主题：【原创】乱侃人民币升值 -- 大黄
家园 【原创】乱侃人民币升值 人民币升值了，这是一件大事。升值第二天我留意了一下，日本《读卖新闻》、《朝日新闻》、《日本经济新闻》三大报头版头条全是这个，足见它的国际性影响。怎么理解和评价这次升值，一帮专家在那儿瞅着后续准备发言呢，咱这“准”字号的还是闭嘴为好。不过老刀点了名，胡乱糊弄过去似乎也不厚道，所以可以侃一下，毕竟是个大事嘛。
首先升值这事吸引眼球的地方在于它成了中美政治中的中心话题之一，你来我去，你说要我说不要，或者现在不要，搞得极暧昧，是八卦的好题材。但说实话，表面这一层其实反倒是最次要的一层。人民币升值对美国就业的正面影响是很小的，反倒是如果引起通货膨胀那就麻烦了。民主党制造了这个议题，共和党也得稍微跟一跟，不过基本是心不在焉，一亿条裤子换一架波音的买卖求都求不来，谁会跟自己过不去呢？
所以升值大家很关心的一个问题就是咱吃亏了没有，是不是顶不住压力被搞了？答案是否定的。人民币升值有使中美关系从这个议题中解套的用意，但这个效果是附带的。那为什么要升值呢？
答案在中国内部，具体来说是两个，一曰宏观经济稳定，二曰金融体制改革。
先说宏观经济。宏观经济学是政府管经济的学问，有几个目标，有几个手段。目标比如增长率啦，就业率啦，通货膨胀啦，比较多；手段就比较少，主要分财政政策和货币政策两类。要说明的是目标之间经常相互打架，保一个保不了另一个，根据不同的目标侧重，要实行不同的政策。财政政策和货币政策都可以有紧缩或扩张的效果，选择不同的组合，达到不同的效果。
上面是一般来说的，书上说的。具体到中国，还有些具体情况。因为书上说的那是成熟市场经济，而中国从十四大才正式搞这玩意儿，很多东西从无到有，从粗到细，现在也没弄完。中国政府运用宏观经济手段管理经济是个很晚近的事情，不过我们这一代都赶上了，全都尝了尝鲜，呵呵。朱槠基时代，基本是运用财政政策为主，比如今年发两千亿国债，明年发三千亿，而到温家宝时代，货币政策逐渐用的比较多，比如去年的升息，今年的升值，都很焦点。这个差别有啥说道没？肯定有，大家可以琢磨一下，呵呵。
其实朱槠基时代也不是没有货币政策，汇率94年深贬了一下，管到最近；低利率保持了9年，去年才升了一点。要说明的是不动的政策未必作用就小，有时候甚至是决定性的。比如通过出口拉动经济的战略，低汇率政策就很关键。
说这么多，就是要说明汇率政策在宏观经济政策里的位置，对它有个基本定位，不能新闻说今天这个重要了，明天那个又重要了，跟着瞎跑，摸不着门道。
再说金融体制改革。市场经济搞了这么多年，是有成果的。比如普通的商品和服务，基本完全市场化了。八十年代可以靠双轨制套价差，搞官倒，现在都市场化了，没戏了。但是另一方面，剩下的几样没市场化的东西，比如资本、土地等要素价格，却变本加厉，兴风作浪，寻租猖獗。在这些要素里面，首要的是资本，金融体制改革要解决的正是这个问题。但这事很难，比如银行的问题，股市的问题，是跟国有企业的问题交织在一起的，要解决只能一揽子解决。朱槠基时代把这事的难度化简了一些，比如放了小，裁了人，国有经济比重连年降低，到现在解决问题的可能性已经大很多了，虽然仍然很难。金融改革至今动作很慢的一个重要原因就是顾虑很多，尤其怕影响当期的宏观经济稳定。你看周小川们要加息，盯通货膨胀盯好久，要升值，盯各个指标也盯好久，很怕影响经济的快速平稳增长。经济体制改革，形象的说就是要给高速行驶的汽车换个发动机，这个难度可想而知。那把车停下来换，休克一下不行么？这就好比说今年咱别吃饭了，把问题解决了再说
。首先这本身就很折腾，今年不吃饭了可不是谁都能受得了的，而且今年能不能搞定，其实谁也打不了保票。
再小结一下，就是货币政策要为宏观稳定服务，为金融改革服务。值得一提的是从升息到升值，都有捎带角的东西，即利率逐步市场化，汇率放弃固定汇率，这些都是金融体制改革的一部分，长远来看比吸引眼球的百分比调整影响更深远。
那说了半天到底怎么为宏观稳定服务的？这个事就很技术了，我说一下自己的看法，不一定对。首先现在什么是宏观稳定的最大威胁？是房地产过热。房地产怎么炒热的？两个原因，一是利率太低，资本呆在银行里不划算，股市又是那么个熊样，没处去只好去搞房地产；二是人民币升值预期导致热钱涌入赌升值，准备升了捞完钱就跑，这些钱大部分也进了房地产。两家一结合，宏观经济搞得很被动，试了各种办法降温，都不理想。比如提高利率对来赌升值的影响就不大，而利率降的太多整体紧缩的就太厉害了，所以降了一次没再继续降，还是得升值。
升值本来从长期来看是既定的，这是经济结构调整的大方向，但同样是升值，升的时机、幅度、方式不一样，效果会差别很大。比如一下子升15%，热钱大捞一笔，然后争先恐后地跑掉，大起大落，房地产一下子出大量坏账，全堆给银行，弄到一半的银行改革怎么办？所以升的结果，最好是热钱慢慢退走，然后通过完善资本市场，把房地产的热度降下来，把宏观经济的风险降下来，为金融体制改革创造条件。
