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主题:【讨论】【整理】阎学通《纽约时报》:中国如何击败美国 -- fride

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家园 【讨论】【整理】阎学通《纽约时报》:中国如何击败美国

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/21/opinion/how-china-can-defeat-america.html?pagewanted=all

WITH China’s growing influence over the global economy, and its increasing ability to project military power, competition between the United States and China is inevitable. Leaders of both countries assert optimistically that the competition can be managed without clashes that threaten the global order.

Most academic analysts are not so sanguine. If history is any guide, China’s rise does indeed pose a challenge to America. Rising powers seek to gain more authority in the global system, and declining powers rarely go down without a fight. And given the differences between the Chinese and American political systems, pessimists might believe that there is an even higher likelihood of war.

I am a political realist. Western analysts have labeled my political views “hawkish,” and the truth is that I have never overvalued the importance of morality in international relations. But realism does not mean that politicians should be concerned only with military and economic might. In fact, morality can play a key role in shaping international competition between political powers — and separating the winners from the losers.

I came to this conclusion from studying ancient Chinese political theorists like Guanzi, Confucius, Xunzi and Mencius. They were writing in the pre-Qin period, before China was unified as an empire more than 2,000 years ago — a world in which small countries were competing ruthlessly for territorial advantage.

It was perhaps the greatest period for Chinese thought, and several schools competed for ideological supremacy and political influence. They converged on one crucial insight: The key to international influence was political power, and the central attribute of political power was morally informed leadership. Rulers who acted in accordance with moral norms whenever possible tended to win the race for leadership over the long term.

China was unified by the ruthless king of Qin in 221 B.C., but his short-lived rule was not nearly as successful as that of Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty, who drew on a mixture of legalistic realism and Confucian “soft power” to rule the country for over 50 years, from 140 B.C. until 86 B.C.

According to the ancient Chinese philosopher Xunzi, there were three types of leadership: humane authority, hegemony and tyranny. Humane authority won the hearts and minds of the people at home and abroad. Tyranny — based on military force — inevitably created enemies. Hegemonic powers lay in between: they did not cheat the people at home or cheat allies abroad. But they were frequently indifferent to moral concerns and often used violence against non-allies. The philosophers generally agreed that humane authority would win in any competition with hegemony or tyranny.

Such theories may seem far removed from our own day, but there are striking parallels. Indeed, Henry Kissinger once told me that he believed that ancient Chinese thought was more likely than any foreign ideology to become the dominant intellectual force behind Chinese foreign policy.

The fragmentation of the pre-Qin era resembles the global divisions of our times, and the prescriptions provided by political theorists from that era are directly relevant today — namely that states relying on military or economic power without concern for morally informed leadership are bound to fail.

Unfortunately, such views are not so influential in this age of economic determinism, even if governments often pay lip service to them. The Chinese government claims that the political leadership of the Communist Party is the basis of China’s economic miracle, but it often acts as though competition with the United States will be played out on the economic field alone. And in America, politicians regularly attribute progress, but never failure, to their own leadership.

Both governments must understand that political leadership, rather than throwing money at problems, will determine who wins the race for global supremacy.

Many people wrongly believe that China can improve its foreign relations only by significantly increasing economic aid. But it’s hard to buy affection; such “friendship” does not stand the test of difficult times.

How, then, can China win people’s hearts across the world? According to ancient Chinese philosophers, it must start at home. Humane authority begins by creating a desirable model at home that inspires people abroad.

This means China must shift its priorities away from economic development to establishing a harmonious society free of today’s huge gaps between rich and poor. It needs to replace money worship with traditional morality and weed out political corruption in favor of social justice and fairness.

In other countries, China must display humane authority in order to compete with the United States, which remains the world’s pre-eminent hegemonic power. Military strength underpins hegemony and helps to explain why the United States has so many allies. President Obama has made strategic mistakes in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, but his actions also demonstrate that Washington is capable of leading three foreign wars simultaneously. By contrast, China’s army has not been involved in any war since 1984, with Vietnam, and very few of its high-ranking officers, let alone its soldiers, have any battlefield experience.

America enjoys much better relations with the rest of the world than China in terms of both quantity and quality. America has more than 50 formal military allies, while China has none. North Korea and Pakistan are only quasi-allies of China. The former established a formal alliance with China in 1961, but there have been no joint military maneuvers and no arms sales for decades. China and Pakistan have substantial military cooperation, but they have no formal military alliance binding them together.

