主题:【原创】我与愚蠢小猪关于中国经济的超长篇论战实录 -- 陈经
央一位略通玄学的朋友教我易经(他总以道行浅推托) 昨天讲到复卦六爻。。。什么卦象卦辞太艰涩了 为了让我不至于太混乱 他就随机起数举例。。。后来我提议测一下雅鲁藏布江截流的事情 正巧新闻中有具体的时辰——2010年11月12日上午11时28分 对应的干支为 庚寅年 丁亥月 丙寅日 甲午时
有意思的是 用这个时辰所起的卦象就是有关于争执的——易经第六卦 “讼”(讼,争也)
(这是一个上乾下坎卦 而坎正是对应的自然水 挺玄妙。。。)
它的大象辞是天与水违行,讼。君子以作事谋始。大意为:天与水背离而行,有德的智者要在行事作为的开始谋划,防止因为契约的问题而导致争讼。因为一件导致争端的事情,一定是由原因的,而原因早就埋伏在事情的开端了。世无讼,政可息矣。
上面图中的六条横线 就叫做六爻 预测结果是取决于变爻 也就是要推出这个卦的变数 这个比较难 他用了两种办法 推出的是不同的结果
用时家奇门 推出的是变五爻 也就是从下往上数第五横 九五:讼元吉,以中正也。大意为:公正的明断裁决讼事则大吉。
用梅花易推出的结果是变三爻 六三:食旧德,贞厉,终吉,或从王事,无成。大意为:靠祖上的积德而食。征兆不大好,但是终究是吉利的。选择跟随王者的事业,但没有什么成功。
他说自己的水平有限 所以推出了不同的变爻 最后他的结论是这个卦是平的 也就是说虽然是凶卦 但是变爻为吉 事情操作得当 凶事变吉。。。
这位小师父还说 古代测这些的人叫做钦天监 不能主国家的人测国运就是妖言惑众。。。
那就妖言惑众一下吧 只要不被天谴。。。
(蓝字部分引自网络)
del
del
一边回流美国,可以这样子操作的?好像是两个相反的方向啊
China's Sure Bet, By LESLIE P. NORTON
As the dollar wobbles, China is pulling back from U.S. Treasury securities and buying up hard assets around the world.THIS YEAR, FOR THE FIRST TIME EVER, China has been investing more overseas in assets like iron, oil and copper than it puts into U.S. government bonds.
China in this year's first half spent $31 billion on hard assets, compared with $23 billion on Treasuries and other U.S. government bonds. Experts say China's investments in each of these asset classes will total about $55 billion for the full year. But even a tie marks a major turnaround from China's previous practices. For many years, the mainland spent next to nothing on hard assets abroad, while its purchases of U.S. government debt ranged as high as $100 billion a year.
Why does China now have such a voracious appetite for hard assets? The most frequently cited reason is its need to feed its rapidly expanding industrial base. True enough. But it's also important to see China's reduction in Treasury purchases and its sharp increase in hard-asset deals as part of its currency strategy. It's widely accepted that the Chinese currency, the yuan, is undervalued against the dollar, perhaps by as much as 40%. Based on moves made in the past few years, it seems likely that Chinese officials will let the yuan, which is pegged to the dollar, rise by 2% to 3% against the greenback each year.
In the face of such a weak dollar, it doesn't make much sense to keep investing heavily in Treasuries or any other dollar-based asset. The annual interest payments can easily be outweighed by the loss in the dollar's value. There are serious concerns in Beijing, too, about the creditworthiness of U.S. debt. The smarter bet is to invest in assets that are likely to hold their value, or even increase in value, as the dollar continues its slide.
Iron ore in Sierra Leone. Mines in South Africa. Coal and gas in Australia. Oil in Brazil and Venezuela. Even Canada's timber industry is reviving as a result of demand from China. Just last week, China jacked up estimates for how much uranium it will need for nuclear power plants.
The recent move by the Federal Reserve to start buying $600 billion of government bonds, known as QE2, will only hasten China's rush for hard assets.Because it amounts to printing money, "QE2 makes the dollar even less attractive," notes Jim Lennon, head of commodities at Macquarie Bank in London. "It's certainly a policy orientation of China to diversify, and they are buying commodities as a strategic investment, and opportunistically."