这样来看，2%的升值幅度就很不错，对热钱来说这是个鸡肋，已经进来的，离开不是，留下也不是；对还没进来的，进也不是，不进也不是，资本大进大出不大可能出现了。时机来说，挺了两年不升值，对热钱是个教育，要知道在这一亩三分地上庄家是谁。而且大家基本已经知道9月胡访美前要升值，那晚升不如早升，少进几百亿热钱。当然这些都是细节了，可以争议，效果怎么样，也不能完全乐观。
货币政策说白了容易极了，一会儿调调利率，一会儿调调汇率，宏观经济就自动驾驶了，似乎没什么技术含量。其实学问极深，运用之妙，存乎一心，并不是那么容易看清楚的。比如有人认为朱槠基是可以跟格林斯潘比肩的宏观经济大师，也有人不以为然；有人认为这次升值可以作为教科书的经典范例，有人觉得这么说完全是歌功颂德。这都很正常。
元宝推荐：四月一日,家园 【文摘】推荐一篇文章：From T-shirts to T-bonds http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=4221685
英国《经济学家》最近的一篇文章，写得很好。按惯例国内会节译，不过还是推荐看原文（原文的图表不错）。我觉得写得好在于思路很清楚，要点抓住了。他山之石，希望能引起我们的思考，也希望能引起一些讨论，呵呵。
China and the world economy
From T-shirts to T-bonds
Jul 28th 2005
From The Economist print edition
Beijing, not Washington, increasingly takes the decisions that affect workers, companies, financial markets and economies everywhere
GLOBAL tremors in the currency, bond and commodity markets greeted China's announcement that the yuan will no longer be pegged to the dollar. No longer is it just Washington that has the power to cause shockwaves. For many people, the tremors reflected the view that China is the root cause of America's trade deficit, and that the revaluation is a partial cure.
In fact, that view is wrong on several counts. China is not the main cause of the American trade deficit. On the other hand, China is behind almost everything else going on in the world economy. For China is beginning to drive, in a new and pervasive way, economic trends that many countries assume to be domestically determined.
Americans like to slap the “made in China” label on their huge trade deficit. Yet not only is China's forecast current-account surplus of around $100 billion this year only a fraction of America's likely deficit of $800 billion, but, as chart 1 shows, most of the increase in America's trade deficit has come from outside China. The main cause of America's trade deficit is a lack of domestic saving, not unfair Chinese competition. The deficit is thus made in America, not made in China.
