主题：【文摘】中印：谁将从可持续增长中受惠 -- Chieftain

把中印这两个发展中大国拿出来比较，是经济学家们乐此不疲的事情。摩根大通

这次选择的是两国经济增长的可持续性。包括中印两个经济体，谁的增长模式更具可

持续性？哪一个可提供更佳的投资回报前景？

　　参加讨论的包括摩根大通首席区域投资战略分析师莫爱德（ＡｄｒｉａｎＭｏｗ

ａｔ），他曾担任ＭａｒｔｉｎＣｕｒｒｉｅ投资战略部主管，逾１５年来密切关注

印度、中国及全球新兴市场的发展；摩根大通驻印度经济学家ＡｒｕｐＲａｈａ；摩

根大通驻上海首席经济学家龚方雄。讨论会由摩根大通证券研究部区域主管、注册金

融分析师ＪｏｓｅＬｉｎａｒｅｓ主持。

　　宏观走势

　　Ｊｏｓｅ：非常荣幸能为大家主持此次有关中印话题的讨论会，在深入讨论之前

，先让我们概括一下两国的宏观经济背景。

　　Ａｒｕｐ：由于印度的整体经济结构并没有改善，我们预测印度将于２００５年

（截至２００５年３月之１年内）出现周期性下滑。我们预测，印度的２００５年及

２００６年国内生产总值将分别增长６％及６．５％，期内通胀率将维持于６．５％

水平。我们预期印度将会适度加息，并令卢比在合理范围内贬值。鉴于经济周期性下

滑，印度孟买证交所敏感指数的２００５年目标预计为４??８００点。同时我们也认

为该指数将于２００６年强劲反弹至６??０００点水平。

　　龚方雄：随着中国政府致力令经济软着陆，我们预测中国经济将会出现周期性下

滑。我们认为，考虑到现时的基础架构，中国将难以维持目前的经济增长速度。

　　我们预期，中国２００４年及２００５年国内生产总值将分别增长８．６％及７

．５％，同期通胀率将分别为４．３％及３．０％。中国将会适度加息（约１００个

基点），汇率制度将更为灵活（升值２％－３％），摩根士丹利资本国际中国指数将

到２００５年底上升１０％。

　　莫爱德：技术性而言，我们不看好中国经济。市场对公司盈利前景感到忧虑，主

要由于通胀乃由成本上涨所推动，而各企业又不能透过提价来增加收入，因此对企业

盈利造成影响。长期而言，我们比较看好印度的经济结构。但由于通胀率过高，引发

市场的加息忧虑，因此印度的经济前景将在短期内仅表现为中性。

　　我们认为，对印度及中国的经济增长目标估计将倾向保守。尽管经济基本因素表

现理想，但今年以来，全球、地区及当地政治因素却不利于新兴市场的发展，对股票

价格造成了负面影响。但一旦投资者接纳我们对中国经济软着陆的正式观点，资金将

会重新流入中国。因此，龚方雄对摩根士丹利资本国际中国指数将上升１０％的预期

，实际上只是一个保守估计。

　　Ｊｏｓｅ：莫爱德，按照你的“３Ｒｓ”理论架构（ｒｅａｌｒａｔｅｓａｎｄ

ｒｅｆｌａｔｉｏｎ，实际利率及通货再膨胀）分析，印度与中国的情况如何？

　　莫爱德：印度与中国均处于通货再膨胀的模式中，实际政策利率均为负值，实际

消费借贷率亦位于历史低位，而消费则维持强劲。虽然中国正处于实现经济软着陆的

进程中，但仍试图保持强劲的消费增长。印度按揭增长率为２０％，其经济结构与通

货再膨胀状况表现一致。

　　增长的持续性

　　Ｊｏｓｅ：下面，让我们讨论一下两国经济增长模式的可持续性。Ａｒｕｐ，请

你简要谈一谈印度与中国的主要不同之处。

　　Ａｒｕｐ：首先，两者都是大国，经济呈不断上升态势，尽管中国经济增长率一

直相对更快。印度从１９９０年代初开始推行开放政策，创造了一个竞争的环境以带

动经济增长。印度拥有良好的高等教育体系及众多懂英语的人口，因此印度的优势在

于其技术型劳动力。印度的服务业在国内生产总值中所占比重高达５０％以上，对印

度的经济增长功不可没。然而，印度在基础架构方面仍落后于中国，令印度在制造成

本方面处于劣势。

　　中国的优势则在于其在国际上具竞争力的制造业（占国内生产总值的５０％），

主要原因在于中国的汇率制度及其对资本的高效利用。高额国内储蓄（占国内生产总

值的４０％）及大量外国投资（外国直接投资为５４０亿美元）纷纷流向硬件基础设

施建设及成本较低的制造业。

　　Ｊｏｓｅ：龚方雄，中国国内生产总值在过去２０多年来维持高速增长的主要动

力是什么？

　　龚方雄：中国在过去２０年来的成功应主要归功于改革开放进程，力图实现工业

化的努力，以及注重教育以培养技术型劳动力。就是因为这样，中国才能够吸引大量

外国直接投资进入中国，推动资本密集型制造业的增长并创造财富，而这是印度没能

做到的。

　　目前，中国的增长已到了一个转折点，在未来１０至２０年内从由出口及投资带

动的经济增长，向由国内需求带动的经济模式转型。此外，与印度相比，中国能够更