China's preference for hard assets over Treasuries, taken by itself, is sure to put upward pressure on U.S. interest rates and make U.S. economic growth somewhat more difficult than it would be if China went back to its previous policy of buying heftier amounts of U.S. government debt each year. Lately, however, any "China effect" has been overwhelmed by Treasury purchases by the Federal Reserve.
For its part, China must maintain a balance between investing wisely and making sure the U.S. remains economically healthy enough to absorb Chinese exports. That consideration will become less important as China further expands its own domestic market and becomes less reliant on exports.
CHINA HAS BEEN ACCUMULATING hard assets at a rapid clip for several years. Among this year's biggest deals, CNOOC (ticker: CEO), China's largest offshore oil producer and one of its most powerful state-owned companies, is spending $2.2 billion for shale acreage in the U.S. owned by Chesapeake Energy (CHK) and $3.1 for 50% of a unit of Argentina's Bridas Energy. State Grid Corp. of China plowed $1 billion into Chilean copper deposits. Sinopec (SNP) coughed up $4.6 billion for 9% of ConocoPhilips (COP)—and another $7.1 billion for 40% of Repsol’s (REP) Brazilian unit.
When China can't buy the business, it buys the underlying commodity. China's Sinofert, after weighing and dropping a bid for Potash Corp (POT) to counter BHP Billiton's hostile offer, announced last week that it would buy $2.2 billion of the key fertilizer ingredient from Canpotex, the monopoly whose three members include Potash.
Chinas's investments in hard assets are growing quickly. In June, even as the mainland dumped a net $15.6 billion of U.S. Treasury and agency bonds, it also bought $1.1 billion in Canadian minerals and Mozambique coal deposits. "China is upgrading its industries, and all are very heavy users of these materials," explains Lu Kang, deputy director general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing.
Adds He Ning, director general of the Ministry of Commerce in Beijing: "China is starting to make overseas investments as a return to the world. It's just a start." As such deals become more numerous, says He, "people will no longer pay attention."
For now, though, the hard-asset investments are making China a standout. In 2008, even as global investment flows by countries around the world fell by 15%, China's more than doubled, points out Ken Davies, a research fellow at Columbia University's Vale Center for Sustainable Investment. In 2009, when the global flows fell 43%, China's inched up by 1%. Had Chinalco's bid to increase its stake in mining giant Rio Tinto (RIO) not fallen apart, China's foreign investment in '09 would have been up by 36%. And last year, for the first time, China purchased more assets in the U.S. than the U.S. did in China, according to data information provider Dealogic.
For 2010, China's nonbond investments around the world, primarily commodities, should hit $55 billion, says Derek Scissors, a research fellow at the Heritage Foundation who keeps a database of China's investments over $100 million. The foundation's data closely tracks the official data published annually by Beijing's Ministry of Commerce.
At the same time, China's net purchases of U.S. Treasury securities are likely to fall to $55 billion this year from about $100 billion last year, says Joe Quinlan, chief market strategist at U.S. Trust. "They're just drowning in dollars," says Quinlan. "QE2 will make them even less likely to want U.S. paper."
Much of China's hard-asset investing is by state-owned companies as part of Beijing's industrial strategy; as state-owned operations, they bear an implicit government guarantee. They often take minority stakes because all the check-writing makes people nervous. Says Michael Perkinson, the China expert at Veracity Worldwide, a risk-management consultancy: "Chinese companies are committed to being very deliberate." After CNOOC's 2003 takeover bid for Unocal was thwarted by Capitol Hill, "They feel they've been burned."
Some of the investments are made by China Investment Corp. and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange Investment Co., both sovereign-wealth funds that are charged with diversifying China's $2.5 trillion in foreign-exchange reserves. After the values of big stakes in Blackstone and Morgan Stanley slid during the financial crisis, CIC reevaluated its strategy, investing last year in commodity companies like Hong Kong's Noble Group, Russia's Nobel Oil, and Canada's South Gobi Energy Resources.