As for last week's revaluation, the announcement marked a significant break with the past. China has long been under pressure to revalue its currency from countries that claim the undervalued yuan gives Chinese exporters an unfair advantage. After pegging the yuan to the dollar for a decade, China has shifted to a managed float against a basket of currencies, with an initial revaluation against the dollar of 2.1%. Nobody is yet sure how this will work. It may be just a token move aimed at warding off American protectionism. Or it could be the first of several revaluations, marking the end of the so-called “revived Bretton Woods system”, under which China and other Asian countries have bought billions of dollars in foreign-exchange reserves to hold their currencies steady against the greenback.
Either way, the tiny revaluation by itself will have little impact on America's huge trade deficit. Indeed, even if the yuan is allowed to rise by another 5-10% over the next 12 months, as many economists expect, that would hardly make a dent in the deficit. Nevertheless, it is still an important change in China's exchange-rate regime, representing a step towards a market-based system. And, as such, it could have implications for the dollar, bond yields, and American consumer spending.
To view China's global impact mainly in terms of its exports and its trade surplus is to misunderstand, and to underestimate, the profound forces behind China's growing influence. Everyone knows that most TVs and T-shirts are made in China. But so, in some ways, are developed countries' inflation rates, interest rates, wages, profits, oil prices and even house prices―or at least they are strongly influenced by what happens in China.
Of course, China is not the only fast-growing emerging economy that is making waves around the world. But China really does loom much larger: its contribution to global GDP growth since 2000 has been almost twice as large as that of the next three biggest emerging economies, India, Brazil and Russia, combined. Moreover, there is another crucial reason why China's integration into the world economy is today having a bigger global impact than other emerging economies, or than Japan did during its period of rapid growth from the mid-1950s onwards. Uniquely, China combines a vast supply of cheap labour with an economy that is (for its size) unusually open to the rest of the world, in terms of trade and foreign direct investment. The sum of its total exports and imports of goods and services amounts to around 75% of China's GDP; in Japan, India and Brazil the figure is 25-30% (see chart 2). As a result, the dragon's awakening is more traumatic for the rest of the world.
Doubling the world's workforce
Most analysis of China's growing importance focuses on its rising share of global output and exports. That, in turn, fuels fears that China is stealing production and jobs from the rest of the world. But this misses half the story. It is true that China's trade surplus has increased sharply this year―mainly because the government's efforts to cool fixed investment have cut back imports. But over the past decade, China's imports have risen at the same pace as its exports. So China is giving a big boost to both global supply and demand.
China's impact on the world economy can best be understood as what economists call a “positive supply-side shock”. Richard Freeman, an economist at Harvard University, reckons that the entry into the world economy of China, India and the former Soviet Union has, in effect, doubled the global labour force (China accounts for more than half of this increase). This has increased the world's potential growth rate, helped to hold down inflation and triggered changes in the relative prices of labour, capital, goods and assets.
The new entrants to the global economy brought with them little capital of economic value. So, with twice as many workers and little change in the size of the global capital stock, the ratio of global capital to labour has fallen by almost half in a matter of years: probably the biggest such shift in history. And, since this ratio determines the relative returns to labour and capital, it goes a long way to explain recent trends in wages and profits.
In America, Europe and Japan, the pace of growth in real wages has been unusually weak in recent years. Indeed, measured by the growth in income from employment, this is America's weakest recovery for decades. According to Stephen Roach, an economist at Morgan Stanley, American private-sector workers' total compensation (wages plus benefits) has risen by only 11% in real terms since November 2001, the trough of the recession, compared with an average gain of 17% over the equivalent period of the five previous recoveries (see chart 3). In most developed countries, average real wages have lagged well behind productivity gains.
The entry of China's vast army of cheap workers into the international system of production and trade has reduced the bargaining power of workers in developed economies. Although the absolute number of jobs outsourced from developed countries to China remains small, the threat that firms could produce offshore helps to keep a lid on wages. In most developed countries, wages as a proportion of total national income are currently close to their lowest level for decades.
