主题：【原创】简单评论评论蒋介石 -- 电子赵括
来证明你的观点，而不是直接下结论。
你一开始说共产党搞农运影响到国名党军官，也应该用史实和统计数据说话。说明为何你认为TG在造国民党的反
为蒋开脱的时候说军队不行，即使是中国最精锐的军队都打不过日本，而且得不到军阀的支持。
问题是你前面说的条件对张一样成立啊，既然最精锐的中国军队都打不过日军，而张的军队是中国军队，因此张的军队也搞不定日军。而且张也不见得能的到蒋的支持。
既然前提条件一样，为什么你对张的评价就是胆小愚蠢，对蒋就是忍辱负重？
其实关于26-27年农民运动过激的资料太多了。不过最近太忙，没空找了。杨奎松是这方面的专家，你可以看看他的《武汉国民党的联共与分共》。他也还算是体制内的研究者，说话不算过激。
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马日事变
维基百科，自由的百科全书
马日事变发生在1927年5月21日（马日）晚上长沙的一件历史事件。共产党在北伐期间在湖南实行土地改革，斗争地主；当中不少为北伐中的国民革命军军官家庭，于是引起军内极为不满。当时由许克祥作指挥，王东原、陶柳等人包围封锁湖南省共产党党部、总工会、农民协会、省党校、省特别法庭等二十多处为共党机关，解除了工人纠察队和农民自卫军武装。许克祥并宣布拥护蒋中正的南京国民政府，是为“马日事变”。而“马日事变”实际上就是武汉分共的一个开端。
5月23日，许克祥等人组成“中国国民党湖南救党办事处”，28日又组成“中国国民党湖南救党委员会”，引发部份县市遂有类似之举。
Sorry for English typing.
You are right, Zhang realized he couldn't get any support, thus he gave up the resistance totally. However, in Zhang's case, Japanese already attacked his army, and he had no way to by-pass it. It came to the time of showing final cards, but he chose not showing. As a result, he lost his home and treasure.
In the case of Jiang, if he would adandom those treaties, which means cut off the Japan's expanding from this direction, he would give Japanese very strong excuse of lauching a war.
It is well accepted facts to Jiang and his generals, that China and Japan would have a war to solve the problem between two countires, which could be the only way to stop Japan's expansion. What he could do is to postpone time of war, and make preparation for it.
似乎好像蒋在1928年就给小张示范过在当缩头乌龟和“show final cards"间该如何选择。
四一二之后武汉政府的反应。
对于蒋的行为，国民党中央一开始显然否定的，也就是说蒋代表的并非国民党的意见。蒋在屠杀共产党的同时也背判了国民党。
这也说明，四一二之前，国共间即使有你所谓的摩擦，还远没到决裂的地步，而最终的决裂，是由国民党的叛徒蒋凭借武力造成的。
蒋的所做所为，不过是黄袍加身的现代版而已，而后的宁汉合流，与其看作是国民党中央同意了蒋的意见，不如看做是军权被蒋掌握后无奈的禅让。自此后，蒋记国民党就成了蒋某人军阀统治的工具，那怕是你所谓最温和的三民主义，都不知所踪了。
Yes. That is the most controvertial issue in the history of China. People tend to explain Zhang's decision as the "Not resist" telegram sent by Jiang. It is also true that Japanese army also attacked Jiang's army in Jinan, and Jiang chose retreat in 1928.
Now argueing this issue might not make much sense since we don't have very solid evidences. Here I would like to explain: Zhang has been a military lord for quite long time in Northeastern China. He should be certainly aware what was the expectation of both Japanese people in ManChu and KangdoGun. Moreover he himself had personal contact with Japanese cabinet members. In fact he served as an independent commander of Chinese army in Northeastern and the highest offical there. He was the only person who hold the responsibility for those DongBei army. I don't think Jiang could control him or force him to do anything against his interest(Even guy like Han fuju could ignore Jiang's command). Fight or retreat, I tend to think could be totally decided by himself. For so long a time, he has no excuse for not make any plan for emergent situations.Moreover he did choose quit multiple times in front of Japanese army's attack. One speculation would be Zhang might like to go deplomatic channel to solve the conflict(like bribing Japanese primier).
Well, here I am not trying to defense for Jiang. Simply make some explanations based those well accepted facts. I believe it is almost unlikely to solve the Sino-Japan problem through abortion of those treaties at that time. Thank you for your kindly reponse.
事实就是，不管借口有多少，理由有多少，1928蒋领导的军队在济南，不比918的关东军在沈阳表现好多少。其类似程度，甚至让人怀疑出于同一”战略思想”的后果。
Well, what I would like to explain is he gained time for war preparation, got his chance, and won the war finally, even though people might say Jiang's army didn't defeat Japanese army at all-He simply made a correct choice in the complicated situation. However, all Chinese anywhere are in fact enjoying the benefits achieved through the efforts paid by them, Jiang, his generals, and those armies, no matter how ugly they might be in most of current Chinese people's mind. Sorry for bothering you by replying that message. Thanks!
因为你对蒋的所有逻辑，对张其实也适用。
但你对蒋和张一褒一贬，让人怀疑是不是先站在维护蒋的立场上再去想办法论证。
我的意思是不要像楼主那样把TG打扮的像沉默的羔羊一样无辜。
事实是湖南的农会早就在造当地国民党基层政权和士绅的反了。上海的那个工人纠察队天天拿着武器在大街上晃荡，控制工厂机关，俨然以第二政府自居，让以秩序和正统维护者自居的蒋总司令又要如何感想呢？（8*8工自联的前辈啊）
蒋介石发动4·12当然是有其个人野心的。但是这无法说明为什么国民党元老派、各大以前倾向进步的新军阀（冯玉祥、李宗仁这些所谓“进步人士”、“TG的老朋友”）都一致支持蒋的分共清洗，并且积极向汪精卫施加压力，撮合了宁汉合流。
实际上当时TG在中国政治舞台上的不得人心，是明摆着的。借用《两个局外人的对谈录》中的话，TG在大革命中的过激政策，实际上让他们在近10年的时间里被逐出了全国性的政治舞台，而沦为偏远地方的“匪患”。直到西安事变重新登上舞台。
但是能不能在共产党的队伍里发展自己的党员呢？
还能成为当时第二大革命党。
看来你的“政治舞台”没有社会底层的位置吧？如果你的所为“政治舞台”是上流社会的俱乐部。那就没什么可辩论的了，屁股不同而已。
如果TG真在你所谓的“政治舞台”上得了人心，那不过是大酱缸蒋记国民党第二而已，还想有今天的位置，做梦！
李立三的全国多点爆破，连TG自己都否定了。
盲目发动流氓无产者暴动的结果就是损失组织力量的基本盘，引起小市民、民族资产阶级和农村中上阶层的恐惧，农民在受到镇压以后也开始远离TG。中共中央最后连在上海都无法立足。
搞4.12的清帮混混才是流氓无产者，发动流氓无产者的是蒋而不是国共。
4.12之前共的主流是右倾保守，也正是因为这个原因在遭到惨重损失后陈独秀下台才真正走上武装斗争的道路。
“中共中央最后连在上海都无法立足”这句话能说明什么问题？以中国当时社会情况，上海恐怕是最不具有代表性的一个地方了。可以说，中共中央离开上海，进入农村，才是TG胜利的开始。