主题：美军朝鲜战争中生物武器库一览（一） -- 石千里
家园 你自己从来没仔细看别人的回覆 老是叫别人看你的老帖子，这样对吗？
我的老帖子回覆在这里：（「请问」04-06）
http://view.ccthere.com/topic/2778365/38#C2823826
我这帖子里讨论 JCS 1837/26 问题，对於这半岛电视台认为此文件在1951年9月启动细菌战（也就是你剪贴後论证一大堆，说时间吻合的东东），用文忠志自己的文章，提出了时间性的质疑，其实也是在打文忠志自己的脸，因为他自己根本没考虑到这个时间性的东西。
既然你前面都没看，那我就在这里再贴重点好了。
＝＝＝
请问思炎哪里有这份JCS 1837/26 文件可以叁考？很多东西必须要眼见为实，因为太多这种阴谋论的东西都是跳跃式的结论。
举例来说，您这里引用的英文说这个文件是1951年9月JCS命令进行大规模测试。这很可能是作者耍的手段，拼凑欺骗没有深入思考的人，也就是说哗众取宠。
因为找不到这个文件，只能找找索引。就从google 上找到的注解资料，JCS 1837/26 文件全名应该是
"Biological Warfare: Memorandum by the Joint Advanced Study Committee for the Joint Chiefs of Staff", 21 September 191, JCS 1837/26
根据文志忠一篇文章，JCS 在1952年2月25-26日批准此文件，文号应是JCS 1837/29 （见注48）
http://www.yorku.ca/sendicot/ReplytoColCrane.htm
这里就有好几个问题值得讨论：
第一，这 1837/26 应该是 JASC 就生物战做的研究报告，虽然在1951年9月21日提交，但这并不是命令。为什麽您引用的文字作者要称这是在1951年9月 JCS 的命令？
第二，根据文志忠自己在上面文章引述的，JCS在1952年2月批准这份文件，真正的批令是1952年2月的 1837/29。但是批准的是什麽，再用文志忠自己的话：
In February 1952 when the joint chiefs approved the principle recommendations of its Joint Advanced Study Committee on Biological Warfare, 'that the United States acquire a strong offensive BW capability without delay,' and that, 'a sound military program requires the development of all effective means of waging war without regard for precedent as to their use,' it also approved a recommendation for, 'the adoption of a positive military policy to the effect that the United States will be prepared to employ BW whenever it is militarily advantageous.' The joint chiefs of staff ordered their staffs 'to prepare directives to the Services' to implement their decision.
这是什麽意思？也就是在2月底 JCS 要他们幕僚准备给各军种下有关对生物战做准备的指令。这里代表美国军方开始对生物战进行比较具规模的准备，但这跟生物武器有没有具体足够规模去使用，有没有真的使用无关。
第三，请回想一下，所谓细菌战的宣传什麽时候开始的？1951年5月中，在志愿军第五次战役遇到挫败之际。5月19日、24日和25日，中国政府发表声明说，美国正在准备使用细菌战，并且指责美国在朝鲜战场使用毒气，以便为细菌战做实验检查。连着一堆指控，到了1952年2月22日朝鲜、苏联指控美国使用细菌战，2月24日，周恩来指控美国细菌战。3月8日中国官方新闻媒体开始大规模报道关于美国在朝鲜战场使用细菌战的消息。美国JCS的「指令」都还在草拟阶段，朝鲜战场已经是大规模的使用了？
家园 你又一次看文章只看一段，文件上显示的批准日期 并不就代表，美军没有go ahead with the plan。 并不代表没有行动，最终是看事实的证据。
而且，你确定你看了全文吗？文志忠可也说了plausible deniability，我想你英语这么好，不用我解释了吧?