高效地利用资本（资本产出的增长率为４％，而印度为５．２５％）。这主要是因为

中国的受教育人口比例较高，技术型劳动力的素质较高，劳动生产率亦较高，机构能

力以及中国的技术水平通过外国直接投资而不断改善。

　　中国若要实现长期的可持续性发展，必须继续推行开放政策，实施银行及金融改

革，开放资本项目，将滞后的国内金融体系融入世界经济的一体化。

　　Ｊｏｓｅ：莫爱德，这是否意味着印度在开放方面表现滞后？

　　莫爱德：首先，我们必须清楚，印度从１９９１年才开始实施开放政策，比中国

晚１２年。然而，只要印度继续致力减少规例束缚，推进开放进程，并完善制度框架

，它将继续处于正确的发展轨道。

　　从宏观的角度分析，中国无疑远远领先于印度。然而，从微观层面来看，印度呈

现有机性增长，即由本土企业带动，而非由外国直接投资带动。印度具备较完善的体

系及以市场为导向的机制及制度框架，因此，我们认为印度的表现将有可能好过中国

。因为投资者最终将会关注于有机增长，以及需要投资于表现更好的公司，从而将令

印度在长期内可能比中国持续占有优势。

　　总而言之，印度拥有可持续增长的内在优势，但亦需在短期内吸引外国直接投资

，以发展基础架构。与此相反，中国即使拥有较完善的基础架构，但在改善微观因素

方面将面临重大挑战。

　　龚方雄：我想说明的是，中国私营经济实际上一直在经历着迅猛的有机增长，而

外国直接投资成为其推动因素。目前，国有资产仅占国内生产总值的１／３，而在１

９８０年代则高达９０％。

　　虽然外国直接投资数额巨大，但仅占中国固定资产投资总额的８％。显然，小型

及私有企业出口为中国经济的有机增长带来支持，并从区内其他地区夺得部分市场份

额。

　　Ｊｏｓｅ：莫爱德，更优越的增长模式是否能为企业创造更多盈利抑或只是个别

企业案例？

　　莫爱德：印度企业的股本回报率高于中国同业。举例而言，摩根士丹利资本国际

指数中，印度企业的股本回报率约为２０％，而中国企业则相对较低，仅为１６％。

原因是印度的资本供应缺乏，因此令印度企业更明白资本的成本。

　　Ｊｏｓｅ：体制改革是否会对增长模式的持续性造成影响？

　　龚方雄：中国的改革一直采用由上而下的方式进行。中国的政治体制在推动改革

方面表现更为积极。其中，土地改革是推动新兴市场发展的另一个因素，区内曾经实

施土地改革的国家，都在推动改革方面扮演着更积极的角色。早在上个世纪，中国就

已开始从农业领域入手展开土地改革。

　　而印度没有实施土地改革，已成为其增长的阻力，印度盛行的种姓制度阻碍了其

识字率的增长。过去，中国从亚洲一些经济体中借鉴了很多经验，并将持续如此。

　　Ａｒｕｐ：据罗伯特?巴罗（ＲｏｂｅｒｔＪ．Ｂａｒｒｏ）及ＡｄａｍＰｒｚ

ｅｗｏｒｓｋｉ进行的系统实证研究表明，并无任何证据支持政治权力与经济表现之

间存在潜在冲突的论点。这就驳斥了民主政治有利于经济增长的理论。

　　著名经济学家及诺贝尔经济学奖获得者阿玛蒂亚?森（ＡｍａｒｔｙａＳｅｎ）

称，民主发展过程是２０世纪中唯一且最为重要的事件。显然，虽然经济增长与民主

之间的关系不大，但民主仍是政治模式中最佳的选择。就长期而言，民主制度一直是

经济发展的有力保障。

　　印度的监督制衡政治体制将会长期存在。我同意龚方雄关于种姓制度阻碍了其识

字率增长的观点。但我不认同，土地改革是经济增长的重要决定性因素，因为印度农

业是完全私有化的。相反，政治体制有必要关注收后亏损等农业收益问题，包括交通

、分销及贮存等。

　　Ｊｏｓｅ：龚方雄，除金融方面，我们也需要关注环境对经济增长的影响。中国

的污染数据令人担忧，其对全球石油需求的影响亦令人难以释怀。此外，中国的耕地

面积仅占其全国总面积的１０％，而印度的耕地面积则超过５０％。你对此有何看法？

　　龚方雄：中国政府已意识到并日益关注环境破坏及对经济造成的影响。在目前的

增长模式下，中国消耗大量的原材料――中国的钢、铁矿石及铝消耗量分别占全球总

消耗量的２７％、３４％及１９％，显然，如果中国不注意环境保护，这种消耗趋势

将难以持续，更无从谈起经济增长的持续性。

Debating the Dollar

December 10, 2004

Morgan Stanley Global Economics Team

