主题：【翻译】对朝鲜战争步兵战斗与武器使用的评注（1950冬—1951年)II -- 徐荣

我对本文预定的翻译计划已经完成，现在回过头来介绍研究背景，下一阶段将补充翻译前面一些因篇幅较长而暂时跳过的战例，并对全文进行整体修订。

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研究背景

这份关于步兵和支援武器的报告，包括一些针对战术和训练的应用及存在问题的评论，它们是以对1950年11月1日到1951年3月1日期间第八集团军和第十军在朝鲜的战斗行动的研究为基础的。

研究人员研究的这些战斗主要来自我军在清川江边、长津湖畔与中共军队交锋的十一月会战和使第八集团军重返汉江一线的二月攻势。这项调查并不涉及参加这些行动的所有部队，在有限时间内，以有限人力不可能调查所有部队。然而，这次调查涉及了直接参加十一月会战中的大多数战斗和二月攻势中的关键战斗的全部细节。在十二月和一月，第八集团军主要把时间花在脱离战斗和重新整编上，双方并无决定性的交火，因此可认为这次调查的发现对于冬季的军事行动具有相当的代表性。

对十一月会战的调查涉及了第2步兵师、陆战1师和第25步兵师的全部军事行动，也有第7步兵师军事行动的某些细节。这四个师承受了敌军进攻的主要压力。在对二月战斗的研究中，第25步兵师处于焦点；在调查中，也有与第3步兵师和第1骑兵师的指挥官们反复核对后确认资料真伪的机会，尽管没有对这两个师的连级部队进行研究。

研究中取得的发现基于50场个别战斗，在这些战斗中，每个步兵连或炮兵连在作战中都遭受着严重压力。此外，在七场战斗中，规模大于连级的部队在公路上以纵队队形行进时遭遇了伏击，不可能再编组战术单位并将它们成建制地展开迎敌，研究人员也对这些战斗进行了细致的研究。在朝鲜，从此类事件中，我军吸取了许多经验教训。

获取并综合朝鲜战争中军事行动的资料的方法依据“岛屿上的胜利”一书描述的标准操作程序，该书包括指导二战战史专家开展工作的备忘录。

如果一个步兵连或炮兵连经历过关键、危急或有启发性的战斗，采访者一到达该部队，就应该集合当前该部队所有的生还者，包括该部队的军官，最好还有其直接上级的指挥官。

采访者不断提出问题，连队的所有成员都集合起来作为见证人，对于他们的参与，研究人员的人为操纵程度只需达到保证陈述能以时间顺列排列就可以了，于是，对这场战斗就可以进行从头到尾的史实重建。在讯问中，涉及战前阶段的相关细节如装备、单兵负载、单位弹药储备、任务、行军后的疲劳程度、防御部署、警报系统等。讯问也要延伸到战后阶段，在总结中将包括部队重整的情况、伤亡率、弹药和武器的缺陷等。

在研究现场是可以发现这些记录的，所有相关信息应在报告中具体表达。在对小部队的采访之前或结束以后，应询问师以上的高级参谋和指挥部门，因此指挥层人员对战斗的意见就能反映在报告中。

到目前为止，在这次分析中作为样本采集的所有的战斗，都以叙述形式记录下来了。这些叙述严密地描述了该部队遭遇到了什么情况，从排级到单兵彻底地说明该部队的战斗经历。

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

This report on infantry and supporting weapons, including some comment on the tactical and training application and problems thereof, is based upon study of the combat operations of the Eighth Army and X Corps, in Korea, during the period 1 November 1950 to 1 March 1951.

The actions taken under study were in the main those incident to the November battle with CCF (Chinese Communist Forces) along the Chongchon River and around the Chosen Reservoir and the February offensive by which the Eighth Army returned to the line of the Han River. The survey did not include all forces engaging in either of these operations; this was not possible within the limits of time and personnel available for the work, It did, however, cover in rather complete detail the preponderant part of the United States forces directly engaged by the November battle and the pivotal actions of the February offensive. As the months of December and January were devoted by the Eighth Army mainly to disengagement and reforming, with no decisive exchange of fire between the opposing sides, the findings are therefore considered fairly representative of winter operations as a whole.

From the November battle, the operations of 2nd Infantry Division, 1st Marine Division, and 25th Infantry Division were covered in full; there is also some detail on operations of 7th Infantry Division. These four sustained the main weight of the enemy attack. In the February fighting, 25th Infantry Division was the focal point of study; there was also opportunity to cross-check certain data with commanders in 3rd Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division, though no company studies were made within these organizations.

The findings are based upon the evaluation of approximately 50 separate actions in which either infantry companies or artillery batteries were fighting under conditions of exceptional stress. But in addition, there was close study of several actions in which forces of larger-than-company size became ambushed while traveling as a road column under conditions where it was no longer possible to form tactical units and deploy them organically against the enemy. Many of the major lessons from our experience in Korea are to be drawn from incidents of this character.

The method of procuring and co-relating the data in Korean operations was according to the SOP described in the book, “Island Victory,” which includes the memorandum written for the guidance of World War II combat historians.

A company or battery has been through a pivotal, critical, or instructive experience in battle. As promptly as the interviewer can get to the unit, it is formed with all survivors present, including its officers, and preferably, the commander at the next level up.

Under questioning by the interviewer, with all members of the assembly appearing as witnesses, and their participation being steered only to the extent which will enable the statements to be composed in chronological order, the action is then reconstructed from beginning to end. The interrogation covers the pre-combat period so as to include such pertinent detail as armament, individual load, unit ammunition reserve, missions, state of fatigue after approach march, defensive installations, system of alert, etc. It also extends into the post-combat phase so that the summary will include condition at reassembly, evacuation of casualties, ammunition and weapons shortages, etc.

Such records as are available in the field are studied on the spot, and all pertinent information is embodied in the report. Either prior to, or following the interviewing of the small units, the staff and command at all higher levels, up to and including Division, are interrogated so that the report will be furnished with that view of operations which obtains within the control echelons.

All of the unit actions from which this analysis was extracted have by now been written in narrative form. The narratives describe exactly what happened to the unit, accounting for its experience right down to the squad and individual level.

科目：步兵

Project DOUGHBOY

1951年10月27日，约翰 霍普金斯大学军事行动研究中心收录

Received 27 Oct 19 51，OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE，The Johns Hopkins University

1953年6月军事行动研究中心第二次印刷

Second Printing June 1953 By OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE

地址：马里兰州切维蔡斯市康涅狄格大道6410号

6410 Connecticut Avenue Chevy Chars, Maryland

原文目录页上的备注：

This Document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

1998年4月18日解密