All the while the US government and its Central Intelligence Agency were operating under the guidance of a doctrine known as plausible deniability. Adopted by the National Security Council in 1948, this doctrine, in the words of CIA chief William E. Colby, meant that if the United States could deny something and not be clearly demonstrated as having said something falsely, then the United States could do so. (10) In other words certain United States government personnel and institutions could lie and cheat, do unpalatable, illegal or immoral things provided they could deny them successfully and not have the government tagged for them. Given these official guidelines is there any reason to be surprised that a secret offensive biological warfare project would, if necessary, become part of a carefully constructed and tangled web of disinformation and deceits?而且，你是引用他的文章中的一段作为你的论点，而他的论证结果偏偏不是支持你的所谓：美国没有细菌战的观点。
经过他的论证，他最后的总结可是：
Conclusion
The disappointment expressed by the U.S. military leadership in the progress of their biological warfare program by 1953 is consistent with Chinese reports of the results of what they took to be an experimental use of biological weapons in China and Korea. The experiments were unsuccessful in starting large-scale epidemics in the battle zone or along the enemy's transportation lines. The official Chinese history of the Korean War states that the Chinese army suffered less than 400 casualties from the biological weapons attacks in 1952. This report, if accurate, tends to confirm the American feelings of disappointment with their efforts. Chinese accounts give many examples of civilian casualties as the result of what were considered to be germ war attacks on the general populace but no over-all figures.
While American scientists and military engineers had been unable to achieve a lethal, easily disseminated, epidemic producing germ agent for use in battlefield conditions, the evidence suggests that for over one and a half years the US tried to do just that and still denies it. This is a black hole in US military history.
家园 拜托一下行不行 美军是无纪律、无组织的乱民是吧？在 JCS 命令批准之前，他们就能自己乱花经费、调派人员，开始大规模地生产准备训练是吧？还什麽 go ahead with plan?
而且，讨论是要看论证过程和证据的，哪有看结论的？我说文忠志论证错误，自己举的最重要证据之一（也就是半岛电视台所谓的第三份秘密文件）根本不支持美国在1952年初有能力进行细菌战。你现在不管文忠志的论证，却要我去看他的结论？到底是论证证据支持结论，还是结论支持论证？
你在学校写论文，别人质疑你的论证过程、及自相矛盾的资料时，你叫人去看自己的结论就行了吗？真是败给你了。
还有，像文忠志这里骂美国政府官员如何如何掩盖、说谎、提供不实信息，这也是证据？
要是这也是证据，那类似地指出中国和朝鲜记录不良，有许多为了政治目的修改历史的也不难找到，你要不要听听别人怎麽说的？
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/EB13Dg03.html
这里引用了美国学者对文忠志的书里无条件地使用中朝资料而未对其可靠性加以确认的作法批评得非常好：
"The authors acknowledge that after 20 years of research they have failed to turn up a single document in American archives that provides direct evidence for their claim. They therefore build a circumstantial case that relies heavily on documents provided by the North Koreans and the Chinese. In fact, the authors reproduce some of the nine Chinese photographs and captions, but they make no mention of the article in The Times, even though their bibliography cites a standard reference work by Milton Leitenberg that discusses the forgeries, mentions the experts by name and summarizes their conclusions. This is appalling.
"Carl Sagan used to say that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. The evidence Endicott and Hagerman present for their extraordinarily dubious claim is notable only for its weakness. The Chinese and North Koreans themselves had the means, motive and opportunity to fabricate evidence, and were known to rewrite history for propaganda purposes. Any plausible defense of the claim that the Americans were guilty of biological warfare in the Korean conflict must address the question of fabricated evidence. Endicott and Hagerman do not even raise it. If theirs is the best case that can be made for American germ warfare activities in China and Korea, it amounts to a dismissal of the charges and an exoneration of the accused."
「作者们（文忠志二人）承认他们经过20年的研究後，仍然无法在美国档案库中找到任何一份文件可以作为支持他们的说法理论（美国在朝战使用生物武器）的直接证据。因此，他们大量地依赖中国和朝鲜提供的文件来作为间接的证据。....