The flip side is that profits are grabbing a bigger slice of the cake (see chart 4). Last year, America's after-tax profits rose to their highest as a proportion of GDP for 75 years; the shares of profit in the euro area and Japan are also close to their highest for at least 25 years. This is exactly what economic theory would predict. China's emergence into the world economy has made labour relatively abundant and capital relatively scarce, and so the relative return to capital has risen. It is ironic that western capitalists can thank the world's biggest communist country for their good fortune.
China's main impact on the world economy is to change relative prices and incomes. Not only are the prices of the goods that China exports falling; the prices of the goods that it imports are rising, notably oil and other raw materials. China is already the world's biggest consumer of many commodities, such as aluminium, steel, copper and coal, and the second-biggest consumer of oil, so changes in Chinese demand have a big impact on world prices.
China has accounted for one-third of the increase in global oil demand since 2000 and so must bear some of the blame for higher oil prices. Likewise, if China's economy stumbles, then so will oil prices. However, with China's oil consumption per person still only one-fifteenth of that in America, it is inevitable that China's energy demands will grow over the years in step with its income.
There is currently only one car for every 70 people in China, against one car for every two Americans. That implies a huge increase in oil demand, which could keep prices high for the foreseeable future, because of scarce global spare capacity. China's consumption per person of raw materials, such as copper and aluminium, is also still low, so rising demand will continue to support commodity prices.
Cheap money
Overall, the upward pressure that Chinese imports of raw materials have put on the prices of oil and other commodities has been more than offset by the downward pressure of Chinese manufactured exports. As a result, another important aspect of the China effect is low inflation.
Central bankers like to take all the credit for the defeat of inflation, but China has given them a big helping hand in recent years. China's ability to produce more cheaply has pushed down the prices of many goods worldwide, as well as restraining wage pressures in developed economies. For instance, the average prices of shoes and clothing in America have fallen by 10% over the past ten years―a drop of 35% in real terms.
A study by Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein reckons that China has knocked almost a full percentage-point off America's inflation rate in recent years. The recent 2% revaluation of the yuan will probably be absorbed by Chinese manufacturers trimming their profit margins and so will not be passed on into export prices. But Americans calling for a 25-30% revaluation may come to regret it: the result would almost certainly be faster inflation.
As it is, China's reduction of inflationary pressures has allowed central banks to hold interest rates lower than they otherwise would be. Three and a half years into its recovery, America's real short-term interest rates are only 0.7%, almost two percentage-points below their average at the equivalent stage in previous recoveries since 1960. This is good news for borrowers, but some economists worry that the entry of China and other emerging countries into the global economy may have affected monetary policy in ways that central banks do not fully understand.
In its latest annual report, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) asks whether it is really desirable to maintain positive inflation rates when China is boosting the world's productive potential so dramatically and thus reducing the prices of so many goods. In other words, are central banks targeting too high a rate of inflation now that China has joined the global market economy?
During the late 19th-century era of rapid globalisation, falling average prices were quite common. This “good deflation”, which was accompanied by robust growth, is very different to the bad deflation experienced in the 1930s depression. Today, we would again have had “good deflation”―but central banks have instead held interest rates low in order to meet their inflation targets. The BIS frets that this has encouraged excessive credit growth.
This echoes a fierce debate in the 1920s. At that time, a similar jump in the world's productive potential (then caused by technology-driven productivity growth) was reducing manufacturing costs. Some economists suggested that, in such circumstances, overall price stability might be the wrong policy goal. Instead, they argued, average prices should be allowed to fall to pass the productivity gains on to workers and consumers as higher real incomes. But just like today, monetary policy prevented prices from falling. And an overly loose policy then inflated the late-1920s stockmarket bubble.
