主题：【原创】中国巴西经济小议兼及印度 -- 葡萄

握个手

或许是头脑僵化，我总觉得，印度和中国的差距，只要是个明白人，即使理解不到你这么透彻，也不需要精准的数据，应该也能做到心中有数，更不用说搞这个行当的。

可是铺天盖哈印的经济写手们似乎并不关心这个，反而诲人不倦的日复一日宣传，似乎这些写手针对的并非具体问题，而是普通民众，甚为可疑，总觉得背后有什么猫腻。

主要是要查巴西为什么在早期金融危机爆发时为什么不准备外汇储备,还有金融危机爆发时候的一些债务问题与当时的财务收支情况.其实写这些也是对今天认识中国的金融情况做参考,看看巴西奇迹怎么变成了巴西危机的.

一是为了整理下以前的一些思考,二也是在国家在转型的时候让身边的一些人或者更多的人对这个国家有点信心.从印度和巴西发展的情况里看见我们发展时候可能的未来,是很好的镜子.中国巴西还有印度都是有实力成为超级大国起码是成为大国潜力的国家,找到大家合作的共同点都是符合彼此利益的事情.而中国与印度巴西不同的是,印度和巴西本身已经在西方经济分工体系里有了相对独立的位置,而中国正在从体系外成为体系的一员,中国以前发展慢不过是想按照自己的意志发展.但是今天以西方为主导的这个世界毕竟控制了这个世界70%以上的主要资源,以及海洋权益的80%,所以当中国获得这个体系的承认需要付出的努力与代价可想而知.而今天,当我们的总理说要积极参与国际政治经济新秩序分配的时候.我们已经不仅仅在转型,我们只要一步一个脚印走下去就可以了.我们不过就是这样走上来而已.

或者偶能找些鸟语资料。

第一是查,70年代因为石油危机开始的那次巴西金融危机,巴西有没有象我在一份资料里看见的那样没有外汇储备或者几乎视同没有外汇储备.(可以的话说说原因,我大致推理的出原因,不过我更希望有依据的写.)

第二是查80年代巴西失去的十年里金融危机发生时期的收支情况,与短期拆借利率情况.最好有他们债务如何以几何方式攀升的资料.(现在卡在了80年代巴西篇,想对之前与当时的金融危机做点认真思考,以次看今天我们一些人说的拉美化有无可能在中国发生.)

Growth with debt, 1974-80

Brazil suffered drastic reductions in its terms of trade as a result of the 1973 oil shock. In the early 1970s, the performance of the export sector was undermined by an overvalued currency. With the trade balance under pressure, the oil shock led to a sharply higher import bill. Under such circumstances, a prudent course of action would have been to devalue the cruzeiro and to adopt growth-reducing policies in order to contain imports. However, Brazil opted to continue a high-growth policy. Furthermore, it adopted renewed strategies of import-substitution industrialization and of economic diversification. In the mid-1970s, the regime began implementing a development plan aimed at increasing self-sufficiency in many sectors and creating new comparative advantages. Its main components were to promote import substitution of basic industrial inputs (steel, aluminum, fertilizers, petrochemicals), to make large investments in the expansion of the economic infrastructure, and to promote exports.

This strategy was effective in promoting growth, but it also raised Brazil's import requirements markedly, increasing the already large current-account deficit. The current account was financed by running up the foreign debt. The expectation was that the combined effects of import-substitution industrialization and export expansion eventually would bring about growing trade surpluses, allowing the service and repayment of the foreign debt.

Thus, despite the world recession resulting from other countries' adjustments to the oil shock, Brazil was able to maintain a high growth rate. Between 1974 and 1980, the average annual rate of growth of real GDP reached 6.9 percent and that of industry, 7.2 percent. However, the current-account deficit increased from US$1.7 billion in 1973 to US$12.8 billion in 1980. The foreign debt rose from US$6.4 billion in 1963 to nearly US$54 billion in 1980.

Brazil was able to raise its foreign debt because, at the time, the international financial system was awash in petrodollars and was eagerly offering low-interest loans. By the end of the 1970s, however, the foreign debt had reached high levels. Additionally, the marked increase of international interest rates raised the debt service, forcing the country to borrow more only to meet interest payments. Productive capacity, exports, and the substitution of imports in various sectors expanded and became more diversified. However, the expected impacts on Brazil's current account were not to materialize until the mid-1980s.

