主题：轮回 -- zhuhit
最近真是事情比较多,工作上2月份出差一个月,又赶上项目上市忙了2个月,中间抽空看了十本经济,市场,交易方面的书,有几个兄弟的站内信都是好久才回的,真是抱歉.
过几天又要出差了,头疼,如果这几天不写点东西就不知道要拖到什么时候了.
好,回归正题.
央行SPL:货币发行体系的转变
梳理一下,国内的货币发行体系:自朱前前总经理对银行系统改革以来,国内的货币是以美元为背书的货币发行体系,1994年汇改,之后银行法的颁布是这个体系运行的保证.同时起步的财税体制改革和国企改革,将大批工人打破铁饭碗,赶入劳动力市场,加入世贸后,国内工厂利用下岗工人和农民工大量赚取外汇,从2001年开始国内的外汇储备大量增加.
国内的货币只能被动增长,于是先沿海后内地,大家都有钱了,央行只能以存款准备金,央票,正回购的方式来回收过剩的基础货币.
待到了2008年国内4万亿,存款准备金一放,利率调低,大量基础货币涌入市场,国内企业大量上马项目,发行企业债,同时地方融资平台,高利贷,信托遍地开花,加速货币流通,国内资源价格暴涨,人力成本大量增加,外贸企业的日子不好过了.
等到了2011年国内贸易顺差高增长势头不再,外汇储备由高增长变为低增长,同年温州高利贷破灭,央行慢慢释放央票囤积的余粮,维持货币的稳定增长,
2013年中央票余粮耗尽,同年银行间钱荒爆发,信托开始违约,一直持续到年底.
2014年微刺激开始,定向降准，央行spl开始
而1994年之前央行的货币发行是靠什么？再贷款。
2014年再贷款批个马甲（spl）又出现了,哈哈,20年一个轮回
so what? Tg will figure its way out of the current mess, likely, 内战内行, and my guess:
1.
"if tomorrow ever comes"
tgchina hopes EU, Japan QE will eventually make Chinese "housing asset" look "more reasonably priced", and hopefully, if RMB is internationalized somehow, global hot money of EU/JPY QE will come into china, to bail out Chinese housing market.
2.
for now:
X's 1纵李天佑=1)民間还有钱, 2) 中央还有钱 [ 晓兵 ] 于:2014-07-04 16:47:02 复:4021389
1. "good" part
民間还有钱: Chinese 1.3 billion troops, most of them still have huge equities in their houses, and all kinds of savings for their children,etc;
"民心可用", with a lot of 蓝天大海 brainwashing;
中央还有钱: TG's 中央 actual budget/tax revenues are much much more than reported in paper, 罚款 and other tricks of all kinds of past many years
and 反腐败 to stop some bleeding of systems;
TG should be ok for a couple of more years at least, financially, my guess.
-----------a good piece, ZT, not intended to bother sysadmin--
《张涛专栏》坐在米缸外数米（二）：谈财政和货币的“连裆裤”
2014年 7月 9日 星期三 11:05 BJT
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（作者为路透中文特邀专栏作家，就职于建设银行金融市场部，仅代表个人观点）