卡尔沙冈常说非比寻常的理论需要非比寻常的证据。文忠志等二人替他们非比寻常地可疑的理论所提出的证据的特点就是它们的薄弱不足。中国和朝鲜有方法、动机、与机会去伪造证据，而且众所皆知他们也为宣传目的而改写历史。任何要合理地支持所谓美国在朝鲜战争使用生物武器之说法的辩解，必须要面对回应有关假造证据的问题。文忠志等二人甚至连这提都不提。假如对美国在中国和朝鲜发动细菌战的指控所只能提出的最有力的证据不过是他们写的东西，那结果只会是控诉无法成案而被控者无罪清白。」
怎麽样，这样互控很有意思吧？
还有，我原来上面的答覆是在4月6日，最早的几个帖子之一。针对您资料里的最重要资料之一（文忠志和半岛电视台 the crucial third document）的质疑，本来就是切入重点的问题，您当时避而不答，要我回去看整个系列。
现在，终於又绕回到这个问题来，真累人啊。可是，您还是没给出一个明确的答覆。
到底文忠志这里的1952年2月批准，下指令，是不是推翻了你前面用1951年9月命令推演出来的一大堆所谓来得及在1952年初进行细菌战的说法呢？
很简单，说说是文忠志对了，还是您对了就行。
- 复 拜托一下行不行
家园 拜托你自己吧，yfb就是看了你那个回复，引出虚拟语气大论 到现在，人家都开盘了，yfb还没出来教一教大家这个虚拟语气的问题呢。
再浪费点时间吧，首先你还好意思提这个文件
1. 贴一下yfb提供的文件的一部分
外链图片需谨慎，可能会被源头改对你和yfb的谬论，石千里已经反驳了，你们好象放弃那个楼的讨论了，这里再给你贴出来：
这完全是yfb的错误理解，第七条是这么写的：＂If low production costs of BW agents can be realized, a partial solution may be offered to the acute need of maintaining a strong military posturefor long period without jeopardizing our economic structure. Further, the achievement of a BW capability may not compete with the procurement of our present weapons systems."可见这里没用任何虚拟语气，yfb需要重学英语语法。这样就表明撰写者们对降低生物武器成本很自信，并为决策者们展示了美好的前景＂可以长期保持军事上的优势而不妨碍经济发展＂，这与yfb的错误理解差了几亿光年。
如果yfb把前面几页一并贴出的话，我们就可以看到撰写者们是如何得到这些conclusions的，或许能直接证实美国用过细菌武器。而这一页上的几条只能显示美国可能用过生物武器，例如最上面的一条＂３. BW poessesses a great potential as a weapon of war＂(生物武器具有巨大的实战潜能)，＂5. A more vigorous test program including large scale field tests should be conducted to determine the effectiveness of specific BW agents under operational conditions＂(more表明他们已经做过类似的工作了，但还不够vigorous）。
此外，yfb的中文理解能力也有问题：＂不过有一点要指出的就是，按照中国方面的说法，美军在朝鲜打细菌战远在50年的12月就开始了。＂这有什么问题？因为中国的抗议书明明写着＂美国侵略军自１９５２年１月２８日起，连续多次使用以虐杀朝鲜和平人民及朝鲜人民军和中国人民志愿军为目的的，更大规模的细菌武器。＂清楚表明美国曾经用过细菌武器，规模没有这次大而已嘛。
2.我早就回答你了，看来你现在不跟我纠结这个第三的问题了，你找不到证据反驳我，而且你自己现在也说是第三份文件了。
A third crucial document – marked “Top Secret” – showed that in September 1951, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff issued orders to begin “large scale field tests… to determine the effectiveness of specific BW [bacteriological warfare] agents under operational conditions.”If these “field tests” were indeed undertaken, then they may have drawn again on the expertise of the Japanese biological warfare team.