To shape a friendly international environment for its rise, Beijing needs to develop more high-quality diplomatic and military relationships than Washington. No leading power is able to have friendly relations with every country in the world, thus the core of competition between China and the United States will be to see who has more high-quality friends. And in order to achieve that goal, China has to provide higher-quality moral leadership than the United States.

China must also recognize that it is a rising power and assume the responsibilities that come with that status. For example, when it comes to providing protection for weaker powers, as the United States has done in Europe and the Persian Gulf, China needs to create additional regional security arrangements with surrounding countries according to the model of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization — a regional forum that includes China, Russia and several central Asian countries.

And politically, China should draw on its tradition of meritocracy. Top government officials should be chosen according to their virtue and wisdom, and not simply technical and administrative ability. China should also open up and choose officials from across the world who meet its standards, so as to improve its governance.

The Tang dynasty — which lasted from the 7th century to the 10th and was perhaps China’s most glorious period — employed a great number of foreigners as high-ranking officials. China should do the same today and compete with America to attract talented immigrants.

OVER the next decade, China’s new leaders will be drawn from a generation that experienced the hardships of the Cultural Revolution. They are resolute and will most likely value political principles more than material benefits. These leaders must play a larger role on the world stage and offer more security protection and economic support to less powerful countries.

This will mean competing with the United States politically, economically and technologically. Such competition may cause diplomatic tensions, but there is little danger of military clashes.

That’s because future Chinese-American competition will differ from that between the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war. Neither China nor America needs proxy wars to protect its strategic interests or to gain access to natural resources and technology.

China’s quest to enhance its world leadership status and America’s effort to maintain its present position is a zero-sum game. It is the battle for people’s hearts and minds that will determine who eventually prevails. And, as China’s ancient philosophers predicted, the country that displays more humane authority will win.

Yan Xuetong, the author of “Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power,” is a professor of political science and dean of the Institute of Modern International Relations at Tsinghua University. This essay was translated by Zhaowen Wu and David Liu from the Chinese.

随着中国对全球经济不断增长的影响力,以及其不断增强的军事投射能力,在中美之间的竞争是不可避免的。两国领导人都乐观地声称,这种竞争不会导致威胁世界秩序的碰撞。

大部分学院分析人士却并不乐观。如果以史为鉴,那么中国的崛起确实对美国提出了挑战。崛起中的力量寻求在全球体系中获得更多的权威,而衰落的力量则很少不战而退。并且由于中美政治体系之间的分歧,悲观主义者也许相信会有更大的战争可能性。

我是一个政治现实主义者。西方分析家们给我的政治观点贴上了“鹰派”的标签,而事实却是我从不高估道德在国际关系中的重要性。然而现实主义并非意味着政治家应当仅仅关注于经济和军事力量。事实上,道德可以在国际竞争中的政治力量之间起到关键作用——并且区分胜者和败者。

我是从对古代政治理论家如管子、孔子、荀子和孟子那里得出这样的结论的。他们在先秦时期著书立说,在2000多年以前,中国尚未统一为一个帝国的时候——一个如此这般的世界,在其中各个小国为了地区优势而展开残酷的竞争。

那或许是中国思想最辉煌的年代,并且不少学派为了意识形态的统治权和政治的影响力展开竞争。他们融会到一个重要的洞见:国际影响的关键是政治权力,政治权力的中心属性是王道。那些行事与道德规范相一致的统治者,无论是如何可能的,就长远来看都倾向于在领导地位的竞赛中获得优胜。

中国在公元前221年由残暴的秦王所统一,但是他短命的统治却无法与汉武帝的功业相比。汉武帝以施行了一套外法内儒的混合制度的方式,在位超过50年,从公元前140年至公元前86年。

根据古代中国哲学家荀子,有三种类型的统治方式:仁政、霸道和暴政(故用国者,义立而王,信立而霸,权谋立而亡)。仁政得内外民心。暴政——建立在军事力量的基础上——不可避免会树敌。霸道则居间:他们不欺瞒内部的人民也不欺瞒外部的盟友。但是他们时常对道德关注不关心并且经常针对非盟友使用暴力。哲学家们总体上同意,仁政会在与霸道或者暴政的任何竞争中胜利。

这样的理论似乎与我们自己的时代相距甚远了,然而仍然存在惊人的类比。实际上,亨利基辛格曾经向我透露,他相信古代中国思想比起任何外来意识形态来才是中国外交政策背后主导性的精神力量。

