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主题:【原创】欧元区救助计划的一些技术细节 -- 我爱莫扎特

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家园 为啥从我看到的东西和你说的不那么一样呢

利比亚的事,非盟是反对的,弃权的是金砖四国加德国

关键问题在于,那边正经是政府军打非政府军,不是侵略战争,即没有大规模伤害武器,似乎也没闹出种族灭绝之类反人类的事,类似的事在非洲只怕每年都能有几出。按以往惯例往往是制裁加停军售。结果蹦出了个禁飞区决议,然后欧美飞机直接参战,貌似也远远超过联合国决议的范畴。如果说这样的事件是正常的,那么只怕非洲所有的总统国王都会背脊发凉吧。

至于希腊,现在这5成减记,不是希腊提的,更不是债主和欠钱的双方交涉的结果,而是理论上的第三方事实上欧洲金融秩序的管理者欧盟出来拍板,半强制的要求债权人接受的。真要是让希腊全民公决,只怕结果必然是国家破产了事,而不是现在这样背着7成债务继续残喘。

家园 那应该是你记错了

利比亚的事,非盟是反对的,弃权的是金砖四国加德国

金砖四国加德国弃权,非盟在联合国安理会的当值理事国有3个,却全部都投了赞成票,否则这法案就凑不够需要的9票支持,没有办法通过的。你把赞成票说成是“反对”的?

关键问题在于,那边正经是政府军打非政府军,不是侵略战争,即没有大规模伤害武器,似乎也没闹出种族灭绝之类反人类的事,类似的事在非洲只怕每年都能有几出。按以往惯例往往是制裁加停军售。结果蹦出了个禁飞区决议,然后欧美飞机直接参战,貌似也远远超过联合国决议的范畴。如果说这样的事件是正常的,那么只怕非洲所有的总统国王都会背脊发凉吧。

相比南联盟和萨达姆的大规模杀伤性武器的无中生有,利比亚不管怎么说还是跳出来一批反对派真刀真枪地跟卡扎菲打仗了的。相比之下,欧美现在做的,比以前只不过是小菜一碟。你把这说成是挑战底线?底线早不知道在底下多远多远去了呢。

至于希腊,现在这5成减记,不是希腊提的,更不是债主和欠钱的双方交涉的结果,而是理论上的第三方事实上欧洲金融秩序的管理者欧盟出来拍板,半强制的要求债权人接受的。真要是让希腊全民公决,只怕结果必然是国家破产了事,而不是现在这样背着7成债务继续残喘。

当初美国政府出面,用纳税人的钱救华尔街私人企业,那算什么?真要让美国人全民公决,会通过吗?现在占领华尔街的人首先就不同意。

家园 墙街报评论EFSF

如果希腊国债的CDS可以“被”不触发,为什么EFSF将来就会赔你钱?

If Greek CDS Don’t Trigger, Why Would EFSF?

Investors who bought insurance against a possible Greek default are sweating right now.

It appears that the “voluntary” 50% haircut on the value of outstanding Greek debt is being structured in such a way as not to trigger CDS protection. The committee that decides is meeting to discuss whether or not the terms of its conditions for a payout have been triggered.

My colleague Matt Phillips, writing a post for MarketBeat on wsj.com Thursday, didn’t hold out much hope for the contracts to be triggered.

If the CDS are not triggered it will add insult to injury to those who bought protection. That’s because, as an insurance contract struck between banks, the CDS usually last over certain long periods, say five years of premium payments for five years of protection. Anyone buying CDS on Greek debt earlier this year will then be on the hook for another four years of payments.

Now, all other things being equal, that might not be a total catastrophe, say people who deal with these contracts. That’s because banks use CDS as a balance-sheet hedge to offset writedowns they take on sovereign debt.

This, though, presumes those CDS contracts retain their value—say because the next time Greece defaults it won’t be “voluntary.”

This seems unlikely.

As Citigroup’s uber-economist Willem Buiter notes, the Greek default passes the duck test.

It looks like a default, sounds like a default and lays eggs. The writedowns would be “voluntary” only in the sense you “voluntarily” hand your wallet over to the guy holding a gun to your head.

Indeed, the ratings agency Fitch said Friday it would treat the Greek plan as a default.

So if these CDS fail to trigger because of political shenanigans and legalese, it raises the question of why anyone would ever want to hold CDS on sovereign debt anyway.

What this does is make it painfully clear what a nonsense CDS—essentially insurance policies against bond defaults—are in the context of developed-market debt, as the Macro Man bloggers point out.

In countries with their own printing presses, like the U.S., the U.K. and Japan, it is very hard to see how a default is possible. True central banks can refuse to buy government debt, but central bankers can always—always—be replaced by politicians.

But now we know even countries that do not have control of their own monetary policy will not be allowed to default in a legalistic sense of the word. The question now must be whether people who bought CDS protection on Greek debt will continue having to pay the premiums on this protection even though they know they’ve been stitched up.

But if CDS on developed-market debt are found to be worthless, then all those balance-sheet hedges—Buiter estimates some $74 billion gross outstanding on Greek debt alone—suddenly become worthless.

Which means banks will have yet new holes to fill in their capital.

That, though, isn’t the end of it.

If insurance written by market participants for market participants is invalidated by sovereigns, what is the value of insurance contracts being offered by the sovereigns themselves?