The Austrian school of economics offers perhaps the best framework to understand what is going on. The entry of China's army of cheap labour into the global economy has increased the worldwide return on capital. That, in turn, should imply an increase in the equilibrium level of real interest rates. But, instead, central banks are holding real rates at historically low levels. The result is a misallocation of capital, most obviously displayed at present in the shape of excessive mortgage borrowing and housing investment. If this analysis is correct, central banks, not China, are to blame for the excesses, but China's emergence is the root cause of the problem.
Not only has China's disinflationary impact caused low short-term interest rates, but China is also partly responsible for the low level of long-term bond yields. To keep its exchange rate pegged to the dollar, China was the biggest buyer of American Treasury bonds over the past year. In the first six months of 2005, its foreign-exchange reserves increased by more than $100 billion, to $711 billion, of which about three-quarters are in dollars. This has also kept capital costs artificially low.
Who calls the shots?
For many decades, global monetary policy has been set in Washington. When the Fed raised interest rates, global monetary conditions would tighten. Today, however, thanks in part to China's purchases of T-bonds, low long-term bond yields have offset the rise in American short-term interest rates over the past year. The yield on ten-year bonds is currently lower than before the Fed started to lift interest rates in June 2004. America's sovereignty over its monetary policy has therefore been eroded, with a given rise in short-term rates producing much less monetary tightening than in the past. To that extent, global monetary policy is increasingly being set in Beijing as well as in Washington.
By helping to hold down interest rates in rich economies, China may have indirectly created a global liquidity bubble. Total global liquidity last year rose at its fastest pace in three decades after adjusting for inflation. This excess liquidity has not pushed up conventional inflation (thanks to cheap Chinese clothes and computers), but instead it has inflated a series of asset-price bubbles around the world. Thus, pushing this argument to its limit, it could be said that the global housing boom is indirectly “made in China”. Not only has China played a role in holding down short-term interest rates, but the People's Bank of China has also supported America's mortgage market by buying vast amounts of mortgage-backed securities.
What does the breaking of the yuan's peg to the dollar mean for bond yields? American Treasury yields rose by 12 basis points after Beijing made its announcement last week. Having played a hand in inflating America's housing bubble, could China now prick it by pushing up mortgage rates, which are closely tied to long-term bond yields?
If abandoning its dollar peg causes China to reduce its purchases of T-bonds, then yields will rise. But this depends on several uncertainties. For instance, will last week's revaluation reduce inflows of speculative capital into China, and hence its need to intervene in the foreign-exchange market by buying dollars? A large chunk of China's foreign-exchange intervention over the past year has been to offset not its current-account surplus but inflows of hot money. Some economists believe that, in the short term, the small revaluation will intensify speculation of further revaluations and so attract even more capital inflows, forcing the People's Bank of China to buy more Treasury bonds to stabilise its currency. If so, bond yields will remain low.
On the other hand, the switch from a dollar peg to a currency basket may cause China to diversify its reserves away from dollars. It is unlikely to dump its dollars, but it could well reduce its new purchases of Treasury bonds in favour of other currencies. And, if China really has broken the yuan's link with the dollar, then this could be the trigger for another general slide in the greenback against the euro, the yen and other currencies, prompting investors to demand higher yields. The fate of American house prices could thus be determined by unelected bureaucrats in Beijing rather than the unelected central bankers of the West.
This article has argued that global inflation, interest rates, bond yields, house prices, wages, profits and commodity prices are now being increasingly driven by decisions in China. This could be the most profound economic change in the world for at least half a century. And its effect could last for another couple of decades. By some estimates, China has almost 200m underemployed workers in rural areas, and it could take at least two decades for them to be absorbed by industry. As this process takes place, it will continue to subdue wage growth and global inflation. Profit margins could also remain historically high for a period (though not for ever, as stockmarket valuations in many countries seem to imply).
China creates immense opportunities, but it also brings new risks. If it stumbles, or if it decides to buy fewer American T-bonds, pushing up yields, then America might really have something to complain about: the first global downturn made in China.