我在《坐在米缸外数米：谈中国央行的逻辑》中，针对目前有关央行货币政策调控的讨论，分别从央行的目标、面临的问题和化解的思路，谈了自己的一些理解。
这里需要作一下解释，之所以把这一分析称作“坐在米缸外数米”，实是因为伴随金融危机和反危机下的货币政策变化、货币政策及央行的具体操作，已经被过度关注。特别是今年诸多“定向”货币政策工具的启用，更是连“独力完成结构调整”的重任也被强加在央行身上，到底这样的理解对不对呢？是否仅仅坐在金融和货币的大缸里，就能把中国经济运行中的“米粒”数清楚？莫非过去我们在教科书上学到的“央行只能进行总量调控”的知识，也伴随这个这一轮危机而烟消云散？带着这些问题，我想对《坐在米缸外数米：谈中国央行的逻辑》中一些没有展开的内容，进一步阐述一下自己的理解。
首先，回答上述问题，需要从货币供求的本原谈起。
实际上作为中国金融学主要奠基人的黄达教授早在其1984年出版的《财政信贷综合平衡导论》中就曾论述：对于一个独立的商业银行而言，是资金来源决定资金运用；对于整个银行体系而言，则是资金运用创造资金来源。（该书于1986年获得第二届孙冶方经济科学奖）。由此可见，有关“究竟是贷款创造存款，还是存款创造贷款”的争论由来已久，我把此称作中国金融“蛋生鸡、鸡生蛋”的本原问题。
究竟如何探寻这一本原呢？恐怕还要从新中国的金融历史入手，作为亲历者的刘鸿儒先生去年在《我国中央银行体制的形成》一文中对此说得很清楚：“新中国成立后相当长一个时期，与当时的计划经济体制相适应，银行业基本上照搬苏联的做法，信贷的范围有限，主要是提供一部分流动资金…中国人民银行的地位实际上就是政府的一个会计、出纳单位…在十年动乱的‘文革’期间，连以计划经济为特征的金融体制也难以维持，银行业务基本停顿，仅仅保留了发行、出纳职能。在这种情况下，国务院决定银行系统同财政部门合并，中国人民银行总行并入财政部，各省市分行与财政厅(局)合并…至此，银行的独立系统不复存在，这在全世界是独一无二的‘创举’”。
由此可见，中国的融资体系是伴随着投资体制、财税体制的变化而兴衰的，即对金融体系而言，资金用途管着资金来源。
本原问题解决了，接下来如何评价货币政策的有效性呢？
对于货币政策的评价，实际上就是对中国金融体系整体状况的评估，既然资金用途管着资金来源，那么评价工作也只有从资金用途入手。而在现代信用体系下，资金用途的理清则又和资金使用者密切有关，这就是在讨论中国债务问题时，我们经常说的那三张资产负债表：政府，非金融企业和家庭居民的资产负债表，而其中无疑只有政府具有单边的改变其他两者资产负债表的能力，进而间接地决定了包括央行在内的金融体系资产负债表的状况。
为什么这么说？
因为政府（财政）掌握着绝对的“分配权”。对于实体企业而言，政府关于区域、产业、技术等层面政策导向直接影响着企业资产的布局，而相关税收、行业管理等规定则直接影响企业的利润，这些影响都最终会转化为企业获取现金流的能力。至于说政府对于居民资产负债表的影响，我想就更不用多说了（税收、就业、公共服务等等）。而对于金融体系而言，只是通过对企业和居民的信用判断，完成对其融资能力的评价（评价越高，融资能力越强），可见经济个体融资能力的评价只是一个结果。
用经济学的语言讲，就是在经济运行机制内部，金融体系属于流通范畴，而财政体系（政府）属于分配范畴，在经济运行层次上，包括商品和资金在内流通领域的各种现象只是总量和结构矛盾的结果，并且时时刻刻受到分配体制的影响。因此，虽然说自中央银行制度产生之后，央行成为了“最后贷款人”，但却始终成不了信用的最终背书人，这一背书人只能是政府（财政）。
好了，说到这儿，我想评判如何货币政策有效性的答案就再简单不过了，就是央行作为控制资金融通总阀门的管理者，其政策导向和工具措施能否够符合经济运行中结构性变化的需要，实现“既不缺水，也不能水漫金山”的目标，如果有央行做到了，那么我们就可以说货币政策是有效的，至于说金山的高度是否合适，则是央行决定不了的，这就是我们常说的货币政策要解决总量矛盾，而且也只能解决总量矛盾。
评价答案有了，接下来我们再来看近年来货币政策的变化。