那么，这里里的again一词充分说明了，日本细菌部队被美国人雇佣，而且不是第一次用到他们。并且，事实已证明如此了。LZ叫你看得最后链接中的文章，你偏不肯看，继续忽视到底是为何？？你这是来讨论沟通的吗？？？
文章中的链接了里已经说了，再给你这样闭着眼睛说话的人贴出来：
三月二十日國務院舉行記者招待會上，國務院發言人雪莉女士雖承認克文報導屬實並默認美國官方掩蓋「七三一」部隊之罪行，但對美國在韓戰中是否使用細菌戰問題無以奉告，因此，久懸不決的「究竟美國是否在韓戰使用了細菌戰，和石井四郎是否親赴韓國指揮細菌戰的問題」，今隨藤文的發表迎刃而解。而纪录片《肮脏的小秘密》也进一步证实了：前日军731人员证实了美国征调前日军“731部队”及“100”细菌部队罪恶累累的战犯及成员参与了朝鲜战争细菌战。其中包括， Shiro Ishii、Kitano Misaji、Colonel Ohta等。
3.你居然还说：
而且，讨论是要看论证过程和证据的，哪有看结论的？我是看过论证过程了,所以我同意文忠志的结论。
而你看过吗？你是不是故意不提啊。。。那好。。。我是不会一次次为你这种纯搅活的浪费时间和精力的， 我这里给你贴出来文忠志的论证过程，您的不是英语很好吗？有种你自己给大家翻译出来，然后一一反驳（用你自己说的话，请不要跳跃哦）。
The first episode concerns OPERATION TAKEOFF of President Truman's Psychological Strategy Board. This board had four contingency plans for the developing situation in Korea, and two of them incorporated 'novel weapons'. OPERATION TAKEOFF (renamed BROADBRIM) was to deal with a possible breakdown of the armistice negotiations that had begun on 27 July 1951, while OPERATION HUMMER (renamed AFFILIATE) was directed primarily to the period after a successful ceasefire negotiation, and was a plan to pressure the enemy during the political talks for a peace treaty to end the war. The second contingency never occurred, but the first did.
The negotiations for a ceasefire in Korea showed signs of breaking down shortly after they began, and were in fact suspended from 23 August until 25 October 1951. The Psychological Strategy Board [PSB] hurriedly approved TAKEOFF on 18 September 1951.(27) There are signs in the still heavily censored versions of the plan that TAKEOFF, which the head of the PSB signalled was to be handled on a 'need to know' basis, and which was framed on the basis of 'plausible deniability.' had some highly unusual aspects in support of 'the political, economic and military courses of action as planned for this eventuality that went far beyond a proposed leaflet drop on China. Collateral documents reveal the secretary of defence complaining about one of the annexes to the plan, having such military and political implications and demanding planning of such magnitude, that it should be more thoroughly considered by the PSB before being handed over for action. (28)
At the meeting for what was described as the covert implementation of Takeoff,on 3 October 1951, the service personnel were hesitant, even a little suspicious. Army General John Magruder confessed that he had delayed forwarding the plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although the documents carried a memo saying that it was an approved plan, the representative of the Pentagon wanted to know why there was no formal indication of this fact on the plan itself. Why was there no box carrying the facsimile signature of the person in authority? Why was there no indication that the plan was a numbered paper in the series of PSB formal papers?' After receiving assurances, General Magruder indicated to the meeting that he would 'probably forward the plan for action tomorrow.' (29) An uneasiness, an air of reluctance, was clearly evident.