Another feature of the 1974-80 period was an acceleration of inflation. Between 1968 and 1974, the rate of inflation had declined steadily, but afterward the trend was reversed. From 16.2 percent a year in 1973, the growth rate of the general price index increased to 110.2 percent a year by 1980.

Stagnation, inflation, and crisis, 1981-94

The effect of the 1974-85 period's industrialization on the balance of trade was significant. The balance of trade moved from an average deficit of US$3.4 billion in the 1974-76 period to an average surplus of US$10.7 billion in the 1983-85 period. In 1985 the share of manufactures (processed and semiprocessed) of total exports reached 66 percent, and between 1971-75 and 1978-83 the share of basic input imports in total imports declined from 32.3 percent to 19.2 percent. The recession and stagnation of the early 1980s had a role in reducing imports. However, import substitution was also important, as demonstrated by the few years of the 1980s that experienced a significant growth in GDP while the trade surplus was maintained.

Between 1981 and 1992, the GDP increased at an average annual rate of only 1.4 percent and per capita income declined 6 percent. Gross investment, as a proportion of GDP, fell from 21 to 16 percent, in part as a result of the fiscal crisis and the loss of public-sector investment capacity. The decline also reflected growing uncertainties regarding the future of the economy. The 1980s became known as the "lost decade," and its problems spilled over into the 1990s. Despite the stagnation of the 1981-92 period, inflation remained a major problem (see stagflation). It sometimes reached very high rates, prompting the implementation of short-lived shock-stabilization programs.

1981-84 period

In 1979 a second oil shock nearly doubled the price of imported oil to Brazil and lowered the terms of trade further. The rise in world interest rates increased sharply Brazil's balance of payments problem and the size of the foreign debt. Nevertheless, the government continued borrowing, mainly to face an increasing debt burden, while it tried vainly to maintain the high-growth strategy. At the beginning of the 1980s, however, the foreign-debt problem became acute, leading to the introduction of a program to generate growing trade surpluses in order to service the foreign debt. The program was achieved by reducing growth and, with it, imports, and by expanding exports. As a result, in 1981 real GDP declined by 4.4 percent. The 1982 Mexican debt crisis ended Brazil's access to international financial markets, increasing the pressure for economic adjustment.

The austerity program imposed by the International Monetary Fund in late 1979 continued until 1984, but substantial trade surpluses were obtained only from 1983 on, largely as a delayed result of the import-substitution industrialization programs of the 1970s and the reduction in imports brought about by economic decline. The austerity program enabled Brazil to meet interest payments on the debt, but at the price of economic decline and increasing inflation.

Inflation accelerated as a result of a combination of factors: the exchange-rate devaluations of the austerity program, a growing public deficit, and an increasing indexation of financial balances, wages, and other values for inflation. The first two factors are classical causes of inflation; the last became an important mechanism for propagating inflation and in preventing the usual instruments of inflation control from operating.

By the mid-1980s, domestic debt nearly displaced foreign debt as Brazil's main economic problem. During the high-growth 1970s, a significant portion of foreign borrowing had been by state enterprises, which were the main actors in the import-substitution industrialization strategy. Initially, they borrowed to finance their investments. However, toward the end of the decade, with the acute shortage of foreign exchange, the government forced state enterprises to borrow unnecessarily, increasing their indebtedness markedly. Their situation worsened with the sharp rise in international interest rates in the late 1970s, the devaluations of the austerity program, and the decreasing real prices of goods and services provided by the public enterprises stemming from price controls. Because the state enterprises were not allowed to go bankrupt, their debt burden was transferred gradually to the government, further increasing the public debt. This, and a growing disorganization of the public sector, transformed the public debt into a major economic problem. By the mid-1980s, the financial burden stemming from the debt was contributing decisively to its rapid expansion.

1985-89 period

During the second half of the 1980s, it became increasingly clear that a large-scale fiscal reform, one that enabled noninflationary financing of the public sector, was needed not only to control inflation but also to restore the public sector's capacity to invest. Both were essential for an economic recovery. However, political obstacles prevented the reform from materializing. And, because inflation had become the most visible symptom of the public-sector disequilibrium, there were several attempts to bring inflation under control through what came to be known as "heterodox economic shocks." The period saw three such shocks: the Cruzado Plan (1986), the Bresser Plan (1987), and the Summer Plan (1989).