A weakening dollar is now center stage in world financial markets. But dollar depreciation is not the endgame of global rebalancing. It is the means toward the end -- a long overdue realignment in the mix of global saving and consumption. Morgan Stanley's Global Economics team has been actively debating the currency issue and its implications for the world economy. Below are excerpts from a recent roundtable discussion we conducted on the dollar.

Stephen Roach: A $40 trillion world economy is woefully out of balance. This shows up in many forms, but the most glaring sign is an unprecedented disparity between the world's current account deficits (America) and surpluses (mainly Asia and, to a lesser extent, Europe). The key to a successful global rebalancing hinges critically on tempering the risks of the world's most serious excesses. For me, that speaks of a shift in the world's relative price structure -- namely, currencies -- in order to re- establish a more sustainable equilibrium. That's where the dollar comes into play. But currency adjustments can't do it alone. A weaker dollar could also be key in forcing the interest rate adjustments that address the asset-driven excesses of the American consumer -- quite possibly the biggest risk factor in today's US and global economy. If the depreciation of the dollar implies tough adjustments elsewhere in the world -- like forcing export-led Asian and European economies to stimulate domestic demand -- then that's not such a bad thing either. Global rebalancing is a shared responsibility.

Stephen Li Jen: I think everyone is too sanguine about this de facto competitive devaluation by the US. To me, this is very serious, and a very dangerous policy pursued by the US. I've never heard any central bank telling the world not to buy their assets. But this was essentially what Alan Greenspan said in his Frankfurt speech on November 19. We are now talking about a gradual sell-off in US Treasuries that would take yields on 10-year notes to 5.0%. But if the world really were convinced by Greenspan, why would bond yields stop at 5%? Why should US equities be spared?