Four days later, in accordance with 'an oral directive,' three Army colonels left Washington for a top secret trip to see General Ridgway, commander-in-chief of the Far East Command in Tokyo. (30) We do not know whether this trip was part of TAKEOFF. Perhaps it was a chance event. But in another coincidence, when US Air Force Colonel Andrew J. Evans, Jr., who had previously worked in the War Plans Division, was shot down by the Chinese in 1953, he told his captors that planning for the BW campaign in Korea had begun in October 1951. His statement was corroborated by another high ranking POW, Colonel Frank H. Schwable, chief of staff of the Marine air wing when he was shot down in Korea, who added that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had sent [their] directive by hand to General Ridgway in October 1951, ordering the initiation of bacteriological warfare in Korea on an initially small, experimental stage but in expanding proportions
The second episode concerns the dual role of the air force's Psychological Warfare Division as both responsible for propagandistic leaflet drops and for biological warfare planning and operations. This dual role requires historians to check any evidence appearing in US operations orders that the Chinese version of events, based on their direct evidence, may be the correct one, and that corroborates the information in the confessions of captured US flyers.(36) Very few air force operations orders for the Korean War have come to light. But those that have raise questions about some B-26 missions. On May 19 through May 23, for example, the operations orders dispatched thirty B-26 aircraft on armed reconnaissance night flights to designated areas of western North Korea to hunt and destroy vehicles and rolling stock. In each case one flight of four bombers was directed to a particular place where a railway bridge or short piece of the railroad had been attacked all day by fighter bombers. Late at night the four B-26s added their ten tons of high explosives to ensure the rail cut. The after-mission reports show that the bombardier of the last aircraft dropped two leaflet bombs labeled M-105 at the very end of the attack. (37) This bombing pattern fits well with that described by the Chinese following their interrogation of captured flyers Kenneth Enoch and John Quinn.
The Chinese claimed that germ attacks were carried out by the B-26s as part of regular bombing raids, and that the germ-infected feathers or insects came in 500-pound-size leaflet bombs labelled M-105. Their prisoners told them that these bombs were reported as duds or as having no visual results owing to darkness. The purpose of these attacks was to contaminate the bombed area and disrupt the work of repair crews trying to restore the rail line bringing supplies from China into North Korea. The Chinese claim is not inconsistent with our knowledge that the US leaflet bomb had in fact been adapted and standardized as a biological anti-crop bomb, and was also considered as an anti-personnel biological weapon against the supplies and equipment of the military supply system of enemy troops.
In the wake of our book the Historical Office of the Air Materiel Command at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio has published an historical study, 'Weapons of the U.S. Air Force: a selective listing, 1960-2000,' which lists the M105 as a biological bomb. Taking into account the evidence and analysis of our book this source confirms the link between the US Air Force biological ordinance, its use as recorded in the after-mission reports of the US Fifth Air Force in Korea and what the Chinese and North Koreans thought was happening to them on the ground via the M105 bomb. (38)
After the Chinese allegations gained world-wide attention, members of the 3rd Bomb Wing were questioned by the US Air Forces Office of Special Investigations to clear the air force of the charges. Colonel William G. Moore, commanding officer of the 3rd Bomb Wing from January to November 1952, signed a sworn statement declaring that while the allegations of germ warfare were entirely false, his flyers did fly leaflet missions, the purpose of which was to warn non-combatants in the areas adjacent to military targets that those targets were subject to attacks by USAF, thus enabling civilian personnel to avail themselves of an opportunity to escape injury and fatalities.
The appropriate time for humanitarian warnings to the villagers along the railway tracks would have been before and not after 100, 000 pounds of bombs dropped by thirty-six F-84 fighter bombers beginning in early morning and the loads of four B-26s late in the evening. Warning for the next time would ring rather hollow, since the cycle of bombing on these targets was weeks apart. Moreover, considering that millions of leaflets with humanitarian messages were being dropped by non-combat aircraft on a daily basis, one may question the purpose of this tiny offering from the leaflet bombs of the B-26s. The Chinese allegations of biological agents dropped in this fashion and in this combination can no longer be dismissed, since detailed evidence from both the US and Chinese archives show that they were quite feasible, they were in line with US capability for covert warfare and that they happened.
