻硬，所以我推断它们是刚刚拉出来的。

CAPT JACK MICHAELY - I began looking around. Then I found dung from pack animals down among the trees. I had estimated that the holes had been dug five days before.But the dung was fresher; the weather was freezing but the dung had not hardened. So I concluded they had pulled out quite recently.

马丁——在我们阵地前方，树林的紧右边，有一幢框架结构的建筑。它伪装良好，看上去像是个观察所。这个区域的某些地方已被凝固汽油弹烧焦。或许这就是敌人被赶走的原因，或者可能是多尔文特遣队迫使他们撤退了。

MARTIN - There was a frame building in front of our position and right next to the trees. It was well camouflaged and looked like an OP. Some of the area had been burned with napalm. Maybe that was what drove them or maybe TF Dolvin had made them retire.

约翰 w. 肯尼迪上士——我们在那幢建筑物里发现了一些葫芦。敌人曾用这些葫芦当碗。几颗米粒还粘在“碗”沿上。我用指头按了按，它们还很柔软。

SFC JOHN w. KENNEDY- We found gourds in that building. They had been using the gourds for eating bowls. There were small particles of rice still clinging to the sides of the bowls. Under the pressure of my fingers they were still pliable.

此次以及其他类似事件，暗示出美军士兵具有出色的但（目前只是）潜在的侦察才能，这种才能可通过在训练中进行某种强化得到发扬。它将在非正规作战中发挥巨大价值。

This incident, and others of the same sort, suggest that in the US soldier there is a marked but latent talent for scouting that could be developed through somewhat more emphasis in training. It would be of great value in irregular-type warfare.

除了在游击战中，我们在本世纪的其他军事行动并不是特别需要侦察才能。因此，在训练中它被给予较少的关注，因此我军将士不得不在很大程度上依靠自己的主动性去发挥搜集情报的本领。

甚至当连级部队已有些明白依靠这些原始的方法获得的情报的重要性时，他们也不大可能向上级报告这些情报。除非通过训练，他们牢记：“当敌军威胁到全军的利益时，无论入伍多久，哪怕是一个新兵都应该去了解关于敌军的出现、移动和习惯的情报”。

我军有一个由来已久的缺点：在战斗中，步兵侦察队所了解到的情报的最至关重要的部分从未反馈到营级。

在野战中，步兵应该是关于敌军战术、武器使用、战勤体系、习惯和一般本性的情报的最具创造性的来源。

陆军是否认识到了步兵这项任务的真正意义并准备好了去有效利用它？这确实是个问题。

我军情报参谋的工作程序是按这种目的设计的：榨干任何一个落入我军步兵手中的敌军士兵所知道的情报。他们几乎没有认识到：要了解敌军，从我军士兵在队伍中看到的、听到的和感觉到的情报中可能会收获更多。

我军在这个情报领域，并没有稳定的析取情报的方法。只有将情报综合，进行图上分析，然后推断出教训。因此就丧失了时间，本来能预测的事物也只能靠碰运气，很多机会也就被浪费了。

在第八集团军内对步兵所获取的情报进行分析最初存在阻碍，但这个阻碍为一个主要的有利因素所补偿。

这个阻碍就是：委员会里只有一名军官负责分析步兵战斗并在十一月会战中迅速地穿行于第八集团军和第十军共六个师的前线，而这项使命本应由至少六名受过专项训练的军官组成的参谋部来完成。有利因素就是第八集团军参谋部，特别是作战部副部长威廉 布洛克上校和情报部副部长兼战斗情报处长罗伯特 G. 弗格森上校无条件的支持。所有的下级军官都全心全意，甚至是狂热地配合工作。

除了更加强调军事行动的后勤方面以及详尽调查我军在战斗中体察到的与敌军有关的一切情报之外，这个工作程序和二战后陆军战史专家们的标准工作程序没什么明显的不同。

步兵连和炮兵连是讯问的主要对象。委员会还会见了负责制定行动计划、作出影响决策的评估的重要高级军官。

要对比步兵和炮兵队伍中发生的真实情况与二线人员对局势的感觉，除此之外别无他法。

首先，在从战斗连队那里了解到的情报的基础上，对中共军队的战术、部署方式、装备、武器使用、火力效能、侦查手段、信号、补给等方面有了确切的评估。这些情报很快由第八集团军司令向所部发布；它们的密级低，所以可以在排级传播，在这一级别可以产生最大利益。除了对中共军队的分析，报告中相当着重与敌军接触过的我军步兵的激烈战斗。因此，第八集团军参谋部认为有必要立即向部队下发这份报告，尽管依照分析家的观点，当时这项工作还远没有完结，这份报告只包含了对战斗中出现的症结所作的一定精度的取样，而不是对整个前线的全面调查。然而，第八集团军参谋部的判断被证明是完全正确的。在以后的军事行动中，更深入地进行分析后，没有使最初的发现的任何关键之处失效的新发现。“歪打正着”。