简单说，危机前，央行主要精力在于，对冲外汇占款增加带来的基础货币过度投放（防止“水漫金山”局面的出现），用央行的话讲就是“货币政策的自主性受到影响，货币供给呈现出较强的内生性特征”，相应也就出现近年来央行资产负债表“资产外币化，负债本币化”的变化。截至目前央行的资产超过80%为外币资产，其负债超过60%则是商业银行为主的金融机构存款，另外2001至今，央行的资产规模由4万亿扩张到33万亿，扩张了8倍之多。
但祸因真的是外汇占款吗？
众所周知，外汇占款快速增长的表象原因则是中国国际收支不平衡所致（“双顺差”的局面），但顺差只是出口减进口的一个数据结果，实质则是中国的进口赶不上出口，即内需和外需不匹配了，而内需不足实际上就是我们常说的生产需求和内部消费需求的脱节——结构性失衡。面对这种脱节，政府（财政）在分配环节也没有做出相应的调整，既没有采取大面积、大幅度的减税，也没有快速提升工资增速，以实现最终消费者的名义收入，而是采取启动外部市场的策略，通俗的讲就是“长着一嘴金牙讨饭吃”，当然这样做的好处就是政府的财力得到了充实，即最大限度的保证了政府资产负债表的健康。
2008年危机的爆发，外需不行了，政府必须出手救经济，但政府依然从自身资产负债表的健康出发，并没有大面积动用财政资金（2009-2010年间，4万亿的财政支出和几十万亿的信贷资金相比，你还能说是积极的财政政策吗？），而通过中央向地方下放金融配置权的方式，刺激实体企业在危机中逆向扩张资产负债表规模，同时也造成了影子银行、融资平台等的兴起。
问题是财政为什么不愿意出钱？原因很简单，因为看不准，不知道钱应该花在那？也就说财政政策和产业政策脱节了，政府在产业布局上迷茫了，“看得见的手”不知道放哪了（资金用途没了），只能退而求其次，求助于“看不见的手”——只保证融资环境的宽松，剩下的问题由市场来解决。但问题是市场同样也迷茫，那么必然就会产生“金融空转”、“脱实向虚”等金融乱像，在此背景下，央行作为资金融通总阀门的管理者，只能不停地“按下葫芦，再按瓢”。还是那个规律在发挥作用——资金用途管着资金来源。
我把这个矛盾称作“财政和货币的连裆裤破了”，本来为防止政府支出直接占用银行信贷资金导致的通货膨胀，我们在法律层面进行了明确的限制，即财政不能直接向中央银行透支，不让财政和货币穿“连裆裤”，但这种规范性安排并不是说财政资金和信贷资金在经济运行中是非此即彼的关系，实际上在外汇占款成为基础货币增加主因之前，我们的基础货币供给主要来自央行对政府债券的认购和对金融机构的再贷款，即货币供给是外生的，其中政府显然是货币供给的第一推手。也就是说央行的货币调控和政府的支出密切相关--资金总量的安排取决于政府支出带动下的经济结构的有意安排，这就是所谓的财政政策、货币政策和产业政策的协调。
而一旦中央政府把金融配置权下放给地方，实质上就已经把宏观层面的政策协调性舍弃了，言外之意就是对结构性调整的有意为之不要了，试问在这样的环境下，一味要求央行的政策精准，现实吗？他能把手里的经济杠杆工具维持好就不错了。
如今，有关货币政策“定向”工具的使用，可以实现稳增长和调结构目标的论调满天飞，仿佛中国经济运行中的所有矛盾，均能“一定解之”，可能吗？试问在当下财政和货币“连挡裤”不完整的环境下，单拎着金融这只裤脚，你能舒服吗？
千万别忘了，“资金用途管着资金来源”这条铁律；也千万别忽视，6月30日，中共中央政治局审议通过了《深化财税体制改革总体方案》，这才是近期发生在中国的真正大事，因为最终信用的背书人要改革了。（完）
在2008年金融危机前的大繁荣时期，企业由于出口强劲和内需旺盛，产能较为紧张。现有产能往往满负荷生产，当然也是赚得盆满钵满，扩张产能的意愿十分强烈。由于新建的产能能够很快得到不错的回报，扩张产能的愿望也非常持久。这与图上所显示的建筑安装工程和设备工器具购置同步、稳定而持久的高增长是吻合的。考虑到中国劳动力供给结构的变化和加速的工业化、自动化，出现“机器代替人”的局面，设备工器具购置投资的增速更快。实际上，土建活动本身就需要大量的机器设备。对于企业主尤其是中小企业而言，那真是美好时代啊！