Richard Berner: I certainly agree with Stephen Li Jen that it can be a dangerous and risky game for Fed officials even implicitly to talk down the dollar. Chairman Greenspan, himself, is often guilty of believing that he can wave his magic wand to manipulate markets to produce the desired result. History shows that even he is sometimes humbled by the collective wisdom of millions of investors.

I believe that Fed officials would like to promote -- if they can pull it off -- a shift in the mix of financial conditions that will facilitate rebalancing. That shift entails higher US rates, an associated compression of equity multiples, a tightening of domestic borrowing costs, and a weaker dollar. Officials must have decided that the risks of the current mix of financial conditions, with all of its potential consequences for growing imbalances and prospective abrupt asset price adjustments, were greater than those entailed in a strategy aimed at letting the air out of the dollar in a more orderly way.

By the way, while I agree that having a central banker talk down his/her own currency can be dangerous, I think we'd all agree that it is broadly appropriate -- nay, essential -- for central bankers to signal their policy intentions. So Greenspan's related comment that market participants should expect rising interest rates is certainly an integral part of today's Fedspeak.

Joachim Fels: On Dick's last point, I have the sneaking suspicion that the Fed's policy of talking the dollar down is part of their game plan to create higher inflation in the US. Core inflation (as measured by the personal consumption deflator) at 1.5% simply doesn't give you enough of a safety margin against deflation if and when the next recession hits. And, in highly indebted economies such as the US, a little more inflation helps to grease the wheels. That's why I think that stagflation will be the name of the game in America in the next few years.

Jen: The possibility of stagflation is a perfect example of what I mean by stressing the potential pain of a competitive dollar depreciation. Yet everyone is still insisting "it won't hurt." I think they are missing the point. The whole purpose of the competitive devaluation of the US dollar is that it would hurt the rest of the world. It is about taking jobs and output from the rest of the world, and leaving the rest of the world to find other ways to come up with alternative sources of demand.

The US is effectively exporting bubbles to the rest of the world by forcing other nations to run a low-interest rate, strong exchange rate policy. Look at Japan in the late 1980s: they were forced to cut their discount rate in half between the Plaza and Louvre accords that demarcated the dollar's descent in the latter half of the 1980s. What happened in Japan in the late-1980s? Japan was left to deal with the bubble and its aftershocks for the ensuing 14 years.

Roach: Stephen, your response is a classic example of what I call the global blame game -- the notion that it's unfair for America to foist its problems on to the rest of the world. While I have some sympathy for this argument, I would also stress that Asians and Europeans have been asking for trouble on this score for a long time. Unable or unwilling to stimulate sustained growth in their own internal demand, they have hooked their economies to the fortunes of the hyper-extended American consumer. The idea that such a "free-rider approach" is a good way to run the world - - Americans consume Asian goods and Asians gobble up American bonds -- was dangerous from the start. It has led to huge dollar overweights in official reserve positions of all major non-US central banks -- overweights that now look fiscally reckless to America's creditors in the event of a sustained further drop in the dollar.

I am not as worried as you that this will be a competitive devaluation that will take jobs and output from the rest of the world. America's manufacturing base has shrunk so much in the past 20 years that such a dramatic turnaround is problematic at best. What I am most worried about is that the dollar's weakness will trigger a real interest rate response that will finally bring the American consumer to his or her knees. With the rest of the world lacking in consumerism, this raises the distinct possibility that we are headed for a protracted period of subpar global growth. Rather than bemoan America's willingness to take a long overdue adjustment -- one that the wise men of Europe and Asia have long sensed was appropriate -- why can't the rest of the world respond with a growth agenda of its own?

Jen: My point is not so much about blaming the US for imposing pain on the rest of the world. It is a fact that there will be pain -- that's not a judgment call. That's how the US current account deficit can be compressed. That's how the US can generate (some) inflationary pressures that prompt Fed tightening. Up to this point, dollar depreciation is a zero-sum proposition! That is now about to change.

