主题:【整理】维基解密:09年乌鲁木齐75事件 -- 大漠孤烟远
"马戎"???: "死亡近1000人, 95%是汉族, 大部分是民工."
XINJIANG PARTY CHIEF LIKELY TO STAY ON DESPITE PUBLIC DISCONTENT AND ERODED INTRA-PARTY AUTHORITY, CONTACTS SAY
Identifier: 09BEIJING3127
Origin: Embassy Beijing
Created: 2009-11-16 11:33:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PHUM PGOV CH
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
VZCZCXRO8913
PP RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #3127/01 3201133
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161133Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6861
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DCC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 003127
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2039
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, CH
SUBJECT: XINJIANG PARTY CHIEF LIKELY TO STAY ON DESPITE
PUBLIC DISCONTENT AND ERODED INTRA-PARTY AUTHORITY,
CONTACTS SAY
REF: A. BEIJING 2753
B. BEIJING 2183 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor
Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: Xinjiang Party Secretary Wang
Lequan seems likely to keep his job, several
contacts predict, despite public anger over his
handling of the July riots in Urumqi. A September 3
demonstration, in which thousands of Urumqi
demonstrators demanded Wang's resignation, may have
actually improved his chances at staying on.
According to some observers, the Communist Party
would be reluctant to remove a high-level leader in
response to public pressure for fear of establishing
a precedent that could lead to demonstrations
against other unpopular provincial leaders. Wang
Lequan continues to enjoy the backing of Party
General Secretary Hu Jintao, our sources say,
although his political authority within the Party
has eroded due to perceptions he botched the
response to the July unrest. Two Uighur
intellectuals told us that ethnic tensions have
accelerated a Han exodus from Xinjiang and have
caused Urumqi housing prices to fall sharply.
Scholars at Beijing's Central University for
Nationalities reported that the Chinese government
has commissioned internal academic studies to exam
the causes of the violence in Xinjiang. The
government appears to be focused on reducing Uighur
unemployment as a means to improve stability in
Xinjiang. End summary.
Wang Lequan: So Bad, He's Good
------------------------------
2. (C) In September, several Embassy contacts
predicted Wang Lequan would be removed as Xinjiang
Party Secretary soon after October 1 National Day
celebrations. Wang Chong (protect), a journalist
for the Communist Youth League (CYL)-published news
magazine China Weekly, told PolOff September 15 that
Wang Lequan would soon be named to a new post in
Beijing, most likely vice chairman of the National
People's Congress. Echoing comments we heard from a
range of sources, Wang said such a "promotion" would
give the Party a face-saving way of removing him
from Xinjiang. Many in the CCP leadership,
especially on the left, were "furious" at Wang
Lequan for "losing control" of Xinjiang during the
July unrest, Wang Chong added, but Wang's status as
a Politburo member made his outright dismissal
impossible. Embassy contacts frequently cited
Public Security Minister Meng Jianzhu, Qinghai Party
Secretary Qiang Wei, and Tibet Autonomous Region
Party Secretary Zhang Qingli as possible candidates
to replace Wang Lequan in Xinjiang.
3. (C) As Wang remained in place through late
October and into early November, however, contacts
began to observe that Wang could remain in Xinjiang.
Wang Xiaodong (protect), a well-known nationalist
author who contributed to the best-selling book
"Unhappy China," told PolOffs October 20 that Wang
would likely keep his job. Wang Xiaodong, who also
works for the CYL-operated opinion polling
organization China Youth and Children Research
Center (Zhongguo Qingshaonian Yanjiu Zhongxin), said
the September 3 demonstrations, during which
thousands of Urumqi's Han residents took to the
streets to demand Wang Lequan's resignation,
ironically served to ensure Wang's survival as
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) Party
Secretary. The CCP, Wang said, had created a
"dangerous precedent" by firing Urumqi Party
Secretary Li Zhi in response to the September 3
demonstrations. Removing Wang Lequan in response to
public pressure, even as part of a nominal promotion
to Beijing, could encourage similar demonstrations
in other provinces. The Party, Wang Xiaodong
warned, could not afford to let the public believe
that mass demonstration was an effective way of
removing an unpopular party secretary. Removing
Wang Lequan from Xinjiang would be difficult, he
added, because after 16 years as Party Secretary
Wang was "deeply entrenched" in the XUAR. Wang
Xiaodong predicted that the CCP was likely to let
Wang Lequan retire quietly in a few years. (Note:
BEIJING 00003127 002 OF 004
Wang Lequan was born in 1944, meaning he will reach
67, the usual retirement age for high-level cadres,
in 2011.)
