主题：【原创】欧元区救助计划的一些技术细节 -- 我爱莫扎特

在刚开始，欧元就没有未来，只是还没有人意识到而已。

且不谈奥地利学派关于市场 VS 政府的看法，让我们看看它是如何成功预测欧元危机的。

1. When the euro starts, in essence a bunch of unreliable countries write an irresponsible naked put, pledging that “a euro in a Greek bank is equal in value to a euro in a German bank.” It isn’t. They bust their fiscal futures, though few people see this up front.

1. 欧元的出现，其实就是一群不靠谱的国家写了一张不负责任的保证书：”我们保证每一张在希腊银行里的欧元跟在德国银行里的欧元是等价的。“ 实际上...这怎么可能呢？ 在刚开始，欧元就没有未来，只是还没有人意识到而已。

2. At first markets believe these pledges and perceive expanded gains from trade, including from lending.

2. 一开始，市场以为这些保证书，贸易盈余和借款字据都是真实有效的。

3. Trade and lending across Europe expand, and this includes housing bubbles in some of the countries. Some of this expansion is sustainable, but some of it isn’t. Eventually the parts which are not sustainable become manifest. The PIIGS are not up to the standards they set for themselves and ultimately they can’t credibly make good on those naked puts they wrote.

3. 于是横跨欧洲，借款和贸易如火如荼，不少国家开始制造起了房产泡沫。这些火热景象，部分有市场支持，更多的没有。到最后这些无法自我维持的举债和繁荣渐渐被大家发现了。大家发现猪脑五国（葡萄牙，意大利，爱尔兰，希腊，西班牙，首字母合写为PIIGS）根本达不到他们给自己设置的标准。大家发现他们根本实现不了他们写下的保证书。

4. Eventual debt troubles induce (some would say require) fiscal austerity, rightly or wrongly. This brings about the original Prices and Production result that “the consumer demand simply isn’t there to support the new commitments.”

4. 无法还债的国家们走投无路，只好紧缩银根。这导致了米塞斯的名作《价格和生产》里所描述的景象：“消费者根本没有需求要买那么多东西”。企业现金流非常吃紧。

5. More fundamentally, at some point the bank deposits (yikes) are no longer there to see through the new projects and commitments at various local levels. That’s scary.

5. 更关键是，银行的扩张过度导致他们手上的资本无法支撑地方商业的贷款了。真可怕啊。

6. A Hayekian contraction ensues, compounded by Keynesian AD negative shock problems. The imposition of tougher capital standards on the banks, combined with bank attempts to unload the crummy bonds, speeds the downward path.

6. 于是企业破产，哈耶克预言的那种紧缩袭来。更高的准备金率和银行抛掉坏账的努力，加速了这种自由落体。

7. It also becomes revealed that the expansion of the German export sector isn’t quite as permanent as it seemed at the time. Periphery demands for German goods are down and if the eurozone splinters the new “deutschmark” could have quite a high value. Eventually a Hayekian contraction will ensue for Germany as well, although this is just starting.

7. 然后人们又突然发现，德国出口的扩张好像不像大家想的那样会永垂不朽。别国的经济危机终究会让德国出口放缓。再加上如果欧元区解体，新的“马克”将会有很高的汇率，再次打击德国出口。最终，“哈耶克紧缩”也会降临到德国身上。现在我们已经看到了这种苗头。

8. What about the USandA? This is the least certain part of the story, but here goes. The creation of the eurozone financialized Europe to a much greater degree and U.S. borrowers assumed this financialization was permanent, more or less. It isn’t! Our shadow banking system could see a very significant whiplash from all of this turmoil, possibly culminating in (shadow) bank runs over here too. We are trying to gently unwind our shadow banking system connections with Europe but we may not have the time. By the way, trying to unwind those ties just causes Europe to unravel more quickly, so we are like a dog trying to chase our own tail.

8. 至于美国呢？美国的未来是最不确定的。但让我们半猜半预测一下。欧元区的产生使得资本更多得流向了欧洲。美国的借贷者也以为这种资本流向会永垂不朽。但是王菲同志教导我们，没有什么会永垂不朽。现在抽在欧洲银行身上的鞭子最终也要抽在美国银行身上，甚至可能以一场银行挤兑而终结。美国现在尝试剪开他们与欧洲银行业千丝万缕的信贷联系。但是，可能，已经太晚了。这种切割工作还可能让欧洲更快地瓦解炒成碎片。美国现在的处境，就像拼命想咬自己尾巴的狗。

And so ends my Austro-Austrian tract.

这就是奥地利学派关于欧元区预测的过去，现在和未来。