If it didn't "hurt" anyone, there wouldn't be any change in the US inflation or demand outlook, and the Fed would be no more justified in hiking rates than if the dollar did not weaken. In other words, a weaker dollar being the trigger for a more hawkish Fed must involve pain in the rest of the world, which is a point that the rest of the world does not understand. The talk in Euroland and Japan is, "how much more currency strength can we tolerate before we get hurt." That misses the point.

As you yourself have argued, Steve, it is the next step -- when the rest of the world and the US take proper action -- that determines if we can move on to a state that is more sustainable in the long run. Going from A to B will not be a smooth path, because equities and bonds are being talked down in the process: Greenspan cannot talk down the dollar without talking down other dollar-based assets as well. Bottom line: I don't disagree with you. I just think that the world doesn't understand that pain is a part of the game here.

Roach: Stephen, thanks for the clarification. Your point is an important one that I certainly do appreciate. I guess it boils down to how the world copes with pain -- constructively (i.e., structural reforms in Europe and Asia plus deficit reduction and increased private saving in the US) or destructively (trade frictions and protectionism). I worry that Asia hasn't gotten over the 1997-98 crisis syndrome -- that it holds a grudge that may complicate the rebalancing endgame.

Andy Xie recently wrote the following: "It is in the overwhelming interest of the region (Asia) to fight back. The global economy should not be there just to serve the US. Everyone's interest must be taken care of offer. The only sustainable equilibrium is a cooperative one."

My question to Andy: If all Asia does in defense is sell Treasuries, it may end up shooting itself in the foot -- i.e., incurring huge fiscal costs of currency losses for that portion of their dollar portfolios they do not sell. Asia needs a backstop of balance and resilience that will enable it to withstand the pain of a weaker dollar. If all there is to Asia is capex and exports, then Asia will get creamed when its US-centric external demand dries up. Talk about being beholden to the "kindness of strangers!" America is hooked on foreign capital inflows. Asia is hooked on the excesses of American consumerism. There is pain involved in breaking both of these habits. I agree with Stephen Li Jen that the world is in denial over that possibility.

Andy Xie: Steve, I am not saying that Asia is not to blame. After the Asian Crisis, the Fed cut interest rates and Asia employed an export strategy to come back without embarking on the fundamental changes needed to establish a new balance between investment and consumption. The US, however, did not ask anyone to change the strategy when it was cutting interest rate and taxes to stimulate demand after the tech bubble burst. That was because it needed Asian savings to stay out of recession. Asia became complacent in living in this precarious equilibrium. Now, suddenly, the US wants to shake it off. How is that possible when the necessary changes are huge? All dollar devaluation would do is increase deflationary pressure without changing Asia's export potential. The cooperative solution involves both (1) the US reducing demand and Asia increasing stimulus in the short term and (2) structural changes in Asia to decrease savings and in the US to boost savings. A unilateral approach by the US could lead us down the road to a bad equilibrium, a prisoner's dilemma.

Roach: Andy, America is like everyone else -- steadfast in its strong predisposition for embracing the painless way out. The theory behind finally facing the pain and getting on with the adjustment is simple -- the longer you wait, the rougher the endgame. I think the Fed has finally taken the leadership in this "resolution" because it has lost confidence in the US Treasury to manage the problem. I do believe that an unbalanced world needs a wake-up call. If that's what this dollar angst boils down to -- all the better. Complacency and benign neglect are no longer acceptable as policy options for a world that has become this seriously unbalanced. You are right, of course, that the only way out is a cooperative solution. But it takes someone to jar the world to its senses to get the major players of the global economy all on the same page. Three (belated) cheers for the Fed for bringing the problem out into the open.

Eric Chaney: That a very weak US dollar will inflict pain on America's trade partners is not debatable, in my view. As I understand it, both Steves -- Roach and Jen -- agree on that. The first Steve has long made the point that some form of external shock is required to force Europeans to unshackle domestic demand. I am not fully convinced of that. Apart from monetary and trade policies, structural policies are in the hands of a bunch of local governments, which have different agendas.

