主题：【整理】维基解密:09年乌鲁木齐75事件 -- 大漠孤烟远

XINJIANG PARTY CHIEF LIKELY TO STAY ON DESPITE PUBLIC DISCONTENT AND ERODED INTRA-PARTY AUTHORITY, CONTACTS SAY

Identifier: 09BEIJING3127

Origin: Embassy Beijing

Created: 2009-11-16 11:33:00

Classification: CONFIDENTIAL

Tags: PHUM PGOV CH

Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.

VZCZCXRO8913

PP RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC

DE RUEHBJ #3127/01 3201133

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

P 161133Z NOV 09

FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6861

INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE

RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DCC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 003127

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2039

TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, CH

SUBJECT: XINJIANG PARTY CHIEF LIKELY TO STAY ON DESPITE

PUBLIC DISCONTENT AND ERODED INTRA-PARTY AUTHORITY,

CONTACTS SAY

REF: A. BEIJING 2753

B. BEIJING 2183 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor

Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) Summary: Xinjiang Party Secretary Wang

Lequan seems likely to keep his job, several

contacts predict, despite public anger over his

handling of the July riots in Urumqi. A September 3

demonstration, in which thousands of Urumqi

demonstrators demanded Wang's resignation, may have

actually improved his chances at staying on.

According to some observers, the Communist Party

would be reluctant to remove a high-level leader in

response to public pressure for fear of establishing

a precedent that could lead to demonstrations

against other unpopular provincial leaders. Wang

Lequan continues to enjoy the backing of Party

General Secretary Hu Jintao, our sources say,

although his political authority within the Party

has eroded due to perceptions he botched the

response to the July unrest. Two Uighur

intellectuals told us that ethnic tensions have

accelerated a Han exodus from Xinjiang and have

caused Urumqi housing prices to fall sharply.

Scholars at Beijing's Central University for

Nationalities reported that the Chinese government

has commissioned internal academic studies to exam

the causes of the violence in Xinjiang. The

government appears to be focused on reducing Uighur

unemployment as a means to improve stability in

Xinjiang. End summary.

Wang Lequan: So Bad, He's Good

------------------------------

2. (C) In September, several Embassy contacts

predicted Wang Lequan would be removed as Xinjiang

Party Secretary soon after October 1 National Day

celebrations. Wang Chong (protect), a journalist

for the Communist Youth League (CYL)-published news

magazine China Weekly, told PolOff September 15 that

Wang Lequan would soon be named to a new post in

Beijing, most likely vice chairman of the National

People's Congress. Echoing comments we heard from a

range of sources, Wang said such a "promotion" would

give the Party a face-saving way of removing him

from Xinjiang. Many in the CCP leadership,

especially on the left, were "furious" at Wang

Lequan for "losing control" of Xinjiang during the

July unrest, Wang Chong added, but Wang's status as

a Politburo member made his outright dismissal

impossible. Embassy contacts frequently cited

Public Security Minister Meng Jianzhu, Qinghai Party

Secretary Qiang Wei, and Tibet Autonomous Region

Party Secretary Zhang Qingli as possible candidates

to replace Wang Lequan in Xinjiang.

3. (C) As Wang remained in place through late

October and into early November, however, contacts

began to observe that Wang could remain in Xinjiang.

Wang Xiaodong (protect), a well-known nationalist

author who contributed to the best-selling book

"Unhappy China," told PolOffs October 20 that Wang

would likely keep his job. Wang Xiaodong, who also

works for the CYL-operated opinion polling

organization China Youth and Children Research

Center (Zhongguo Qingshaonian Yanjiu Zhongxin), said

the September 3 demonstrations, during which

thousands of Urumqi's Han residents took to the

streets to demand Wang Lequan's resignation,

ironically served to ensure Wang's survival as

Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) Party

Secretary. The CCP, Wang said, had created a

"dangerous precedent" by firing Urumqi Party

Secretary Li Zhi in response to the September 3

demonstrations. Removing Wang Lequan in response to

public pressure, even as part of a nominal promotion

to Beijing, could encourage similar demonstrations

in other provinces. The Party, Wang Xiaodong

warned, could not afford to let the public believe

that mass demonstration was an effective way of

removing an unpopular party secretary. Removing

Wang Lequan from Xinjiang would be difficult, he

added, because after 16 years as Party Secretary

Wang was "deeply entrenched" in the XUAR. Wang

Xiaodong predicted that the CCP was likely to let

Wang Lequan retire quietly in a few years. (Note:

BEIJING 00003127 002 OF 004

Wang Lequan was born in 1944, meaning he will reach

67, the usual retirement age for high-level cadres,

in 2011.)