2008年金融危机之后，为了“保增长”，我们国家贯彻了有中国特色的凯恩斯主义，实施了强有力的措施刺激需求。可是，此需求非彼需求，刺激措施的着力点是有限的，只能够创造特定的需求。国有企业早就退出了竞争性行业，总不能国家直接花钱盖工厂装设备吧。刺激措施更多地局限于“铁公鸡”等行业，这些行业的投资更多的是单纯的建筑安装工程，而不需要太多的设备工器具投资。近几年来，国家为了“保增长”、“稳增长”，屡屡出台大规模的刺激政策，从图上看，确实导致了建筑安装工程增速屡屡抬头，并一直保持在较高的水平。可是，仅此而已。建筑安装工程的有力增长并不能有效带动设备工器具的购置投资，后者一路下滑，2014年更有加速下坠之势。这可不像是健康的经济结构。
进一步说，实体经济的泡沫化也是固定资产投资结构恶化的重要原因。金融危机之后，全球都进入低速增长的调整期。主流经济体都在去杠杆、降需求。作为世界工厂的我国，当然也有产能调整的内在要求。但是，我们国家显然过度的刺激政策，催生了地产泡沫，从而导致了大规模的房地产投资和土地开发投资。这些投资当然主要体现为建筑安装工程。
住宅地产和经营城市方面的投机很容易理解，实际上工业厂房的建设也是类似的故事。草根的调研可以发现，大量的开发区、新区里成片的厂房，远远望去漂亮整齐，近看却没有门框窗户，当然更不会有机器设备。醉翁之意不在酒，建设厂房，只是为了圈地；而不建厂房，则不能办理房产证，当然就不能到银行抵押融资。至于机器设备嘛，以后再说吧，现在产能过剩谁还上设备啊！可以说，地方政府、企业和个人，很大程度都是在投机，真正玩的是“地”，只是要玩这个游戏就不得不带上建筑安装工程而已。
前文提到的悖论，至此可以有比较合理的解释。人为的刺激，引致了大规模的、盲目的土建工程投资。每年数十万亿并且看来无休无止、胃口怎么都无法满足的建筑安装工程，势必造成局部的资源紧张，当然抬高了利率。而建筑安装工程投资内在的投机属性，必然隐含巨大的信用风险。高企的利率，很大程度是风险溢价的体现。而机器设备的投资却每况愈下，则反映了工矿企业生产资料需求低迷，PPI当然也高不到哪去。同时，由于大量的土建工程没有配套机器设备，当然无法产生足够的现金流。只赚GDP不赚钱，企业自然苦不堪言。
看来，人为的刺激，强拉“铁公鸡”愈来愈与宏观经济脱钩，效率低下，代价高昂。能够想象只有厂房没有设备、只有铁轨没有机车的经济能够持久吗？建筑安装工程和设备工器具购置投资“剪刀差”所反映出来的丑陋的经济结构是不能持续的，未来必须收敛。而究竟是建筑安装工程拉高机器设备投资，还是机器设备投资拉低建筑安装工程、利率PPI靠拢，读者不难从图中感受到倾向。未来不妨进一步观察两者的动向。
红薯螃蟹，不能当饭；挖坑盖楼，不能立国；宏调刺激，不能兴邦。早点回头，减刺激，降利息，才是正道。（完）
民间有钱?
企业债占gdp比重是非常高的，仅次于日本（或者大于）不太记得了
个人有钱？
国内劳动力人口已经在走下降趋势了
未来会慢慢比现在没钱
另外：如果拿日本90年的情况比中国现在，一样的，民间好像很有钱，出口很好，日本货畅销世界
但是日本照样失去20年
所以从这种指标上看，不能判断，国内的情况会比日本失去20年强
日本欧洲qe了
但是国内5月分外汇占款基本为0
所以不能说日本欧洲的钱进来了
另外日本qe,措施用尽，还是没有起色，安倍支持率下降的厉害，要防止日本的政策转向的风险
http://www.cchere.com/article/3648138
US: foreclosure, bank failures bloody in 2008 system's 減法 operations, japan, EU never done that, tgchina will never let that happen, they are all crony capitalism in that sense;
kind of why US is doing well now, 1 of many reasons.
TGchina: politics becomes economics now, and politics is very hard to model.
good writing, thanks.