David Miles: I must confess that I am also a bit confused by the view that if there were more structural reform in Europe this would help reduce imbalances in the world. I thought "restructuring" was a sort of catch-all for liberalizing labor markets and product markets designed to make Euro area more competitive, productive and so on (i.e., a set of policies designed to tackle high unemployment by, for example, weakening restrictions on hiring and firing, making social security less employment unfriendly, cutting restrictions on maximum hours and so on). If all that works, doesn't the Euro area become more competitive? How does that help close the US trade gap? Isn't the Euro area actually doing its bit to help by keeping itself less competitive?

Of course, one could argue that the prospect of structural reform creating future higher wealth in Europe would boost consumption now by more than output, so net demand for the output of the rest of the world rises, helping shrink the US deficit a bit. But that depends on European households interpreting reforms in a positive light and being willing to borrow against (uncertain) future gains. All that strikes me as a bit unlikely. It is not that I am against the position that reform in labor and product markets in many European markets is needed. Rather I am not convinced that this has much to do with reducing structural global imbalances. In fact, it is even possible that it could make things worse.

Roach: Structural reform is a long and arduous process that often entails major risk for incumbent politicians. The temptation is always to put off the heavy lifting -- thereby ducking any potential backlash. The US saga of the 1980s is a key case in point. A stronger dollar crushed Smokestack America and unleashed a powerful wave of corporate restructuring. America -- aided, perhaps, by more tenuous social contracts than in Europe -- took the currency signal as an imperative to reinvent itself. Moreover, a strong yen in the mid-1990s triggered aggressive restructuring by Corporate Japan. Europe whines a lot but doesn't seem to get the old adage of "no gain without pain."

Riccardo Barbieri: I would argue that if the EU or the euro-zone started major labor-market reforms tomorrow morning, that would not necessarily raise aggregate demand (and thus, imports) next year. In the medium-term, however, a more competitive Europe would not only challenge US and Japanese companies, but also, probably, enjoy higher rates of economic growth. In turn, that would boost imports.

Roach: Precisely. A more competitive Europe will finally promote lasting job creation, income generation, and domestic private consumption. That would be the sustenance of incremental import growth that would eventually offer opportunities for increasingly competitive US exporters. "Eventually" is the key word here. But let me come back to something that bears on what I believe is Europe's overly-defensive response to recent currency adjustments: Are you guys serious in expressing the belief that America's central bank has made a conscious decision to punish Europe for its lagging progress on structural reform?

Barbieri: I interpret the apparent preference of the Fed for a further weakening of the dollar and higher interest rates as a reaction to the US election outcome. Mr. Greenspan evidently feels that the dollar will be better underpinned once it is widely viewed as "cheap" and US interest rates are rising.

Europe is criticized for its lack of structural reforms -- a criticism that most of us would share. However, the euro has so far borne the brunt of the dollar adjustment. The appreciation of the euro will drive up imports and will cost Europe further jobs. In sum, Europe could do more on the structural side, but is doing more than its share on the macro side. The same holds with Japan, with the notable exception of exchange-rate policy.

Roach: Riccardo, your Euro-centric view of pain misses one important issue -- the failure of Asia to bear any burden of the dollar's recent weakening. Isn't that what burden sharing ultimately must entail?

Barbieri: Countries that follow dollar pegs -- either explicitly (i.e., China) or implicitly (i.e., Japan) are a complete or partial exception.

Roach: But isn't Chinese currency policy the real missing link in the global rebalancing script?

Barbieri: Yes. China certainly does stick out as a critical factor going forward. I realize that until two years ago, in a strong dollar environment, the Chinese peg suited everyone else around the world. The fact is that now the US, unilaterally, wants a weak dollar is a very real irritant on the Chinese side. However, one thing is clear: Every percentage point of dollar depreciation is also one percentage point of RMB depreciation against third parties. This will put further pressure on countries that do not have the flexibility and the local market size of the US. To the extent that China refuses to change its currency regime, then Europe will have at some point to draw a line in the sand -- if it can -- in terms of the euro exchange rate. In my view, that line is at 1.40.