4. (C) Ilham Tohti (protect), a Uighur economist at

Beijing's Central University for Nationalities who

was detained for six weeks following the July 5

riots, told PolOffs October 28 that the CCP had been

prepared to recall Wang Lequan from Xinjiang until

the September 3 demonstration caused the Party to

recalculate. Tohti predicted Wang Lequan would

remain in place until at least the "next major CCP

meeting of 2010," such as the Fifth CCP Plenum in

fall 2010. Dildar Eziz (protect), a prominent

Uighur author who works for the Xinjiang Chinese

People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC),

told PolOff November 6 that President Hu Jintao's

late August visit to Xinjiang had served to shore up

Wang Lequan's political position. During the visit,

Hu had praised Wang's rule of Xinjiang during

meetings with Party cadres, which praise was

intended to convey the message that Wang would be

staying put, Eziz said. Ma Rong (protect), a Peking

University sociologist and frequent advisor to the

CCP United Front Work Department, also cited Hu

Jintao's support as the key reason Wang would keep

his post. Wang Lequan, Ma told PolOff November 12,

recently had told his staff that he planned to

remain in Urumqi "for another three years." Ma,

like Wang Xiaodong, predicted the CPP would "handle"

Wang Lequan simply by letting him stay in Urumqi

until he retired.

But Does He Still Call the Shots in Xinjiang?

---------------------------------------------

5. (C) Though most Embassy contacts now predict Wang

Lequan will remain in Xinjiang at least until 2010,

most said his political authority and standing

within the Party had diminished because of a wide-

spread perception that he had botched the early

response to the July 5 riots. Ilham Tohti said

that, following the July unrest, the central

government no longer deferred to Wang Lequan on

policy matters related to the XUAR and ethnic

affairs. "Xinjiang had been the donkey that led the

(central government) camel," Tohti said, "but not

anymore." Similarly, Wang Xiaodong relayed that

Wang Lequan and other high-level Xinjiang leaders

had been severely criticized during internal Party

meetings immediately after the riots, which

criticism had reduced Wang's standing in the CCP.

6. (C) Wang Xiaodong, citing personal contacts in

the People's Armed Police (PAP), added that PAP

commanders in Urumqi had been prepared to move much

faster the night of July 5 to quell the violence but

had found that the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau

paralyzed by indecision. This, according to Wang,

was one reason Xinjiang PSB head Liu Yaohua had been

fired in September, but many PAP officials also

blamed Wang Lequan for delaying the order to

mobilize the PAP. Eziz, however, expressed

skepticism that Wang Lequan's authority had

significantly diminished in the wake of the July 5

riot. "So long as Wang Lequan is physically present

in Urumqi, he will continue to wield power," she

said.

Han Flight

----------

7. (C) Several contacts noted that the July riots

had resulted in a Han exodus from Xinjiang. Dildar

Eziz, who owns several properties in Urumqi, said

the departure of Han from the city had impacted the

housing market. Apartment prices once as high as

RMB 5,000 per square meter had fallen to RMB 2,000

after the July 5 riots. She said property prices

had fallen especially sharply in the Saimachang

district, one of the hotspots of the July riots.

Beijing University's Ma Rong, who specializes in the

study of internal migration to Tibet and other

minority regions, also observed that Han migrant

workers were leaving the XUAR out of fear of further

violence. Ilham Tohti said that well before the

riot Han were already starting to leave Xinjiang in

pursuit of higher-wage jobs in China's coastal

provinces. Han children raised in Han "bing tuan"

BEIJING 00003127 003 OF 004

(the quasi-military Xinjiang Production and

Construction Corps) enclaves were less willing to

remain in Xinjiang than their parents because of

diminished job opportunities. Population dynamics

in Xinjiang were fundamentally different than in

Tibet, where high salaries continued to attract Han

migrants, Tohti observed. Even before the riot the

Chinese government had been having difficulty

maintaining sizable Han populations in Xinjiang

cities and towns outside of Urumqi.

