主题：最近在看本抗日的书。 -- johny

The road to Nanjing and to the Generalissimo himself lay open. For Matsui, now Commander-in-Chief of Japan's newly created Central China Expeditionary Force, the temptation to push on was irresistable - but the order to advance did not come. On 3 November, a peace initiative sponsored by Vice-Chief of Staff Hayao Tada had begun through the medium of the German Ambassordors to Tokyo and Nanking. The terms of peace, including the creation of a demilitarized zone extending south of Yunting River and a Nationalist-Japanese partnership against Communists, were not actually presented to Chiang until 5 November. Time was needed to consider and negotiate the terms - but time was running out now for Tada and the others crying restraint, who found themselves locked in a battle as fierce as that raging on the Yangtse with those who wanted to expand the war against China.

The debate over whether or not to advance to Nanking laid bare a fundamental flaw which had developed in the character of the army since the 19th century. From being simply the executant of policy decided largely by others, the army, through dedicating itself to preparing Japan for total war, had come to take a profound interest in formulating as well as executing policy. But the new interest was not supported by a new system or institutional framework. The army might now be capable intellectually of deciding its own destiny; but organisationally it was still the servant of others.

Under men like Nagata and Araki, organisational frailties were concealed to some extent, such was their personal dynamism. The one an effective consensus builder, the other the head of a powerful clique, both were clear in their minds as to what needed to be done, and under their direction the Imperial Army could make policy purposefully and relatively efficiently. In their different ways they acted as clearing houses for the masses of conflicting opinions rising from every section of the General Staff and Army Ministry and the independent commands on the mainland - assembling, focussing, filtering, integrating, analysing, interpreting. Had either Nagata or Araki been Army Minister when the shots were fired at the Marco Polo Bridge, it is quite possible that war would never have developed.

Without this kind of dominant figure, policy-making in the army was haphazard in the extreme, determined on the one hand by temporary coalitions of officers in the Tokyo High Command and on the other by the pre-emptive action of officers in the field. General Yanagawa, for example, used his field command to try and enforce his view of policy by ordering the 10th Army to advance on Nanking. This was immediately countermanded by Tada, who repeated his prohibition to Matsui. Neither General disobeyed this direct order, but a cabal of officers in Tokyo who wanted Nanking captured then proceeded to work on Tada to persuade him that his order reflected bad policy.

This was not conspiracy or insubordination; there was no secret about the identity of these expansionist officers. They were sincere in their views - and in the Imperial Army, sincerity was always allowed a voice. As it happened, events on the mainland played into their hands. The landings at Hanchow Bay and Plover Point had been very successful, successful enough to encourage those who wanted to advance - but not to convince Chiang that defeat was inevitable. During November the peace initiative gradually withered. On 1 December, Tada capitulated and gave the order to move on Nanking; on 2 December, Chiang also gave in and agreed to discuss peace - 24 hours too late to save his capital.

The Nanking decision illustrated not only the method of policy-making, but its sinister weaknesses. So wide was the spread of the consensus required for action that no one person had a sense of responsibility for what eventually happened, though later an individual might accept personal credit or blame. In effect, it was a 'system of irresponsibilities', lacking accountability and potentially irrational. And because they were taken jointly, desicions tended to reflect the general characteristics of the group. As all the members had been through the same process of indoctrination at Ichigaya, stressing the importance of the attack, the consensual system tended to ensure that anmy policy was weighted towards action.

The method was also very slow. In the case of Nanking, it had taken nearly a month to make the desicion in favor of a campaign that was to last only 12 days - militarily, a disastrous delay. A swift pursuit might have broken the back of Chiang's military strength for good; instead the commanders' vacillation allowed many of Chiang's troops to escape.