所以有人说：
中国最大的风险，就是不让经济减速的风险
不做减法的风险
我还以为你是比较看好国内的经济那，看来你只是开放的讨论一些问题
比较喜欢和你讨论的氛围
你怎么不举举
我判断国内钢铁产量到顶的判断
判断国内联保制度铁索连周会出问题
判断2010年底上证高点在3100点左右那
等等我就不一一列举了
另外：国内的铁路货运量已经连续两年下跌了
1. 朱前前总经理"减法"
"自朱前前总经理对银行系统改革以来,国内的货币是以美元为背书的货币发行体系,1994年汇改,之后银行法的颁布是这个体系运行的保证.同时起步的财税体制改革和国企改革,将大批工人打破铁饭碗,赶入劳动力市场,加入世贸后,国内工厂利用下岗工人和农民工大量赚取外汇,从2001年开始国内的外汇储备大量增加."
2. HW 减法
environment
3.
X'减法
kind of politics as a start
4.
中国最大风险:highly leveraged 的政治 system
EU, JPY economic zero growth, social system still stable
5.
how about Tgchina?
at the end of Mao time, "毛林共识" ALGO almost fall apart, and 1 of reasons=林 913 event, it kind of disabled TG's 精神原子彈: Chinese people not buying political BS from TG anymore;
now, 轮回 again, 相对论方程"一阶性", many old issues with a system are still there, with more "derivatives" now:
1)can chairman X china dream propaganda make TG 精神原子彈 work again? he is selling TG leadership as 民族主义 now, but no real beef, paper tiger, mostly. He dares not to play real war. dangerous.
2) if economy slows, how do you finance TG's "毛林共识" or 列寧's models: 枪杆子 and 笔杆子? they are very expensive? cut military? even more dangerous.
3) uncle sam short squeezing of Tgchina
6.
with all those system's "information"
smart money is going to suck even more blood from TGchina, making all those issues even worse.
kind of Uncle Sam's financial war on Tgchina, my guess, hoping for some systematic 相变 inside TGchina.
I would think Tg as a group knows all that, but how to handle all these fxxking problems atop a highly leveraged/concentrated political system, with possibly many insider traders helping Uncle Sam?
7.
again, IF "information" at system level comes out, and market figures out that Tgchina has topped out, and that information starts getting priced in, and all system's 减法 operations are coming your way, if you have TG long positions:
TG longs will stop buying, those TG white and yellow shorts in and out of mainland china, all under US command, start shorting more, all staring at TG with red eyes, ready to suck their share of blood, big time.
If Tg falls apart, china falls apart, uncle sam/JPY smile big time, and some local Chinese political groups will smart as well, TG haters globally distributed will all smile.
I don't know the reasons, but I guess Tgchina will likely be ok, and for now, chairman X strategy is to clean up TG, trying regaining Chinese people's trust, and sell Chinese nationalism hard whenever and wherever possible.
but economy slowing down is a big problem: if college grads can't find jobs, and if you put your hands into Chinese ordinary people's pocket, stealing their savings for their children, or if you let their house price/equity fall apart, how Chinese people are going to react?
that is the hardest part of the "model".
Chinese ordinary people of 1.2 billion=system介质, are they linear or non-linear, after experience so many systematic changes in TG's almost 100 years of history?
any 相变 brewing in this big chunk of 介质?
前经理在经济上失分太多。
把所有的经济大牌一下子打光了
维持了表面的繁荣
如果措施得当的话，tgchina甚至现在可以考虑剪别人羊毛了
当然历史不容假设
热钱进来，要有利益才行，什么地方给他利益？
人民币升值？实体反正是不行了，产能过剩，实体利润率太低了
只能虚拟经济了，但是现在虚拟也不行了
股市，楼市短期看不到向上的迹象
1.
and jury is out, global capital markets have almost unanimously spoken out: US as a economic, political and social system: it has survived 911, and it has outsmarted international "model challenge" from tgchina as a potential game changer of post world war II.
that information is now almost at system level.
but the tricky part of the capital market's information processing: system
s 工作介质 is non-linear fundamentally, some 工作介质 "get it", most don't or they are slow in getting system's information, the result: the slow ones or "never get it" ones will be eaten alive by system's "减法" operation, one way or another. "stupidity" just does not deserve anything.
that is why I keep saying that many TG senior traders are super smart, they are the smart 工作介质 of Tgchina's system;
and how about "our" troops? troops are always stupid, anywhere in the world, they are basically 乾電池, and now with "self-aware" robots coming out in army, 乾電池 can't even find jobs, globally.
this is kind of system's "乾電池减法" operation in the white evil created and USA managed global "民主自由金融" game
Tgchina with a 1.5B 乾電池 will likely get hit the hardest, in this new round of system's "减法" operation .