先秦时代的破碎化与我们当今时代分裂状况有着相似之处,并且由那个时代的政治理论家所提供的药方恰恰直接与今天相关——即依赖军事或者经济力量而不行王道的国家必将失败。

不幸地是,如此这般的观点在当今经济决定论的时代并没有多少影响力,即便政府们总是口头上承认他们。中国政府声称共产党的政治领导中国经济奇迹的根基,然而它似乎表现得如此,好像与美国的竞争只会在经济领域内展开那样。而在美国,政治家们定期地把他们的领导归诸于进展,而却从未归诸于失败。

双方的政府都必须明白是政治领导力而不是向问题当中砸钱,才决定谁是赢得世界主导权之竞赛的一方。

许多人错误地相信中国可以通过显著地提升其经济援助就可以改善其对外关系。但是爱是很难被收买到的;这样的“友谊”并不能经受困境的检验。

那么中国如何能够在世界上赢得民心?根据中国古代先贤,这必须首先在国内实现。仁政开始于在国内创建一个值得追随的模范,这一模范可以进一步激励国外的人民。

这就意味着中国必须把其主要目标从经济发展转换为建立一种消灭当今如此之大贫富差距的和谐社会。它需要把拜金主义转换为传统伦理价值并且剪除腐败而支持社会正义和社会公平。

在其他的国家,中国为了与美国竞争则必须行仁政,而美国仍然是世界上主导性的霸权力量。军事力量支撑了霸权并且有助于解释美国为何有如此多的盟友。奥巴马总统在阿富汗、伊拉克和利比亚犯下了战略错误,然而他的行为也展现出了华盛顿有能力同时展开三场对外战争。相较而言,中国军队自1984(与越南)年以来就没有卷入过任何战争,并且很少的高级军官拥有实战经验,更不用提士兵了。

与中国相比,美国享有着与世界其他国家更好的外交关系,无论是从数量上还是从质量上来看。美国有着超过50个正式的军事同盟国,而中国一个也没有。朝鲜与巴基斯坦仅仅是中国的准同盟。前者在1961年与中国建立了正式同盟关系,然而却几十年间没有军事联合演练和军售行为。中国和巴基斯坦有着实质性的军事合作,但是两者没有将他们联系在一起的正式军事同盟。

为了塑造一个对其崛起来说友好的国际环境,北京比华盛顿更需要发展更多高质量的外交和军事关系。没有一个领导性力量可以和世界上每一个国家有着友好关系,因此中美竞争的核心还是在于谁拥有更多的优质伙伴。为了实现这一目标,中国必须比美国提供更优质的道德领导力。

中国也必须意识到它是一个崛起中的力量并且认可随着其地位而来的责任。例如当需要为弱小力量提供保护的时候,正如美国在欧洲和波斯湾所做的那样,中国需要在上海合作组织的框架下和邻国建立额外的地区安全部署,上合组织则是一个包括了中俄以及一些中亚国家的地区性论坛。

唐朝——这一朝代从7世纪延续到10世纪并且也许是中国史上最辉煌的时代——雇佣了大量外国人作为高级将领。中国在今天同样也需要为了吸引优质移民与美国展开竞争。

在下一个十年,中国的新一代领导人将会从经历过文革那段困难时期的一代人中挑选出来。他们更为坚定并且极为可能比起物质利益来更为珍视政治原则。这些领导人需要在世界舞台上发挥更大作用,并且为弱国提供更多的安全保护和经济支持。

这就意味着与美国政治上、经济上和科技上的竞争。如此这般的竞争会遭致外交关系上的紧张,但是却不会有太大军事冲突的风险。

这是因为未来的中美竞争与冷战中的美苏争霸有所不同。不仅中国还有美国都无需代理人战争来保护其战略利益或者获得自然资源和科技。

中国加强其世界领导地位的任务和美国维持其现有地位的努力是场零和游戏。一场争夺民心的战役才会决定谁能够最终获胜。并且,正如中国古代先贤所预言的那样,义立而王。

阎学通,《古代中国思想与当代中国力量》的作者。清华大学政治学教授,清华大学现代国际关系研究所所长。这篇论文由Zhaowen Wu和David Liu由中文所转译

PS:正版原文好像没在网上看到,我自己就随便翻译了一下

关键词(Tags): #政治通宝推:sitan,本嘉明,
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