These two episodes support the charges made in February-March 1952 by China and North Korea that the United States was employing biological agents
这个论证过程，你怎么就偏偏看不到？？？
那好，你的态度既然如此，还是那句话，请您“不用拼凑式跳跃论证法”论证出我贴的纪录片和Endicott等我引用的文章，包括我的文章是阴谋论，论证出美军没有真的实施细菌战的计划，没有在朝鲜战争动用细菌战。
- 复 拜托一下行不行
家园 难道文说得没道理么？ 美国这边关于当时的资料销毁了不少，你到哪去找资料呢？不就只能靠推理找到迷失的那一环么？所以现在看来历史学家文忠志也好，美国的生物武器专家也好，海外的“民主运动”人士也好，甚至还有一些专业人士也好，可能都在用手摸象，所以你想相信谁的就会注定你屁股坐歪了，看不进去另一方合理的一部分了。不知道你为何揪住思炎不放，她的帖子里有资料不严谨很正常，但你觉得你指出的地方就一定对么？我承认我的屁股坐在中国的指控这一边，但我尽量从第三方的眼光去分析能查到的资料。我给你回贴说得还不够明显么？任何有道理的提问我都会在后面的帖子里提供答案，你着急个啥劲啊。如果你要提问，请不要延伸，严重影响心情。
另外，我从你和yfb的帖子里能看出你们还知道很多我们曾经并不知道的事，但显然二位不打算告诉我们那到底是咋回事。最后如果你觉得你有这个能力，请提供你认为Name Code Artichoke和肮脏的小秘密不能支持美国朝鲜战争中使用生物武器的证据。
家园 他是故意不提文的论证过程。我贴出来，让他自己翻译解释反驳
- 复 说实在的
家园 看看，又开始扯上了。 你和yfb比较难沟通，似乎误解他人的地方太多了些，你的疑问我让你看最后那份引用的东西，那是思炎的帖子了？提及思炎的问题，我认为更多的是你和yfb没看她的全文，甚至有些回答，而是以为自己的理解是对的就开始瞎扯，并且态度很恶劣。
我这个关于美国用流行性出血热病毒的帖子远没结束，还早着呢。我到“政大典藏”去找过日本人的原文，可惜没有。至于日本细菌战鬼子人数的问题，看来你又没仔细看我的帖子，除了731，日本鬼子还有其他细菌战部队，我尚未确定的总数是3000多骨干逃回了日本，而落入苏联之手的只有100来人，这跟思炎的资料来源不一样，有啥好质疑的？
你最后这一段是你和yfb典型的做法，白的先描成灰的，然后再描成黑的，这下谁都不好意思说谁了，你觉得是不是应该有个“度”来衡量一下是非曲直。就凭你最后这一段，我觉得你真的比较萎缩。
我本来希望你和yfb能自己收集整理一些资料来讨论，不过我不认为你们两个有那个能力和那份心态比北明和Milton Leitenberg做得更好，我有时间去“破”你们制造的垃圾，还不如直接去和他们的东西较劲。
家园 对战沙的筒子们要求不要太高了，呵呵 家园 关于政大的 政大那里，只有内容提要。要校内的才能看到。
而且还有一篇《戰後日本生物化學部隊如何逃避東京大審》，也是藤井志津枝的。
編號: A199605006
篇名: 戰後日本生物化學部隊如何逃避東京大審
How Japanese Biochemical Crops Escaped from the Tokyo Trial After the War
作者: 藤井志津枝 Fujii Shizue
刊名: 國立政治大學學報
期數: V.72 part 1
頁次: 33(P.151-183)
出版日期: 1996.05