2.
politicians like 乾電池, particularly in EU, because 乾電池 troops have votes.
so, the biggest challenge for TG today is: with a slowing down economy (economically, it is very bad, regardless), how to play Chinese 乾電池 of 1.5B?
3.
atop all these issues, as said, TGchina is highly concentrated and leveraged political system
for a near equilibrium macroscopic system of huge size, system's 梯度越大，系统 储存/compressed 自由能越多, and those 储存/compressed 自由能 will come out, eating 梯度, and maximizing system's entropy, so system becomes more stable, or system jumps into a new form, 相变;
TG has a huge 梯度 now, politically in particular, already bad, and making it worse, fundamentally, TG's "毛林共识"是一种落后的生产关系, period, in the minds of global capital market.
ok, now, Tgchina still has 1.5B 乾電池, but 乾電池 is not really risk free:
"Chinese ordinary people of 1.2 billion=system介质, are they linear or non-linear, after experience so many systematic changes in TG's almost 100 years of history?
any 相变 brewing in this big chunk of 介质?"
4.
if you don't have physicists help you, get some engineers like 军委副主席徐才厚上将, 徐才厚同志1963年考入"哈军工"电子工程系学
劣幣驅逐良幣: tg's leadership, in terms of ALGO power, in a closed, concentrated and leveraged system, or they are all 劣幣 anyway.
that is 1 of many reasons that fundamentally:
"毛林共识"是一种落后的生产关系, it may still work out in mainland china, but it will never fly internationally.
and in today's globalized capital market, smart money and brain will keep flowing out of TGchina, as long as "毛林共识" ALGO still runs as #1 ALGO in tgchina's system.
and as said before, the dilemma is: if you don't run that "毛林共识" ALGO , tgchina may have fallen apart yesterday.
risk is getting bigger and bigger, slowly, how many years it may take for it to blow out? nobody knows.
1.
the so-called sino-US marriage.
I think chairman X is cleaning up and consolidating TG, and when times comes, starts negotiating with Uncle Sam;
2.
Uncle Sam: if you are falling apart anyway, why do I bother to make an offer now to whatever you try selling to me? I may just wait for a yard sale when your house falls apart.
3.
next couple of years: the game will be more interesting
US: china hater Hillary becomes president
Tgchina: 1纵李天佑, how long he can hang on there?
X's 1纵李天佑=1)民間还有钱, 2) 中央还有钱 [ 晓兵 ] 于:2014-07-04 16:47:02 复:4021389
1. "good" part
民間还有钱: Chinese 1.3 billion troops, most of them still have huge equities in their houses, and all kinds of savings for their children,etc;
"民心可用", with a lot of 蓝天大海 brainwashing;
中央还有钱: TG's 中央 actual budget/tax revenues are much much more than reported in paper, 罚款 and other tricks of all kinds of past many years
and 反腐败 to stop some bleeding of systems;
TG should be ok for a couple of more years at least, financially, my guess.
4.
fundamentally, TG's載體 of 1.5B people is still a piece of fxxking sweet candy, now with EU and JPY in economic zero growth forever;
both Tg and Uncle Sam know that, so more likely, a deal will work out eventually.
for now, X has to run TG's #1 ALGO "毛林共识" hard, as hard and as long as possible;
if uncle sam sees Tg is losing control of mainland china, Uncle Sam is not going to come to talk to you, he will fxxk you from behind, with help of JPY in particular.
not an easy game for Tgchina to play, now with Hilary coming into office in two years.
