主题：【读书笔记】滞胀的年代（上） -- wqnsihs

不能打酱油。财政部有时著名土财主，奉进不奉出。减税绝对没有可行性，因为所有产业都有理由减税：例如节能；新材料；生物工程。。。。

至于民营企业创新能力，从体系上来讲对产业升级意义不大。个别产品升级于事无补。

发牢骚是真吧

尽量给自己心理暗示提醒自己注意这两方面，在静下来后反思自己在与别人辩论或是接受别人观点时有没有做到辩证接受，还是仅仅一味盲从或反对。对观念的接受养成了批判吸收的习惯后，就不难做到不偏激，不盲从。

推荐一本老美写的书《走出思维的误区》。

First, CDS market warns the financial market long time ago. CDS players are Lehman's lending commercial bank. Info was leaked out long time ago.

Second, Lehman's auditor is too loose. There is accounting problem.

third, Lehman mini-bond sold to Asian investors are unnecessarily complicated with remote trusts to separate legal trouble from the parent firms. that mini-bonds were marketed by asshole Asian bankers (e.g., HSBC private banking, DBS private banking...) aggressively to innocent and stupid retail investors.

Most investors did not even read the prospectus when they committed millions of dollar into Lehman mini-bonds.

Fourth, Lehman, even without including its off-balance sheet liabilities, had very high leverage ratios (at least higher than several investment bank peers. And unlike JPMorgan Chase, it has no stable retail deposit base to support its liquidity needs in times of turmoil.

Fifth, Lehman was killed by its heavy exposure to commercial real estate MBS. There was an active commercial real estate MBS market and you could see distress earlier.

I just want to point out that domestic chinese bankers are too confident in residential real estate loans (both individual and commercial development ones, what we call CRE here).

I saw several pieces where bankers trashed industrial loans, but were overconfident in residential loans.

China has not experienced a serious business downturn yet. Chinese bankers perceive real estate loas much safer than industrial loans--that could be a serious misperception.

For long time in the English-speaking world, individual residential loans and CRE loans are perceived as one of the most dangerous type of loans. The history can date back to 1920s. The reason that FDR even established Fannie was because bankers refused to lend to individuals over LONG TERM for residential mortgage loans.

that's a lesson learned over 150 years of banking in the North America: I think it is a well-tested lesson for China, who was just 30 years into its capitalistic experiment.

如果没有足够的信息披露给你，我们不可能从打扫战场的战利品里指导我们战前该如何打这场仗。

In US, we actually have half-publicly-disclosed info.

In China, I guess only regulatory insiders could see the aggregate bank info.

我们都只能看到公司的控制者在不违反法律或者轻微违反法律情况下，同意给我们看的公司的部分实际信息。区别在于，不同的会计准则，审计要求以及监管规则以及法律规定会给出不同的鼠洞而已。

统计方法，是数额增加，还是，比例增加，后者绝对恐怖，前者就没什么啦。98-99年银行坏账20%-30%。98年国民生产总值1万亿美金。现在是5万亿美金，即使坏账金额保持不变，比例也将缩小到6%，说白了，注水稀释掉了

物价有效控制就得控制货币，加息，但是这会导致企业完蛋，失业增加，社会动乱。98年通缩，似乎社会没有多大反应，88年通胀的结果大家都看到了。很简单，通胀损害的是全体国民利益（包括首都市民），通缩部分地区受损，以中央的能力，力保大城市北京，上海，广州不乱（很容易办到），就可以啦，局部动乱很快可以解决。让我选择，选通缩。同时准备3600亿失业补助金，每个月300，一年3600，假设极端情况一亿人失业