類別: 人文學科類
pdf全文: (電子全文限校內瀏覽)
[摘要]
筆者在〝第二次中日戰爭期間日本生物化學部隊組織之研究〞（『近代中國』第一百期、
一百零一期）一文中指出，日軍在二次大戰期間，曾為迅速開發有效的生化武器，不惜以
中國、蘇俄、蒙古和韓國的俘虜與平民為實驗對象，因而殺害無辜者三千多人（註一）。
當然日軍亦知此種作法不為世人所容，因此當蘇聯於一九四五年八月九日向日本宣戰時，
即積極設法隱匿準備細菌戰的日本關東軍第七三一部隊，將其設施破壞並緊急將人員送回
日本。然而，由於部份支部撤退不及遭蘇軍逮捕，使得日軍從事生化戰的事實暴露。因此
，在日本投降之後，蘇聯曾向盟軍司令部要求引渡石井四郎、北野政次等元凶，以進行戰
爭犯罪的軍事審判。
就常理而言，盟軍司令部應有義務將石井等人交付遠東軍事審判法庭（註二），或在其後
的哈巴羅夫斯克軍事法庭（註三）接受審判。但是，麥克阿瑟卻在美國國防部的指示之下
，奉命用軍艦將這些戰犯暫時送到美國藏匿，進而勸誘他們提供細菌戰的資料，以作為換
取免究戰犯罪責的條件。尤有甚者，石井等人在抵達美國之後，即受雇於正在積極準備生
化戰的美國陸軍生物戰本部。他們在此供出一切關於第七三一部隊細菌武器的資料，而美
軍則根據此一情報和資料再做進一步的研究。
其後，由於美軍在遠東地區的實際需要，使得被秘密送往美國的石井等人，又再由美國送
回日本，協助美國駐日陸軍第四○六細菌部隊。當時，石井等人的主要任務是協助該部隊
發展生化戰計劃，並專門從事對韓國當地流行性疾病，以及韓國特有的老鼠與昆蟲等進行
研究工作。在一九五○年十一月間，美國陸軍公佈的新武器名單中，赫然出現「細菌戰用
炸彈」這一項目。此種新式武器曾於韓戰中使用的事實，後來被「國際科學調查團」（註
四）所揭發，並詳載於調查美軍在韓從事細菌戰的報告書內。在其後的越戰中，美軍更延
用更具威力的生化武器攻擊北越，使北越蒙受慘重的損失，其後遺症甚至影響至今。
本文旨在探討此段時期日美生物化學戰人員的動向，進而揭露美國不但掩飾石井等戰犯的
罪責，甚至利用其犯罪技術助其稱霸世界的行為。美國此舉無異將自己推上歷史審判的被
告席
http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/cgi-bin/gs31/gsweb.cgi?o=dnccujrn
家园 1952年美国已经能够分离汉他病毒并有办法散布？ 我只能说，这是很好的科普材料，但是在重点上（朝鲜战争中的细菌战）还是无关。没有证据能证明美国在朝鲜战争时有能力散布流行性出血热病毒，甚至您这里提到的东西也只是日本在研究这个做为细菌战的一部份。
您最好能提出比较直接的证据而不是跟思炎一样人云亦云。
至於思炎，我只能说，她甚至连中央文件、战俘口供、半岛纪录片都没有好好看过，而且对这些所谓的证据的可靠性都未做说明。我相信她连半岛纪录片里提到中朝影片昆虫乱爬时，半岛找来的相信美国可能进行细菌战的科学家说那只能是摆拍的那段都没看过。
家园 美国人比较糟糕的一点是，他们在本土从来没有被痛击过 而两颗原子弹给日本人的冲击还是不小的，所以日本人目前只能把他们的精神力量投放到无尽的yy空间里，近几十年内估计差不多还是老实的。
而目前最邪恶最需要联合起来提防的还是美国人。欧洲两次世界大战后老实了很多，俄罗斯元气和心气都不行了，而没挨过打的山姆大叔还在把战争作为解决一切问题的手段。从平民到国会都有战争瘾。注意军队挨打和国家挨打不是一个层次的概念，而美国这样一个暴民民主国家，红脖子们不被狠狠地痛打，还真把战争当成“橄榄球赛加电脑游戏”呢。