主题：【整理原创】朝鲜战争中的细菌战（系列终结篇） -- 思炎

注意你也犯了个错误，其实不用跟你引用的Endicott文章扯起来的。 我给的是如下，是纪录片《肮脏的小秘密》中的截屏和旁白：

A third crucial document – marked “Top Secret” – showed that in September 1951, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff issued orders to begin “large scale field tests… to determine the effectiveness of specific BW [bacteriological warfare] agents under operational conditions.”

If these “field tests” were indeed undertaken, then they may have drawn again on the expertise of the Japanese biological warfare team.

还要注意的是，这个文件是第三份秘密文件，有些有关细菌战的文件美国隐藏，没有公布（或可能销毁）。这里还有一个要注意的词是AGAIN。

并且，就算你引用的Endicott的文章，他的文章中也对文件时间做了说明：

At the meeting for what was described as the covert implementation of Takeoff,on 3 October 1951, the service personnel were hesitant, even a little suspicious. Army General John Magruder confessed that he had delayed forwarding the plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although the documents carried a memo saying that it was an approved plan, the representative of the Pentagon wanted to know why there was no formal indication of this fact on the plan itself. Why was there no box carrying the facsimile signature of the person in authority? Why was there no indication that the plan was a numbered paper in the series of PSB formal papers?' After receiving assurances, General Magruder indicated to the meeting that he would 'probably forward the plan for action tomorrow.' (29) An uneasiness, an air of reluctance, was clearly evident.

Four days later, in accordance with 'an oral directive,' three Army colonels left Washington for a top secret trip to see General Ridgway, commander-in-chief of the Far East Command in Tokyo. (30) We do not know whether this trip was part of TAKEOFF. Perhaps it was a chance event. But in another coincidence, when US Air Force Colonel Andrew J. Evans, Jr., who had previously worked in the War Plans Division, was shot down by the Chinese in 1953, he told his captors that planning for the BW campaign in Korea had begun in October 1951. His statement was corroborated by another high ranking POW, Colonel Frank H. Schwable, chief of staff of the Marine air wing when he was shot down in Korea, who added that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had sent [their] directive by hand to General Ridgway in October 1951, ordering the initiation of bacteriological warfare in Korea on an initially small, experimental stage but in expanding proportions.(31)。。。。

。。。。There are further grounds to ask the question whether the anxiety around TAKEOFF related to biological warfare. As nervous rumblings about the operation continued into late November 1951, there was a flap about 'statements concerning Novel Weapons. Some serious reservations about TAKEOFF continued, from Secretary of Defense Lovett down through the military staff. But the director of the Psychological Strategy Board, former secretary of the army Gordon Gray, presumably with presidential backing, continued to push. The Joint Chiefs of Staff eventually approved the plan 21 December 1951 and reported that implementing plans have been prepared and are in the hands of operating agencies. (35)