4. (C) Ilham Tohti (protect), a Uighur economist at
Beijing's Central University for Nationalities who
was detained for six weeks following the July 5
riots, told PolOffs October 28 that the CCP had been
prepared to recall Wang Lequan from Xinjiang until
the September 3 demonstration caused the Party to
recalculate. Tohti predicted Wang Lequan would
remain in place until at least the "next major CCP
meeting of 2010," such as the Fifth CCP Plenum in
fall 2010. Dildar Eziz (protect), a prominent
Uighur author who works for the Xinjiang Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC),
told PolOff November 6 that President Hu Jintao's
late August visit to Xinjiang had served to shore up
Wang Lequan's political position. During the visit,
Hu had praised Wang's rule of Xinjiang during
meetings with Party cadres, which praise was
intended to convey the message that Wang would be
staying put, Eziz said. Ma Rong (protect), a Peking
University sociologist and frequent advisor to the
CCP United Front Work Department, also cited Hu
Jintao's support as the key reason Wang would keep
his post. Wang Lequan, Ma told PolOff November 12,
recently had told his staff that he planned to
remain in Urumqi "for another three years." Ma,
like Wang Xiaodong, predicted the CPP would "handle"
Wang Lequan simply by letting him stay in Urumqi
until he retired.
But Does He Still Call the Shots in Xinjiang?
---------------------------------------------
5. (C) Though most Embassy contacts now predict Wang
Lequan will remain in Xinjiang at least until 2010,
most said his political authority and standing
within the Party had diminished because of a wide-
spread perception that he had botched the early
response to the July 5 riots. Ilham Tohti said
that, following the July unrest, the central
government no longer deferred to Wang Lequan on
policy matters related to the XUAR and ethnic
affairs. "Xinjiang had been the donkey that led the
(central government) camel," Tohti said, "but not
anymore." Similarly, Wang Xiaodong relayed that
Wang Lequan and other high-level Xinjiang leaders
had been severely criticized during internal Party
meetings immediately after the riots, which
criticism had reduced Wang's standing in the CCP.
6. (C) Wang Xiaodong, citing personal contacts in
the People's Armed Police (PAP), added that PAP
commanders in Urumqi had been prepared to move much
faster the night of July 5 to quell the violence but
had found that the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau
paralyzed by indecision. This, according to Wang,
was one reason Xinjiang PSB head Liu Yaohua had been
fired in September, but many PAP officials also
blamed Wang Lequan for delaying the order to
mobilize the PAP. Eziz, however, expressed
skepticism that Wang Lequan's authority had
significantly diminished in the wake of the July 5
riot. "So long as Wang Lequan is physically present
in Urumqi, he will continue to wield power," she
said.
Han Flight
----------
7. (C) Several contacts noted that the July riots
had resulted in a Han exodus from Xinjiang. Dildar
Eziz, who owns several properties in Urumqi, said
the departure of Han from the city had impacted the
housing market. Apartment prices once as high as
RMB 5,000 per square meter had fallen to RMB 2,000
after the July 5 riots. She said property prices
had fallen especially sharply in the Saimachang
district, one of the hotspots of the July riots.
Beijing University's Ma Rong, who specializes in the
study of internal migration to Tibet and other
minority regions, also observed that Han migrant
workers were leaving the XUAR out of fear of further
violence. Ilham Tohti said that well before the
riot Han were already starting to leave Xinjiang in
pursuit of higher-wage jobs in China's coastal
provinces. Han children raised in Han "bing tuan"
BEIJING 00003127 003 OF 004
(the quasi-military Xinjiang Production and
Construction Corps) enclaves were less willing to
remain in Xinjiang than their parents because of
diminished job opportunities. Population dynamics
in Xinjiang were fundamentally different than in
Tibet, where high salaries continued to attract Han
migrants, Tohti observed. Even before the riot the
Chinese government had been having difficulty
maintaining sizable Han populations in Xinjiang
cities and towns outside of Urumqi.