家园 这篇文章写的真好！ 至少可以部分的解释目前的经济危机。现在大部分人们是把责任推到贪婪无度的资本家身上，这篇文章却给了不同的答案，至少是一个不同的视角。
家园 【文摘】美国政府汇率失控悲剧 中国替美元挖掘一个坟墓 来源：东方早报
http://business.sohu.com/20050804/n240223471.shtml
文 宿景祥
“尽可能用各种办法，征募一批又一批的工人，宽猛相济，恩威并举，给以报酬、引诱甚而强逼！我每天都要得到消息：开掘的壕沟延长到哪里。”一个压低的声音：“据我接到的消息，没有挖壕沟而是在掘坟墓。
”
这是歌德《浮士德》第五幕中的一段话。已经100多岁高龄的浮士德，忧愁袭来，双目失明，但仍想继续填海造田，并为此用尽各种方法。他听到铁锹和铁铲的声音，以为人们在为他开挖壕沟，但实际上人人都知道，这是在为他掘墓。
过去几年来，美国政府一直督促中国改变汇率制度，理由是这将改善美国的国际收支，减少其贸易赤字。但实际上，这不过是一种自欺欺人的说法。过去3年来，美元实际汇率下落了30%。与此同时，美国的国际收支情况仍在继续恶化，去年的贸易赤字高达6177亿美元。国际清算银行最近发表了一份研究报告，指出美国日益扩大的经常账户赤字，最终可能导致美元的失控，随之而来的是国际金融市场的混乱、动荡，甚至全球性经济的衰退和保护主义的盛行。
中国改行浮动汇率、由盯住美元改为盯住“一篮子货币”，从最简单的货币理论上看，也是明显地削弱了美元，同时也削弱了美元体制。美国如同浮士德一样，在比以往任何时候都需要中国支持美元的时候，却闭着眼睛让中国替美元挖掘一个坟墓。但问题在于，中国仍然需要美元体制的稳定。在这方面，中美有着共同的利益。
货币是商品交换的手段、衡量价值尺度和价值贮藏手段。对于一个国家而言，货币发行权是国家主权的基本体现。很多国家法定货币以历史伟人肖像作为图案，正反映了这一点。但在国际货币领域，问题要复杂得多。
一方面，现行货币体制具有国际制度安排的特质，是国际秩序的重要组成部分。各主要国家的政府有责任通过合作，建立健全国际货币运行的制度。但另一方面，货币作为一种由国家垄断性供给的公共商品，不啻于一种国际交往的语言。意大利语是中世纪晚期和文艺复兴时期地中海地区的商业语言，威尼斯的杜卡特和佛罗伦萨的佛洛林是当时的主要国际货币。
现行的货币体制，即有管理的浮动汇率制。美元是这一体制的核心货币，通常被称为美元体制。美元被用作国际货币，它的三种基本功能，即交换手段、价值尺度和贮藏手段都得到扩展，美国可以从中获得很多益处。货币间的这种竞争性，表现出的是国家主义和民族主义的色彩。与此同时，在国际货币的使用方面，则更多地体现着个人主义的商业性和普遍的世界主义性质。
这几种矛盾纠缠在一起，决定了国际货币体制的不稳定性。整个20世纪，国家间的货币竞争是国际货币体制矛盾的焦点，但从目前的情况看，西方主要国家的政府对国际货币事务的控制能力在下降，国际银行家们的力量则在增强，正在试图重新取得在这一领域的主导权。
根据国际清算银行的报告，世界需要一个新的“国际宏观稳定框架”。目前，国际银行家们正试图建立一种正式的合作机制，即危机管理机制。这将是一个由国际银行家们设定和控制的一个框架。对未来的世界经济而言，它无疑是一个不祥的征兆。
银行家控制国际货币事务的历史非常悠久。早在16、17世纪，在意大利的几个城市共和国里，银行家们便形成若干个俱乐部，每年定期聚会几次，在短暂的交易会期间，以非常巧妙的机制冲账、抵账，结清巨额的账目。他们不仅仅掌握着欧洲黄金和汇票的流通，还操控着欧洲各国政治事务，通过提供贷款和资金的封锁，决定国家间战争的成败。