8. (C) Not all Embassy contacts viewed the Han

exodus as a serious problem. He Weifang (protect),

a liberal Beijing University legal scholar currently

teaching at a university in Shihezi, about 100 miles

northwest of Urumqi, told PolOffs October 21 that he

knew of some Han leaving Xinjiang because of the

July 5 riot, including a colleague at Xinjiang

Normal University who was seeking job opportunities

in Guangzhou in an attempt to leave the region.

However, Professor He said he believed that Han

migration from the XUAR was a temporary phenomenon.

He noted that housing prices in Shihezi were

actually rising, which he attributed to the city's

strong local economy and majority Han ethnic makeup.

The Search for Answers

----------------------

9. (C) Tohti said that a major difference between

views on the July unrest in Xinjiang and those on

the March 2008 unrest in Tibet was the rejection, by

both the general public and elites, of the official

propaganda on the Urumqi riots. In the Tibet case,

most Han accepted the government version, which

blamed the 2008 violence on a small number of

separatists working on the orders of the Dalai Lama.

However, nobody, according to Tohti, believed

official statements that World Uighur Congress

President Rebiya Kadeer had masterminded the July

riots. The Xinjiang riots, he said, had created a

rift between the Communist Party and Han residents

in the XUAR that did not exist in Tibet. Ma Rong

said that the public skepticism had been caused by

Wang Lequan's attempts to manage Han anger by

covering up the extent of the violence. The actual

death toll from the July riots, Ma asserted, "was

nearly one thousand," of whom "95 percent" were Han,

mainly migrant workers. (Note: The official death

toll is 197.) Authorities, Ma Rong said, could not

reveal the real figures for fear they would spark a

new round of Han reprisals against Uighurs.

10. (C) Several academic contacts told us that the

Xinjiang unrest had prompted numerous government

agencies to commission "internal" (neibu) academic

studies to examine the underlying causes of the

Urumqi riots. Wang Xiaodong said a colleague

working with the Xinjiang People's Armed Police had

told him of opinion polls commissioned by the PAP

that sought to clarify the causes of the violence.

Ma Rong said that he had been invited to attend a

major conference on bilingual education in Xinjiang

the week of November 16, which he characterized as

part of the government's response to worsening

ethnic tensions. Pan Jiao (protect), a sociologist

at Central University for Nationalities, told PolOff

November 13 that many academics specializing in

minority affairs had been tasked to work on internal

research projects, which reflected the Party's

genuine surprise over the Xinjiang unrest. "The

leadership," Pan said, "could not believe something

like this could happen at a time when China is doing

so well overall."

Focus on Employment as Key Issue

--------------------------------

11. (C) According to Pan Jiao and other academic

sources, many internal studies were focusing on high

Uighur unemployment as a factor contributing to

ethnic tensions. Tohti told PolOffs that, despite

his status as an outspoken critic of Chinese policy

in Xinjiang, friends in the State Ethnic Affairs

Commission had been sharing internal reports on the

July riots with him and asking for his comments.

Tohti said the main policy proposal to emerge in the

wake of the July riots was a plan to limit

importation of Han workers to the XUAR by requiring

BEIJING 00003127 004 OF 004

that Xinjiang companies hire at least 50 percent of

their workers from the local community. Although

the policy did not include hiring quotas for

Uighurs, the 50-percent regulation would, if

implemented, increase Uighur employment. Dildar

Eziz said that while she had heard of similar ideas

to improve Uighur employment, she doubted the

proposals would have any meaningful impact since few

large companies operated in predominantly Uighur

cities like Hotan (Hetian) and Kashgar (Kashi). She

predicted the programs would have many loopholes and

would not change the fact that Han employers only

hired Uighurs "as a last resort." Tohti said that

the Han out-migration from Xinjiang was providing

more job opportunities for Uighurs and more space

for minority-owned businesses to develop. Eziz,

though acknowledging these developments, said the

changes would be temporary. Uighurs remained on the

economic margins, she said, doing the most difficult

jobs for the least pay.

HUNTSMAN

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