IN 2001, BEIJING launched its "zou chuqu" edict for Chinese companies to "go global"—to develop world-class brands, diversify import sources, expand export markets, boost competitiveness and reduce low-return currency reserves. The U.S. was the perfect destination: China had massive amounts of dollars and the U.S. had plenty of the types of resources that China needs. Lenovo (0992.Hong Kong), for example, acquired a world-class PC manufacturer from IBM. Relates Andy Rothman, a former U.S. diplomat and the top China analyst at CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets: "It was frustrating to them that they were driving the growth in demand for resources but didn't have a seat at the table."
Then came the Unocal debacle in 2005, when CNOOC withdrew a buyout offer after organized opposition from Congress. Reeling, China began a hunt for assets elsewhere around the globe. But Western multinationals had most of the resources tied up. "The problem is the existing monopoly system is very hard to break down," says Fan Gang, a prominent Beijing economist and former advisor to China's central bank. "Being a latecomer is not easy. We were very late, and very cornered."
That drove China to some of the riskier parts of the globe. It pushed heavily into resource-rich Africa. Beijing pronounced 2006 "The Year of Africa" and began buying up resources there.
It wooed leaders of countries the West might find unsavory. "In China, there is no concept of a failed state. The Chinese way is to stoke the pace of development," says Jin Linbo, a senior fellow at the influential China Institute of International Studies in Beijing.
In many African countries, where investment plummeted after the end of the Cold War, China's interest was hugely appreciated. China offered, in addition to direct investment, a mix of cheap loans and infrastructure improvements, export credits, and regular visits by top brass from the mainland.
Industrial & Commercial Bank of China (1398.Hong Kong)—bought 20% of Standard Bank, the continent's largest financial institution. China financed the presidential palace in Sudan. It built soccer stadiums. "If you are a typical multinational, you do a one-shot deal. China will build a port, a refinery. China is investing big time in what counts for Africa," says V. Shankar, CEO for Middle East, Africa, Europe and the Americas for Standard Chartered, the London-based banking company.
Even noncontroversial nations welcomed the People's Republic. Botswana's president famously said: "I find that the Chinese treat us as equals. The West treats us as former subjects." All that the mainland asks for, in turn, is that the countries cut ties with Taiwan.
CONSIDER THE CASE of Kosmos Energy's stake in a massive offshore field in Ghana, which state-owned Ghana National Petroleum Corp. and CNOOC offered to buy for $5 billion. Exxon Mobil (XOM) withdrew a $4 billion offer in August, amid signs that Accra favored the Chinese-backed bid. The next month, China Export-Import Bank loaned Ghana $10.4 billion for infrastructure projects; China Development Bank offered another $3 billion loan to develop Ghana's oil and gas sector. Last week, Texas-based Kosmos, which is backed by Warburg Pincus and Blackstone, rejected the CNOOC offer as too low. But observers believe the CNOOC group will keep pursuing it.
China built pipelines across Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and began mining for copper south of Kabul. It hopes to build roads and pipelines through Pakistan and Afghanistan. That has U.S. officials seething. "The Chinese are not particularly concerned about the regime they deal with. They are oligopoly buyers who drive up prices all around the world. In U.S. trade policy, we need to think about the way China is directing its state-owned companies," says one top U.S. diplomat in Asia.
Less controversially, China invested heavily in Australia, where it is such a large presence that Australia's Foreign Investment Review Board recommends that Chinese ownership stakes stay below 50%. In Australia, Chinese acquirers accounted for 40% of 2009's inbound mining transactions. The mainland has committed to buying 20 years worth of natural gas from Chevron's $37 billion project on Australia's Barrow Island. It already owns 9% of Rio Tinto and has tried to buy more; after that effort failed, it detained a Rio Tinto executive in China for alleged bribery.
Beijing's new five-year plan, to be adopted early next year, will focus on more sustainable growth: higher consumption, lower dependence on exports, increased wages in the interior, more efficient energy consumption. That might "slow" demand for resources, says Scissors of the Heritage Foundation, "but they will still have a deficit in commodities and primary products and will invest to protect supply."
In coming years, China will face more competition for resources from other rapidly developing nations, all of them industrializing and huge owners of dollars. Of the total $8.1 trillion in foreign exchange reserves held by countries in 2009, more than 60% was held by 11 Asian countries., according to Christopher McNally of the East West Center.