That said, if China does change its currency regime, the world financial system will no longer be the same. Indeed, a further move towards flexible currencies could in due course bring an end to the supremacy of the dollar. Or will it? Can the world financial system and international trade be organized around different currencies? What will be the numeraire for the commodities markets? In my view, the expectation that holds world markets together is that a period of higher US and world inflation will be followed, in the medium term, by fiscal consolidation in the US, which will then re-establish the credibility of the dollar. But, will this come to pass?

Ted Weiseman: I disagree with one part of Ricardo's earlier argument in assessing the current-account implications of the US policy mix. Contrary to what he stated, post-election news on the US fiscal front actually has been quite positive.

Barbieri: My reasoning goes as follows: The US will continue to have a current account deficit in coming years, but the deficit must decrease in order to prevent an excessive accumulation of net international liabilities, i.e., in order not to have the world awash with dollar assets. However, if a given policy approach promises, say, to reduce import dependency and to raise the saving ratio, that is helpful for the dollar, because it reduces the US current account deficit in the long run and should thus make the rest of the world more willing to hold US assets.

My bottom line: if you think that we will see significant tightening in fiscal policy in the next four years, then this is something we must take on board in assessing currency risks. If it also means a higher overall US saving ratio, then I guess this should make us more optimistic (or less pessimistic) on the dollar.

Weiseman: The argument we've been making is that the US fiscal situation is gradually improving -- that the current budget deficit is not out of line historically. So this is not really where the focus should be in the debate about the US savings imbalance. The relentless downtrend in the personal savings rate is the glaring issue. That has to start rising if the overall national savings rate is going to go up.

Roach: America's federal government budget deficit is a very serious problem for precisely the reason you state, Ted -- a dramatic shortfall in private saving. Declining personal saving is an outgrowth of the Asset Economy -- namely, aging and myopic homeowners banking on unrelenting house-price appreciation to do the saving for them. The fact that America is now in the midst of a housing bubble is especially worrisome in that regard. The problem with persistent structural budget deficits -- a long- term prognosis that is centered in the 2.5% to 3.5% steady-state range -- is that the US has no cushion of private saving to fund it. That's the intractable current account problem in a nutshell. Nor would I be quite as optimistic as Ted on the federal government deficit -- the peaking is cyclical, whereas the real problem is structural. America's saving problem is off the charts -- possibly the most serious imbalance in an unbalanced world. Sounds to me like a classic case for a consumption tax.

At least Europe and Asia have that cushion -- much higher private saving rates -- giving them every right, in my opinion, to be critical of the US for its profligate ways.

Barbieri: If the US economy continues to do well, shouldn't the Fed step up the tightening pace? It all looks like a huge bet on growth. If American companies invest their savings in the US (perhaps with some help from a weak dollar), then the pie grows, jobs grow, and consumers can pay off their debt.

Gray Newman: If Administration officials made important moves on the fiscal front, I wouldn't be surprised if we saw the dollar rally. In that case the negative economic impacts of fiscal tightening could well be offset by an easing of long rates. That could buy us time but it would undoubtedly perpetuate an outsize current account deficit -- setting us up for an even bigger problem in the future.

Roach: So here's what this aspect of this debate boils down to: Does the US have a structural budget problem, or not? Does the US have a private saving problem, or not?

If the answer to both of these questions is "no" then we should be pounding the table on the likelihood of a miraculous US current account adjustment and a related strong reversal of the dollar. If the answer to both of these questions is "yes" -- and that is where I am -- then the adjustment game is just beginning. The trick comes when the answers to either question get shaded one way or another. The dollar's recent decline reveals the collective preference of the consensus of global investors. Again, it's not that a weaker dollar will fix all that ails an unbalanced world. But, as I noted at the outset of this debate, it is very much the Trojan Horse of global rebalancing -- a spark to real interest rate adjustments and a concomitant trigger to a narrowing of global consumptions and saving disparities.

The hope is the world finds a way to manage the dollar's decent gradually over time. Unfortunately, given the sheer magnitude of today's global imbalances, that may be wishful thinking.