因为先前出版的备忘录《在朝鲜的步兵战斗注解》中已作了对小战术资料的评价，在这里就没有必要讨论它了。然而，从对第2步兵师的最初讯问中得到了原始状态的情报，它具有某些额外的价值，我们还没有就这次讯问提交完整的记录，因此应当（在下文）摘要复述它。

Except for bush-whacking expeditions, our other operations in this century have not particularly required it. Hence, it is given little training attention, and the men have to develop this intelligence faculty pretty much on their own initiative.

Even when troops at company level have some grasp of the importance of information which they have obtained by these primitive methods, they are not likely to communicate it to higher authority unless through training they are fully impressed with the fact that whatever new a private soldier may learn with respect to the presence, movements, or habits of the enemy becomes of value to the entire Army.

It is a chronic fault in our service that much of the most vital part of what is learned by the infantry screen during combat never gets back as far as battalion.

During field operations, infantry should be the most productive source of information pertaining to the enemy’s tactics, use of weapons, combat supply system, habits, and general nature.

It is a fair question whether the Army recognizes the true significance of this role and is established to make optimum use of it.

Our G-2 processes are designed to drain dry any enemy soldier who falls into infantry hands. They take little cognizance that perhaps more is to be learned of the enemy from what has been seen, heard, and felt by our own soldier in the line.

There is no steady winnowing of this field of information. There is adding it up, analyzing it across the board, and then deducing its lessons. So time is lost, matters which are calculable are left to chance, and many are wasted.

This infantry analysis within Eighth Army had one initial handicap, which, however, was offset by one factor of main advantage.

The handicap was that the Committee comprised one man; to analyze the operations of infantry accurately and expeditiously across the six-division front of the Eighth Army and X Corps in the November battle would have required a minimum staff of six officers already trained in the work. The advantage was the unqualified support given to the project by Eighth Army Staff, in particular, Co1 William Bullock, Asst G-3, and Co1 Robert G. Fergusson, Asst G-2, Chief of Combat Intelligence. All lower commands co-operated fully, and even enthusiastically.

The process was not markedly different from the SOP followed in World War II by the Army combat historians, except for increased emphasis on all logistical aspects of operations, and exhaustive search as to everything which could be learned of the enemy from what our troops had experienced during battle.

Infantry companies and artillery batteries were the main subjects of the interrogations. Higher commanders were interviewed to the extent necessary to develop the general frame of operations and the estimates which led to the taking of decisions.

There is no other way than this to contrast the reality of what occurs along the rifle and gun line with the sensings of situation in the rearward echelons.

In the beginning, on the basis of what was learned from the combat companies, certain estimates were arrived at as to the CCF’s tactics, manner of deployment, armament, use of weapons, fire effects, methods of reconnaissance, signals, supply, etc. These were immediately published to the Eighth Army by its commander; the classification was down-graded so that the information could be circulated at platoon level, where it would do the most good. In addition to its analysis of the CCF, the report had put considerable emphasis on the high action of our infantry forces which had engaged the enemy. It was therefore deemed advisable by Eighth Army Staff to rush the report to troops with the least waste of time, although, from the viewpoint of the analyst, the work at that time was far from complete and comprised only a reasonably accurate sampling from the crux of action rather than a comprehensive survey across the front. However, the Staff judgment of what action should be taken proved to be wholly correct. Nothing occurred in later operations, or further along in the analysis, to invalidate any material point in the initial findings. The “shot in the dark” proved to be fairly well on the target.

Because the evaluation of data as to minor tactics which was made in that early period has been published in the Memorandum, “Notes on Infantry Operations in Korea, “there is no need here to discuss it. There were, however, certain additional values of an intelligence nature deriving from the first interrogations of 2nd Infantry Division which have not been wholly committed to writing and which would therefore warrant recapitulation.

• 【整理】永不褪色的抗美援朝战争