Here I’m referring to the European Financial Stability Facility, which is now being touted as a super insurer of European sovereign debt (albeit maybe only the first 20%). Once again, Buiter makes a critical point: not allowing existing CDS to trigger reduces the credibility of the EFSF protection.

I’d go even further. The whole euro exercise has raised serious credibility issues. Governments used all sorts of accounting fudges, off-balance-sheet accounting and derivatives to meet single-currency membership criteria that had already been stretched to breaking point. Greece consistently misled on the state of its finances.

France and Germany broke the Maastricht treaty obligation to keep their budget deficits below 3% of GDP even before the 2008 financial crisis.

The latest maneuverings just confirm that Eurocrats make used-car salesmen look like the apotheosis of probity, prudence and honesty.

家园 本来就是这样

欧美一直以来一直鼓吹“市场原则”。现在你先不尊重市场和规则,凭什么要市场尊重你。

想想中国某些媒体说起市场原则里比欧美还起劲,就觉得好笑。

家园 我很好奇这次希腊国债CDS赌局的另一边是谁?

今后国债CDS肯定卖不掉了,是华尔街?

家园 日本和俄罗斯出手了,购买欧元债券....
家园 那点数量,还不够塞牙缝的

EFSF的杠杆化操作,就是他只出2500亿(本来一共4400亿,已经用了一半),剩下的从市场上筹集7500亿到10000亿。

原先法国的想法是让欧洲央行担保,万一筹不到钱央行垫着。而且有央行在背后,大家也愿意凑份子。但德国不肯。

现在这个方案,上哪里找那么多钱呢?

家园 刚刚在网上看到奥地利新闻社报道

随胡主席访问奥地利的部长表示,中国重视和欧盟的战略伙伴关系,而且现在全世界是同船合命,中国将会大力支持欧洲度过危机....

家园 补充两个细节

一、德国说不允许欧洲央行给EFSF提供担保,不允许EFSF跟欧洲央行借钱,基本上EFSF就搞不到钱了。

且不论1万亿欧元是不是够用,8000亿欧元是什么概念?是1.1万亿美元,世界上外汇储备最多的国家前三名中国日本和沙特分别的规模是3.2万亿、1万亿和0.5万亿美元。现在主要的可兑换货币就是美元和欧元,欧央行不创造新的欧元,那就要吸纳1.1万亿美元到欧洲。就是说,假设中国真的给了他2000亿欧元,那需要中国卖掉将近3000亿美元的美国国债,再在外汇市场换成欧元,这将引发美国国债和外汇市场的巨大波动。那,美国能答应么?我一直的观点就是,美国自身的问题非常严重(这个可以参见我以前发的文章),从他自身的角度,未来必须在低利率环境下继续扩大负债,但又不能让美元崩了。。。这个判断如果成立,那么美国是绝对不可能坐视欧洲吸纳1.1万亿美元而不是自己印欧元去救欧猪的。

二、EFSF与法国评级问题

EFSF是一种担保,按照各国在欧洲央行的出资确定比例,总担保规模7800亿,但是为了AAA评级,担保范围限于AAA国家,实际规模就是4500亿了。实际上不光是AAA的问题,这个担保里面,意大利西班牙合计2320亿,2300+4500=6800,再加上其他三小猪,就是7300多亿了,这些国家本省就是事实上没有担保能力了,以要求AAA评级的名义踢出去,可能更有面子一点吧。

这AAA的4500亿的来源国现在共有6个国家,是欧元区核心区法德比荷卢奥芬中间扣掉比利时以外的其他六国,见下图。

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这6个国家在4500亿规模中的占比分别为德国47%法国35%荷兰10%奥地利5%芬兰3%卢森堡0.4%。

EFSF现在用掉了2000多亿了,假设法国的AAA没了,那你德国马上面临选择,要么印钱(其实就是继续透支德国的信用,算是背水一战,成王败寇吧),要么大家散伙。且不论,法国AAA没了之后对金融市场的其他冲击。

这个主动权完全在美国手里。很多人可能就是搞不明白,欧洲人自己的玩意,凭什么非要美国的评级公司来说话?这就是市场化自由化。多少国家在美国倡导的市场化自由化过程中,被又当裁判又当运动员的美国人玩死了,现在只是轮到欧洲了而已。

通宝推:伪叔叔,
家园 花!是不是不会买美债,只会到期不再续买
家园 主要还是考虑到就业

反倾销对外贸对应的就业影响比较大

家园 现在最关键的是投资壁垒。

只有不到5年就从凯雷收购徐工到中国窥视西门子。

西方在崩溃呀。

家园 一样的

比如某个月中国外汇占款新增500亿美元,假设都是美元的话,全球除掉中国外的所有国家手里是减少了500亿美元,然后假设中国把这500亿美元换成了欧元,就是吸了500亿美元走。

家园 估计最终要赖皮

希腊总理说了,救援方案政府要公投。就目前这架势,可能学冰岛,赖皮了事。

家园 最新消息,希腊总统宣布欧洲救援方案全民表决

好负责的政客啊

外链出处

Addressing lawmakers on Monday evening, Mr. Papandreou said the decision on whether to adopt the deal, which includes fresh financial assistance, debt relief and deeply unpopular austerity measures, properly belonged to the Greek people.

“Let us allow the people to have the last word, let them decide on the country’s fate,” he said.

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