"The financial crisis of 2008 encouraged people to make investments in hard assets as opposed to U.S. Treasuries," says Colin Banfield, head of Asian mergers and acquisitions for Citigroup in Hong Kong. "There's a desire to spend reserves on actual businesses rather than holding the currency."
Thanks to its resource purchases in Africa, "China has leapfrogged India by a quarter mile," says Shankar of Standard Chartered.
The appreciating yuan also means buying abroad will be easier. CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets says that a rate of five yuan to the dollar, versus 6.65 today, would reduce "economic distortions," and help create a consumer economy: China's market would suddenly become 33% larger. At that rate, CLSA predicts, China's "reserve accumulation and consequently its official purchases of U.S. Treasuries will slow to a tiny fraction of the current pace." Manufacturing in China gets less attractive; factories in the U.S. become more alluring.
Already the world's second-largest economy, the mainland is expected to have more than 350 million middle-class households in the next decade. Imagine what that means for future commodities prices.
China is now the world's largest consumer of copper, tin, steel, coal, aluminum and seaborne iron ore, and the second largest consumer of oil. And investors are betting on an array of companies they think will benefit. At T. Rowe Price, that includes companies like Freeport McMoran Copper & Gold (FCX), the largest publicly traded copper producer, Peabody Energy (BTU) and Joy Global (JOYG).
"The reality of the situation is everything you touch in commodities is affected" by China's hearty appetite, says Rick de los Reyes, who follows the materials industry for T. Rowe Price.
"In some ways, China has the most perfect information, because much of what's driving commodity prices higher is Chinese demand," says Shawn Driscoll, an energy specialist at T. Rowe Price and keen observer of the mainland's movements around the globe. "The Chinese government knows what their needs are long-term. From my perspective, they are the most informed buyer."
For the U.S. Treasury market, that may not be such a good thing.
现在在鼓噪自由化的那一群,也只是给人当枪,看苏东波的过程,得利的必然是原来就把握权柄的团体。
回到袁大头,有这么稳吗
近读毛五卷,毛讲的最多,也最终决定毛政策取向的就是一个“大”与“小”的问题。大仁政与小仁政,大民主与小民。尤其是“大仁政”与“小仁政”之论,更是观察毛政策取向的关键因素。
可是,周刘邓在治国上比较倾向于“小仁政”,这二者之间的得与失,浪费了多少中国人的口水啊。
我注意到陈元在人民日报的文章.
不知我的观点合拍否?
如是经典!
毛泽东1920年在给蔡和森的信中对袁世凯有深刻的评论,寥寥熟语,入骨三分.其重点,在于信仰问题.袁世凯是信仰专制主义的,您当我异议.
理想信念,是区别政客和政治家的根本点.耶稣之后,圣保罗不需要创立翻天覆地的理论,只要他坚持主耶稣的理念并在信众之中推广,他的事业就成功了.
葡萄兄持续数年的努力,无论有无结果,结果如何,都是非常令人敬重的.
还有策略的问题.比如同样是削藩,文帝景帝武帝历三世才成功,而建文帝希望毕功一役,身无所踪.现代社会的变革,时间上大大加快,程度上也会大大加深.普通人,做好必要准备就是了.
毛主席当年让田家英读<贾谊传>,可惜田不能领会深意,后来为双方都不待见也就豪不奇怪了.
大政治家也必须妥协.武帝娶阿娇,更以金屋宠之,当时可是都以为他真是乖巧,真是乖巧啊.
不愿意相信,你有啥办法?
就像我给很多人说,
当年被人们当做良心的,是朝廷台的分店。
如今给人们视为希望的,是某省的党报。
但是人家就是不信,于是你就没奈何了……
送花成功,可取消。有效送花赞扬。恭喜:你意外获得 8 铢钱。
参数变化,作者,声望:1;铢钱:0。你,乐善:1;铢钱:7。本帖花:1
如果放在两年前,时间不是很充裕吗?这两年来,时间是变多了还是变少了?不想再内部进行必要的变革,所谓的时间永远也不会够。印尼化的出路是明摆着的。不需要一次又一次的来证明。当然,这一次说不定会不一样,历史上很多人都是这么想的。