1.
economics cancer:
nobody inside TG's top leadership dare to throw out that ALGO, "毛林共识" ALGO; they all have to run that #1 ALGO sometime, one way or another. Hu and Zhao all tried not running that #1 ALGO: they were dead almost right away;
and as long as "毛林共识" ALGO is the #1 ALGO in TGchina's system, capital market of already globalized will never like tgchina's economic system.
as a result, 劣幣驅逐良幣 forever in tgchina's economic system, regardless of TG's market reform propaganda.
it is almost like a cancer is eating up the rest part of the system: the system still fxxks like a normal person, but we all know that hooker has HIV infection. OMG(:).
and the hooker is getting less and less bids.
as long as global heatbath works as a system, the priceless information always exists somewhere, and some smart assholes can figure it out, then arbitrage, short the damned hooker in this case;
once that critical and priceless information is written on the wall everywhere: information fully priced in, big money already made by the very few 先知先觉 traders, with a little bit left over for the rest of the market players, they are huge in numbers but small in brains, very often.
2.
International politics.
TG is not even 普京, in terms of wrestling with Uncle Sam's white wolf team.
"中国邦联 of 新加波 and TW, plus a global 華僑 "特五" of about 80 million=a huge 战略机遇 missed by Tgchina to significantly challenge US led global heatbath or 国际政经意识形态次序, largely created by white."
that historical 战略机遇 may have been missed by Chinese nation forever.
3.
普京 to USA: ok, I tried working with you in your game, and you still fxxked me, putting NATO right at my border;
I am going to fxxk u back as much as I can, and I don't care if we die together: Ukraine, a victory at least politically for 普京.
4.
TG is not even @普京 level, 外戰经验太少;
"毛林共识" ALGO have never flied beyond Chinese mainland border, since day 1.
that is a reflection of Chinese nation's overall weakness: very little ALGO power, if any, with all kinds of reasons as I have posted before.
and Tg's GFW and all kinds of brainwashing propaganda are only going to make it worse.
5.
with all that, even one day Tg can get a bid from Uncle Sam for Sino-US marriage, the bid is not going to be sweet at all: uncle sam will bully you, fool you and trick you into selling TG's載體 with almost a yard sale price.
enjoy it, baby.
看这任经理感觉只是在拖
面临的局面比朱前前经理还要困难
xi的动作感觉还可以，起码能抓住一些东西
我知道你为什么要用英语写了
其实我是同意你的判断的
但是用中文写，实在是怕给自己惹麻烦
的确如此
战略机遇期已过
如果朱前前总经理再干两届，类似普京的人物主外，现在该哭的是美国
历史不容假设
从某种程度上说也是一个必然
其人才选拔体系决定了这种必然
"中国邦联 of 新加波 and TW, plus a global 華僑 "特五" of about 80 million=a huge 战略机遇 missed by Tgchina to significantly challenge US led global heatbath or 国际政经意识形态次序, largely created by white."
1.
Uncle Sam:
1) 2001 911, fighting two wars at same time;
2) 2001 internet stock bubble falling apart, new business models are still "no where", global information/ALGO highway still in "day dream"
3) 2008 financial earth quake
omg, sky is falling, if "中国邦联 of 新加波 and TW" hits Uncle Sam from behind.
now looking back, Uncle Sam must feel scared big time
2.
if Tg put together that "中国邦联 of 新加波 and TW plus a global 華僑 "特五" of about 80 million", taking advantage of Uncle Sam's ass falling apart at that time
global 偏微分方程 system: 边界条件, 路徑依賴, would be much favorable to Tgchina, big time;
3.
there have been many similar 战略"边界条件, 路徑依賴" in human history, where history makes a "wild turn": real 政治家 战略家 make 战略 calls at those critical turns, then, those 政治家 and 战略家 would make or change history, leaving a permanent mark in human system of global scale.
otherwise, you are just a 政客, period.
are most US presidents are 政客 anyway?
yes, but uncle sam has a fairly robust system as a back up, in case of 政客 messing up.
atop 2008 US financial crisis: warren buffett said, USA is a good ship overall, we just happened to have a bad 船長 now: buy this down turn with your money, the US system will work its way out, and we will be ok.
there is only one warren buffett, 金融战略家, in this world, so far, period.
4.
as non-linear, dissipative and dynamical as a social system can be, most social system of large scale with a fairly long history: they are overall fairly stable, with some kind of ALGO running at its core.
where is that ALGO/Information?