The objective of the Cruzado Plan was to eliminate inflation with a dramatic blow. Between 1980 and 1985, the rise in the GPI had escalated from 86.3 percent to 248.5 percent annually. Early in 1986, the situation became desperate, prodding the implementation of the plan. Its main measures were a general price freeze, a wage readjustment and freeze, readjustment and freeze on rents and mortgage payments, a ban on indexation, and a freeze on the exchange rate.

The plan's immediate results were spectacular: the monthly rate of inflation fell close to zero, economic growth surged upward, and the foreign accounts remained under control. However, by the end of 1986 the plan was in trouble. The wage adjustments were too large, increasing aggregate demand excessively and creating inflationary pressures. Moreover, the price freeze was maintained for too long, creating distortions and leading to shortages of a growing number of products. The plan could have been rescued if adjustments had been made at crucial moments. Instead, inflation accelerated again, and there was a return of indexation.

The two other stabilization plans amounted to renewed attempts at bringing inflation down from very high levels. It was soon clear that without a thorough reform of the public sector, controlling inflation would be impossible. Both plans introduced a price freeze and eliminated indexation, but there were differences between them, and with the Cruzado Plan. Neither was able to address the public-sector disequilibrium effectively. The objective of the Summer Plan, for instance, was mainly to avoid hyperinflation in an election year.

In fact, the public-sector disequilibrium became virtually locked in as a result of the 1988 constitution, which created advantages for various segments of society without indicating how these advantages would be paid for. Moreover, it transferred large portions of the tax revenues from the federal government to state and municipal governments, without requiring them to provide additional public services. With less revenue and more responsibility, the federal accounts experienced growing deficits. In addition, several subsidies were locked into the legislation. These factors and the financial burden of the public debt meant growing problems of public finance.

The 1980s ended with high and accelerating inflation and a stagnant economy, which never recovered after the demise of the Cruzado Plan. The public debt was enormous, and the government was required to pay very high interest rates to persuade the public to continue to buy government debt instruments.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_history_of_Brazil

据说是从国会图书馆研究文章中摘录，应该不算太离谱。

说是石油危机后继续举债催发展的经济政策，希望经济发展速度能够超越外债增长速度。结果是反过来,就挂了。

http://scholar.google.com/url?sa=U&q=http://www2.fgv.br/professor/fholanda/Arquivo/Economicdevelop.pdf

记得大学学城市规划的时候，670年代巴西是个反面教材。

刚才朋友说在有一个学校有一个韩国的博士生论文，是关于巴西，俄罗斯，中国，印度的汇率的 (英国的学校),还有点资料是法语的.如果被许可弄到了我一起发上来,大家一起参考.我太笨,现在才想到请人帮助,汗一个.

scholar.google.com

偶都是用维基看大略，再去搜论文看academic的结论。

建国三十年与改革之辩:和愚蠢小猪的另类观点

首先和文章作者有相同意见的地方是对建国前三十年经济发展的肯定．但是和作者不同的是，在我看来建国前三十年中国经济发展尤其是建设一个独立工业体系的发展是服务于这样一个目的：国家民族的救亡图存．自从１８４０年第一次鸦片战争爆发以来一直困扰中国发展的就是国家与民族的独立问题．

日本在明治唯新的时候，就解决了这个问题．而中国直到１９４９才开始真正解决这个问题．要获得真正的民族独立自主，要保证的是国家安全，要保证的是国家有和平发展的环境与空间．这里我们不得不说说印度和巴西．印度在印度大起义后，本土除了印巴分治的时候就没有再发生过大的动乱与战乱.而1840年之后,中国到1949年的一百年间,每10年就要爆发一次大规模的对内对外战争.所以到1949年家底消耗的差不多也无从发展经济.印度超过我们是很正常,本来在1840年的时候印度人均GDP是我们的2/3总量是我们的40%.这100年里,是整个西方世界技术革命浪潮一个接一个的时候,而技术对经济发展发生的决定性作用就是在这个100年里确立的.说那时候我们落后了100年的距离不是夸张,现在我们距离日本美国还有20年的距离.这个还需要我们以和平手段至少20年以上的努力才能追赶.同样巴西，在１９世纪和巴拉圭发生过惨烈的地区战争后（南美洲标准）就再也没有发生过任何地区战争与国内战争．尽管经济危机重重，发展走了一个又一个弯路．但是今天的巴西，依旧人均GDP数是我们的倍数．这里我们可以看见，一个和平的发展环境或者狭义的说本国的和平发展对于一个国家与民族的发展是多么重要．