相比之下，以中央银行代表的政府控制国际货币事务的历史很短暂。1927年7月，英、德、美、法中央银行行长在美国财政部长奥格登?米尔斯家里开会，讨论汇率问题，开创了此类聚会的先例。到1967年1月，西方主要国家的财政部长们在英国首相官邸开会，试图就国际利率水平达成协议。此后，这些国家的央行行长和财长每年都要聚会，进行政策协调，最著名的例子是1985年的“广场协议”和1987年的“卢浮协议”。但他们之间的合作矛盾重重，在过去10多年来变得越来越无力。
今天世界经济的基本面是全球化、跨国公司和资本流动，它一方面促进了全球经济的发展，同时也对21世纪的主权国家构成严重的挑战。美国政府最终将可能失去对美元汇率的控制，这不仅是美元的悲剧，也是未来几年世界经济所面临的巨大危机。
家园 不知道今后中国会不会采用一种小步匀速慢跑的升值方式 假如长远来说保持升值进行经济结构调整是既定的大方向，那可否采取这样的策略。在大的步伐上很有规律，每隔几个月就上升几个千分点；小的方面当然还是要出其不意，每几个月之内升值的时机不会让外界看出规律。这样的小步伐，累积的年利率是很低的，热钱不值得为此跑进跑出，要进来，也要投到实业上才能赚到合理的盈利。但在大方向上，又一直保持了升值预期。这样子就既吸引了国际资金，又避免了游资大进大出对经济的冲击。不知道这会不会是一种思路？
家园 升值可以使出口减速，这是稳定增长率的重要方面 家园 我为什么写这篇文章 看了“行路人”朋友的回文，我觉得有必要把我的思路说一下，算是作个补充吧。
行路人朋友说，“升值可以使出口减速，这是稳定增长率的重要方面”，我看这两句都可以商榷，具体如何，我就不说了，因为可能有100位经济学家讨论这些事情，并且或许有101种观点，呵呵。
我谈的是一个视角的问题。我认为，从一两个宏观经济指标来谈论人民币汇率改革与升值这样的重大事件，只能是盲人摸象，人言人殊，抓不住要害。人民币的问题，关系重大，牵一发而动全身，甚至不止动了中国，而是动了整个世界。中国已经不同了，我们看问题，要有整全与宏阔的思路，不能习惯于在枝节问题上转圜，否则我们就离这个时代越来越远了。
小弟才疏学浅，发文本意是抛砖引玉。河里肯定有未显身的高人，期待着能在讨论中共同提高，呵呵。
家园 很同意您的观点 经济政策必定牵一发而动全身，但经济政策的目的和作用却是经济学家争论的最重要的话题。国内搞新闻的专业水平都欠缺，被学者指哪里打哪里，抓不住关键。
不过我说的那句话怎么商榷法，还请指教，呵呵。
- 复 很同意您的观点
家园 Pacer兄客气了 再试着说两句吧。“升值可以使出口减速，这是稳定增长率的重要方面 ”。
先看前半句，我觉得这个因果性是不牢靠的，比如现在对出口的制约因素，如果我看发达国际贸易保护政策的效应是主要的，改革外汇体制部分减缓了保护主义反弹的力度，这个负负得正的效应不应该忽略。具体的数字，等下半年的数字出来再说，不过总的说来，汇率只是影响出口的诸因素中的一个，光看汇率是肯定不够的。
后半句，出口是稳定增长率的重要方面，这个要看这个“稳定”的时间范围了，低汇率加低工资成本维持的稳定是不是可持续的？我看从长期来看肯定是不行的，短期即使稳了增长率这个指标，这种政策带来的别的问题也使之得不偿失。事实上，现在已经是考虑怎样给这个政策收尾的时候了。
总之，兄的论点如果是在一些预设的假定或前提下讨论，没有大问题，但偏偏现实中正是这些东西需要考较，需要推敲，呵呵。不知这个回答您能不能同意。
家园 我这句话只说了问题的一部分，不及其余，您说得不错，谢谢指教
家园 花, 不过要再多说说啊
家园 又见高人，花~~ 家园 好文，献花