8. (C) Not all Embassy contacts viewed the Han
exodus as a serious problem. He Weifang (protect),
a liberal Beijing University legal scholar currently
teaching at a university in Shihezi, about 100 miles
northwest of Urumqi, told PolOffs October 21 that he
knew of some Han leaving Xinjiang because of the
July 5 riot, including a colleague at Xinjiang
Normal University who was seeking job opportunities
in Guangzhou in an attempt to leave the region.
However, Professor He said he believed that Han
migration from the XUAR was a temporary phenomenon.
He noted that housing prices in Shihezi were
actually rising, which he attributed to the city's
strong local economy and majority Han ethnic makeup.
The Search for Answers
----------------------
9. (C) Tohti said that a major difference between
views on the July unrest in Xinjiang and those on
the March 2008 unrest in Tibet was the rejection, by
both the general public and elites, of the official
propaganda on the Urumqi riots. In the Tibet case,
most Han accepted the government version, which
blamed the 2008 violence on a small number of
separatists working on the orders of the Dalai Lama.
However, nobody, according to Tohti, believed
official statements that World Uighur Congress
President Rebiya Kadeer had masterminded the July
riots. The Xinjiang riots, he said, had created a
rift between the Communist Party and Han residents
in the XUAR that did not exist in Tibet. Ma Rong
said that the public skepticism had been caused by
Wang Lequan's attempts to manage Han anger by
covering up the extent of the violence. The actual
death toll from the July riots, Ma asserted, "was
nearly one thousand," of whom "95 percent" were Han,
mainly migrant workers. (Note: The official death
toll is 197.) Authorities, Ma Rong said, could not
reveal the real figures for fear they would spark a
new round of Han reprisals against Uighurs.
10. (C) Several academic contacts told us that the
Xinjiang unrest had prompted numerous government
agencies to commission "internal" (neibu) academic
studies to examine the underlying causes of the
Urumqi riots. Wang Xiaodong said a colleague
working with the Xinjiang People's Armed Police had
told him of opinion polls commissioned by the PAP
that sought to clarify the causes of the violence.
Ma Rong said that he had been invited to attend a
major conference on bilingual education in Xinjiang
the week of November 16, which he characterized as
part of the government's response to worsening
ethnic tensions. Pan Jiao (protect), a sociologist
at Central University for Nationalities, told PolOff
November 13 that many academics specializing in
minority affairs had been tasked to work on internal
research projects, which reflected the Party's
genuine surprise over the Xinjiang unrest. "The
leadership," Pan said, "could not believe something
like this could happen at a time when China is doing
so well overall."
Focus on Employment as Key Issue
--------------------------------
11. (C) According to Pan Jiao and other academic
sources, many internal studies were focusing on high
Uighur unemployment as a factor contributing to
ethnic tensions. Tohti told PolOffs that, despite
his status as an outspoken critic of Chinese policy
in Xinjiang, friends in the State Ethnic Affairs
Commission had been sharing internal reports on the
July riots with him and asking for his comments.
Tohti said the main policy proposal to emerge in the
wake of the July riots was a plan to limit
importation of Han workers to the XUAR by requiring
BEIJING 00003127 004 OF 004
that Xinjiang companies hire at least 50 percent of
their workers from the local community. Although
the policy did not include hiring quotas for
Uighurs, the 50-percent regulation would, if
implemented, increase Uighur employment. Dildar
Eziz said that while she had heard of similar ideas
to improve Uighur employment, she doubted the
proposals would have any meaningful impact since few
large companies operated in predominantly Uighur
cities like Hotan (Hetian) and Kashgar (Kashi). She
predicted the programs would have many loopholes and
would not change the fact that Han employers only
hired Uighurs "as a last resort." Tohti said that
the Han out-migration from Xinjiang was providing
more job opportunities for Uighurs and more space
for minority-owned businesses to develop. Eziz,
though acknowledging these developments, said the
changes would be temporary. Uighurs remained on the
economic margins, she said, doing the most difficult
jobs for the least pay.
HUNTSMAN
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