在新中国建立的时候国家的发展是从属于国家安全这个目标的．所以，在纯粹狭义经济学范畴的在建国前三十年里的中国国家建设项目，在当时不仅是合理的而且是必须的．不从这个角度去理解技术和科技生产力的发展来考虑，理解建国前三十年的发展在今天看来那些成就无疑是失败的与错误的．为什么这样说呢？今天的人很自然的把，日本与四小龙与今天的中国比较．日本与四小龙的发展无疑和中国走了相反的道路。用简单的话来讲就是：日本和四小龙不管自己情愿或者不情愿，他们本身的发展是建立在以美国欧洲为领头羊尤其是以美国为首的西方政治经济分工体系里的发展．他们在体系里比中国容易的多的获得技术资金与资源的供应，这个使他们在经济腾飞的阶段获得比中国多的多的便利条件．同样对比中国，在建国前三十年日本与四小龙腾飞的阶段，为独立自主与国家安全付出的代价是大家都看的见的．如果这个时候，中国倒下去中国就是今天的苏丹或者说动荡拉美的翻版，如果中国和前苏联那样的投降了，我们甚至没有出卖自己的本钱．但是这两种如果，都没有发生．

西方列强有个惯例：如果不能打败的，那就成为朋友．日本和德国尽管战败，但是获得比多数非列强更好的生存环境不是因为善良的因素，而是尽管战败德国和日本依旧获得了西方世界的承认，这样的承认无疑给２战后两个国家的再次腾飞写下了注脚．同样的问题，也出现在了中国．在中国坚持自己独立自主与国家安全的努力成功后，西方在再次拥抱中国的时候无疑是充满＂仁爱＂与＂宽容＂的．我们和日本与德国不同的是：我们不是战败国．我们今天获得各种便利，是我们用三十年努力获得承认后的红利．不是我们的对手仁慈，而是我们和我们的对手比任何时候都现实：我们都需要共同生存在这个世界．但是我们和西方的现实差距就放在那里,我们必须从学习很多东西开始使自己重新回到西方主导的经济体系中去.必须学习,如何利用全球资源使自己经济获得更便利更经济的发展.这样,就有了改革,有了改革的近三十年经济腾飞的过程,一段重新回归世界体系的历史.在这个阶段里,日本在60\70年代大量引进技术缩短自己和世界先进技术的距离,节省自主研发的时间与资源消耗是一种很现实或者是唯一有效实现追赶的手段.(日本在这20年里,引进技术花费了15亿美圆,这些技术如果自主开发需要1000亿美圆的代价)还有一个很现实的问题,改革初期中国的外汇储备只有250亿美圆到90年代初期也只有300亿美圆左右.在资本主义世界里,比技术更重要的发展要素不是资源是资本.改革初的中国在经济上发展道路遇到的问题是选择综合发展还是积累资本就和当年建国在国家安全与经济发展的选择一样,实际没有他途.国家发展和经济发展,对于中国这样体重的国家来说,可以加速却可以三步并成两步甚至一步走,但是没有可以跳过去的发展阶段,没有捷径.资本积累,是改革最主要的目标.在当时的条件下,资本狭义的说就是以美圆为主导的外汇储备.不为什么,因为今天世界上80%的世界贸易以美圆结算.所以我才说,建国三十年和改革的近三十年,是一个相互继承的历史,一个叫中国国家在落后一百年后艰难追赶的历史,我们必须要为落后付出代价.这个是我和小猪文章认识改革的最大分歧.或者说对经济发展本质的不同思考.

今天的世界，哪怕资源丰富的美国与前苏联，都不可能仅仅依赖本国资源获得本国的可持续发展．那么，在冷战结束后世界经济日益全球化的现在．可以在全球范围里获得政治与经济的分配权利，实际就是掌握着对自己国家未来的主导权．任何没有物质保障的发展，哪怕资金再充沛，技术再先进，经济再发达都是过眼云烟．

历史走到今天，对于日本和德国这样的国家，尽管战败的记忆已经遥远．但是战败国的印记依旧象一个看不见的天花板横梗在，两国的头顶上．最近日本在伊朗的石油份额被强行没收凸显了一个再明白不过的事实，日本在政治上的影响力与其想获得的大国地位是多么的不相称．所以，日本要争常，要以世界领导者的姿态来获得对世界范围政治经济新秩序的分配权．而２００６年，我们的温总理说：我们要积极参与国际政治经济的新秩序建设．

是的，我们跨过的是艰难的一跳，跳过龙门的那一跳，用了三十年．