主题：【译】中国军队对猛烈炮击的战术反应 -- 徐荣

After June 1951

After June 1951, with the front line roughly along the 38th Parallel, the CCF began to employ a position-type defense along a main line of resistance. In order to withstand intense UN air and artillery bombardment, the CCF deployed units in great depth along narrow fronts and erected an elaborate system of field fortifications with extended outposts and key terrain features organized for an all-around defense. Primary defensive positions were commonly placed on the forward slope, with personnel shelters on the reverse slope. The forward defensive trenches had shelter holes for individual soldiers dug into the bottom at intervals of several feet. Recesses for storing hand grenades were dug into the sides. Tunnels and alternate trenches connected the forward slope defensive positions and the personnel shelters. Ammunition storage spaces were also connected with the defensive positions by trenches. All positions were constructed to provide cover from high-angle fire while still maintaining good fields of fire. The fortifications on hilltops were covered with alternate layers of logs and dirt to a depth of up to fifteen feet. From three to twelve layers of logs were used, depending on their availability.10

In addition to digging in to provide cover, the CCF also used the terrain, natural vegetation, darkness, unfavorable weather conditions, and smoke to cover its movements. In forward areas, marches took place at night, with the men walking in single file three to five paces apart. Secondary roads and trails were used, and march discipline was very strict. The Chinese launched attacks only at night or during poor weather, unless the opportunity for a major success clearly outweighed the extra casualties to be taken in a daytime operation. If an objective was to be held, the attack began early enough in the evening so that the battle would be over by midnight. The rest of the night could then be spent digging in and organizing a defensive position. Attacks designed to delay or halt UN advances began early enough to allow an end to the engagement by daybreak. Planned withdrawals took place under cover of darkness and only rarely were supported by mortar or artillery fire. According to Chinese prisoners of war, this was done because, if CCF soldiers opened fire, they immediately became primary targets for UN artillery.11

Camouflage was another CCF defense against UN artillery. Unit commanders paid great attention to the initial camouflaging of their positions and instructed their troops to always take maximum advantage of natural cover and concealment. Troops dug foxholes very carefully and not only concealed the hole with natural vegetation but also scattered the dirt around to avoid attracting attention. When resting outside of foxholes, the troops would scatter about under trees or other natural cover, always keeping a distance of at least ten feet between them. If an aircraft approached, the men would freeze in place in order not to disclose their position by movement. This kind of camouflage discipline often saved CCF units from detection while they were on the march or crossing open terrain. The uniform caps worn by CCF soldiers had loops on them for attaching natural vegetation, and this helped them blend in with their surroundings. The CCF also was careful to camouflage mortars, artillery pieces, and all vehicles near the front. Although mortar firing positions were almost always in cleared areas, after firing five to ten rounds, crews would place the mortar in a camouflaged hole some ten yards from the firing position and then take shelter in individual foxholes. To heighten the effect of camouflage, the Chinese made decoys using materials found at hand. They stuffed straw into discarded clothing to create realistic dummy riflemen and also constructed dummy artillery positions using logs for barrels, steel plates for shields, boards for trails, and straw for wheels.12 Although made with simple material, these decoys were realistic enough to attract a significant amount of UN fire. So effective were CCF camouflage efforts that, according to a report written by the U.S. IX Corps G2 in September 1951, they were a major reason for the CCFs ability to survive in the face of constant aerial surveillance and fierce bombardment by UN forces.13

Conclusion

The Communist Chinese Forces reduced casualties from UN firepower in three ways:

• The CCF reduced the scale of offensive operations. Initially, the CCF had planned and initiated operations intended to destroy UN division-sized units. The need to defend against massive UN artillery, however, forced the CCF to change its focus to planning operations designed to destroy company and battalion-sized units. It became obvious to the CCF very soon that the concentrations of men and materiel required for large-scale operations created too many good targets for UN air and artillery forces.

• The CCF dispersed troops and supplies and protected them underground as much as possible.

• The CCF exerted every effort to counter UN target acquisition efforts through the effective use of cover and concealment. By using these defensive measures, the CCF, a force whose firepower was decidedly inferior to that of the UN Command, maintained enough combat power in the field to allow the Chinese government to achieve certain strategic objectives in Korea. If success is defined by achieving political-military objectives, Communist Chinese defensive measures against UN artillery were successful.

When the CCF headquarters realized the destructive effect of UN firepower, it promptly took action to counter what the Chinese called the "inflict-casualties-war" being carried out by the UN Command. One major step was to reduce the number of troops deployed within the effective range of UN artillery. By means of shell fragment analysis and the study of sound and flash, the CCF quickly determined the type of UN artillery deployed across the front line from its units and then positioned them accordingly. Following what they called the principle of "with troops light to the front and heavy to the rear, with firepower heavy to the front and light to the rear,"7 the CCF placed a relatively small number of soldiers along the front line while the main body was positioned along a second line and on the flanks in preparation for counterattacks. The headquarters then directed that large numbers of troops should not concentrate in one place and that there should be no more defending of positions to the death. The CCF objective was "to limit casualties while still fighting to kill and wound more of the enemy and gain the time that was needed."8

During the first half of 1951, when the CCF was applying the principle of deploying troops "light to the front and heavy to the rear," the U.S. Eighth Army described it as a "one up, two back" defensive formation.9 In this disposition of forces, a forward corps had one division on the front line with two divisions in reserve. An army had one corps forward with two corps in reserve. Frontline regiments still had the mission of digging in and offering stiff resistance to advancing UN troops, but the holding of terrain was now of minor importance. The CCF objective was to create weaknesses in a UN offensive and then exploit them using counterattacks by its deep reserves.

TACTICAL RESPONSES TO CONCENTRATED ARTILLERY

CHAPTER 7

THE KOREAN WAR: CHINESE FORCES’ RESPONSE TO HEAVY BOMBARDMENT

by Dr. Gary J. Bjorge

The Chinese armies sent to Korea during the Korean War consisted basically of light infantry divisions with no air, no armor, and little artillery support. The United Nations (UN) forces they faced enjoyed air supremacy over the front lines and an enormous superiority in artillery firepower. During the first half of 1951, the UN Command used its air assets and artillery to inflict heavy casualties on the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) and forced the CCF to develop special defensive measures. First, offensive operations were reduced in scale. Second, the CCF attempted to reduce the number of lucrative targets and placed as much of the army underground as possible. These efforts were successful enough to allow the CCF to maintain the combat power needed to achieve an operational and strategic stalemate on the Korean peninsula.

April and May 1951

The devastating effect of artillery fire and aerial bombing on CCF maneuver units is illustrated by what happened during the CCF's April and May offensives in 1951. The April offensive against the U.S. I Corps north of Seoul pushed UN lines back to the northern outskirts of the city but then ground to a haft in the face of heavy casualties and disorganizaton caused by UN air and artillery attacks. Interdiction of CCF rear areas by UN bombers and long-range artillery caused the Chinese supply system to collapse and disrupted communications between units. As confusion increased, CCF commanders were forced to issue such generalized orders as "go as far south as possible." Reserve units passed through forward units without knowing the number of casualties already sustained or the state of confusion that existed.1 When the offensive ended after nine days, an estimated 71,712 Chinese and North Korean soldiers had been killed.2

Early in May, the CCF shifted its units to central Korea and, on 16 May, launched an offensive against X Corps. During the resulting battle, which UN forces called the Battle of the Soyang River, restrictions on the use of ammunition by UN artillery were lifted for the first time in Korean operations, and artillery units achieved record rates of fire. For example, during one 12-hour period on 17 May, the 38th Field Artillery Battalion of the 2d Infantry Division fired 11,600 rounds from its 105-mm howitzers. When the battle opened on 16 May, the artillery available in X Corps consisted of the following:

4 medium battalions (U.S.)

7 light battalions (U.S.)(1 armored SP)

1 battery, 155-mm (SP) (U.S.)

1 provisional battery, 8-inch howitzer (U.S.)

2 light battalions (ROK) 3

While the battle was in progress, X Corps received additional artillery, including another battery of 8-inch howitzers, bringing the total number of battalions to almost twenty. The X Corps deployed this artillery to a depth of thirty miles along a forty-mile front, and during the six crucial days when the CCF offensive was blunted and finally broken, it fired the following amount of ammunition:

date Rounds Tons

16 May 17,113 504.71

17 May 38,885 1,088.46

18 May 41,357 1,187.45

19 May 47,184 1,357.42

20 May 50,102 1,377.53

21 May 47,188 1,287.55

Total 241,829 6,803.124

During these six days, B-26 and B-29 bombers on night-bombing missions also supported X Corps. Operating under radar control, they dropped as many as 200 tons of bombs a night on CCF reserves and suspected assembly areas.5 CCF casualties from this artillery fire and bombing were extremely heavy, and their units often fell into a state of great confusion. This was especially true at night when, despite the CCF's tradition of night fighting, they found it hard to collect troops and reorganize.

The following incident illustrates what was happening to the CCF at this time. On 19 May, the Chinese captured two U.S. soldiers and took them to the headquarters of a CCF battalion preparing to join the attack. On the night of 20 May, this battalion came under heavy bombing just as it was forming to attack south. Terrible explosions inflicted so many casualties that the surviving troops fled northward in disorder. Amid this confusion, one of the U.S. soldiers escaped and made his way back to the U.S. lines. A patrol from the 9th Infantry was sent out to try to locate the other American. The patrol found him dead, but in the same area, there were also approximately 300 dead fully armed CCF soldiers.6 Since the CCF always placed great stress on salvaging weapons from the battlefield, the presence of all these weapons was another indication of how CCF unit organization was breaking down under the impact of UN firepower.